Reshaping an Earthly Paradise: Land Enclosure and Bavarian State Centralization (1779-1835) by Tomlinson, Gregory DeVoe
Louisiana State University 
LSU Digital Commons 
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
7-1-2020 
Reshaping an Earthly Paradise: Land Enclosure and Bavarian 
State Centralization (1779-1835) 
Gregory DeVoe Tomlinson 
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations 
 Part of the European History Commons, and the Social History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tomlinson, Gregory DeVoe, "Reshaping an Earthly Paradise: Land Enclosure and Bavarian State 
Centralization (1779-1835)" (2020). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 5308. 
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/5308 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu. 
 
 
RESHAPING AN EARTHLY PARADISE: LAND ENCLOSURE AND 
BAVARIAN STATE CENTRALIZATION (1779-1835)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
in 
The Department of History 
 
 
 
 
by 
Gregory DeVoe Tomlinson 
B.A., San José State University, 2009 
M.A., San José State University, 2012 
August 2020 
  
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
The Central European History Society (CEHS) funded a visit to the Bayerisches 
Haupstaatsarchiv and Staatsarchiv München in the summer of 2016. Further support came from 
the LSU history department and the generous contributions of members of the LSU Osher 
Lifelong Learning Institute (OLLI) for a subsequent visit in the summer of 2018. The staffs of 
the Bayerisches Haupstaatsarchiv and Staatsarchiv München are extremely dedicated, 
professional, and were more than helpful with their assistance. I would especially like to thank 
Dr. Susanne Millet at the Hauptstaatsarchiv München for her explanation of archival policies and 
assistance with Kurrentschrift handwriting. 
There are many people that provided advice and extensive commentary during this 
project. I would like to thank Professor Suzanne Marchand for her guidance, mentoring, 
patience, and support. Thank you for giving me so many opportunities to expand my intellectual 
horizons and for giving me the confidence to complete this, and other projects. Professor 
Brendan Karch offered helpful comments as well as relatable counsel regarding the dissertation 
process. Robert Billinger, Rafe Blaufarb, James Brophy, Wolf Gruner, Rosamond Hooper-
Hammersley, and David Meola provided detailed feedback and encouragement at the 
Consortium on the Revolutionary Era (CRE) and German Studies Association (GSA) 
conferences. Professors Rita Krueger and Howard Louthan gave me the great opportunity to 
present early thesis ideas at the Center for Austrian Studies (CAS) workshop in Minneapolis in 
2017. 
Countless people provided support during the writing of this dissertation. Professor 
Katherine Aaslestad was a great person to discuss thesis ideas from the beginning of this project 
 
 
iii 
 
to the most critical research trip I took to Munich in the summer of 2018. Professors Libra Hilde 
and Mary Pickering at San José State University (SJSU) in San José, California offered helpful 
suggestions for navigating the Ph.D process. I would also like to thank Ken and Ashlee Kruse, 
Matt Bell, Robert Harney, Roland and Mary Dommert, Evelyn Hayes, Janice Irving-Wise, and 
fellow LSU Germanists Scott Berg, Erik Wagner, and Jason Wolfe. 
Writing this dissertation would not be possible without the love and support of my 
family. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents Chris and Irene Tomlinson, and my brother 
Andrew Tomlinson. This project could not be completed without you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………..ii. 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………....v 
INTRODUCTION. THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF BAVARIAN STATE 
BUILDING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND OWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION 
(1799-1835) ………………………………………………………………………………………1 
CHAPTER 1. REDRAWING THE MAP: THE ROLE OF LAND IN THE GROWTH OF 
ELECTORAL BAVARIA………………………………………………………………………34 
CHAPTER 2. A STRUGGLE FOR PROPERTY: STATE-GUIDED ALLODIFICATION (1799-
1809) ……………………………………………………………………………………………76 
CHAPTER 3. BAVARIA AND THE CONGRESS SYSTEM: POSTWAR ALLODIFICATION 
EFFORTS (1809-1817).……………………………………………………………………….127 
CHAPTER 4. LAND AND POWER: THE LANDTAG AND LAND REDEMPTION (1818-
1825) ……………………………………………………………………………………….....169 
EPILOGUE. THE ROAD TO LIBERAL LAND POLICIES (1825-1848) ……………….....206 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………..216 
VITA…………………………………………………………………………………………..226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abstract 
 The Electoral state of Bavaria was reformed through a comprehensive project of land-
based allodification (the creation of a distinction between privileged titles and property 
designations) through the process of “redemption” beginning in 1799. This process was 
previously impeded by the strength of landholding estates that included notables and the Catholic 
Church. In addition, Electoral Bavarian leaders lacked centralized control. Civil servants, known 
as cameralists, mediated political and economic interactions between these estates. The economy 
was based on subsistence and the productive capacity of Gutsherrschaft, a manorial system 
based on regional jurisdiction and rent collection by notables who largely did not own property 
that could be bought or sold. 
 A shift in this system took place first in terms of cameral education, and second in its 
application by controversial reformers such as Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, later ennobled 
as the Graf Montgelas, or simply, Montgelas. Cameral reformers in Bavarian, and German 
universities, proposed that the role of such civil servants be expanded to included arbitrating land 
sale as part of a centralized state. Additional educational reforms included the Enlightenment 
idea of physiocracy that cameral scholars interpreted as a school of thought that included land 
enclosure for productive crop yields. Montgelas was an early proponent of this school of thought 
but was exiled due to his membership in the Enlightenment inspired secret society, the 
Illuminati. 
 Montgelas found support in exile in the Duchy of Zweibrücken from its ruler, Maximilian 
IV Joseph. Also referred to as Max Joseph, this ruler allowed Montgelas to develop his ideas 
including the Ansbach Memorandum which called for a larger, centralized cameral authority in 
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the model proposed by reformers in cameral institutions. Similar reforms in Bavaria were seldom 
pursued and when attempted failed. 
 Max Joseph, a member of the minor Wittelsbach line, became Elector of Bavaria when 
Elector Karl Theodor died in 1799. The new Elector brought Montgelas with him to serve as his 
First Minister of state. Montgelas reformed the centralized bureaucracy and aligned Bavaria with 
France, leveraging the success of the Revolutionaries’ armies to quash internal and external 
threats to Max Joseph’s rule. This brought territorial expansion, recognition of Bavaria as a 
Kingdom, and the implementation of a unitary legal code in the form of the 1808 constitution. 
Legal supremacy allowed Montgelas to begin the process of allodification. Claiming the land for 
state use was beyond the power of the state ministries and Montgelas could not pursue this 
project by fiat. Instead the process, known as “redemption,” was voluntarily done by notables 
seeking cash payment for their land. The collapse of the Napoleonic system nearly destroyed 
Montgelas’ reform programs as debt, famine, and disorder ensued though Montgelas’ efforts 
were vital to the state and the allodification, through compromise and modification, remained. 
 Montgelas was removed from power in 1817 and a new constitution in 1818 was 
implemented and included the creation of a legislative body, the Landtag, to advise the King. 
The limits of the Bavarian state, financially and beholden to an acceptable constitution in the 
eyes of much stronger postwar reactionary powers, impeded its ability to address pension 
payouts and other forms of support to landholders. Redemption efforts stalled but the process of 
land reform was given much-needed structure and transparency. The system survived until the 
1830 when stronger German economic forces in the form of the Prussian led Zollverein 
(Customs Union) effectively placed Bavaria under the dominance of Berlin.  
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Introduction. The Interconnected Nature of Bavarian State Building and the 
Transformation of Land Ownership Classification (1779-1835) 
 
In 1808 the Bavarian noblewoman Ana Maria Meierl levied a grievance against the 
General Commissariat of the Isar Landkreis in the newly formed Kingdom of Bavaria.1 Bavarian 
Finance Ministry officials based in the capital Munich read Meierl’s complaint on the topic of 
the “breakup of neighboring fief properties” that her family possessed.2 Meierl ended her 
complaint by both asking for assistance from Munich’s Finance Ministry administrators and 
underscoring how the loss of fiefdoms affected so many of her fellow notables.3 Meierl’s petition 
to the regional government was answered. She retained the fief as private property. A Finance 
Ministry scribe recorded that the land would be respected, “…to each regarding the partition of 
the vacant fief property, taken over (for/by) her as owned item.”4 This complaint sheds light on 
several important economic, political, legal, and social developments in the Kingdom of Bavaria 
in the early nineteenth century. 
The Meierl case represents not only one example of the division and sale of former fief 
property in the Kingdom of Bavaria it is also demonstrative of the dynamic shift in European 
conceptions of land ownership and usage in the early nineteenth century. The very notion of 
what constituted land ownership and land usage changed in Europe beginning in the eighteenth 
century. Common land ownership, semi-feudal tenant farming, and their organization under the 
watchful eyes of noble jurisdiction were fixtures of eighteenth century European subsistence-
 
1 Petition of Ana Meierl to the General Commissariat of the Isar Kreisamt, August 10, 1808, in 
BHStA, MF 17316. German: “Die beste des Anna Maria Meierl zu jedem die zertremmerung des 
Lehen lehren Guts betretend übernahme ihr als einen dahin gehörigen Gegenstand.” 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. German: “…zu jedem die Zertremmerung des Lehen lehren Guts betreffend übernahme 
ihr als einen gehörigen Gegenstand.” 
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based agricultural production and social order. Land was not physical property but the shared 
basis of the hierarchical yet symbiotic stability of the European way of life. Reformers changed 
the legal definitions that governed this system, however, during the late eighteenth century for 
the purposes of social revolution and the belief that increased agricultural production would 
bring greater tariff and toll revenues for the state. In each case, productive agriculture required 
the breakup of the old feudal order. In turn, such a transformative alteration to the land system 
was a critical tool for state building. 
Stimulating profitable and productive agriculture required the elimination, or restriction, 
of the entrenched legal definitions that governed the privilege of landholding. Physiocrats, 
economists who in part advocated for the amelioration of agricultural land through the 
introduction of new soils and land enclosure, greatly influenced eighteenth century reformers. 
Intrepid, reform-minded civil servants were confronted, however, with established definitions of 
land and property. Land law was of paramount importance for European rulers and legal terms 
like Dominium directum and Dominium utile were commonplace. Dominium directum concerned 
the eminent domain of the estate including the ability to rent land.5 Dominium utile was the 
tenant farmers’ right to farm and pay rent on land.6 Ancien regime France, for example, had a 
system of property that was defined more by its ties to power and authority rather than as a 
descriptor for possession of commercial goods or land.7 Manorial estates were frequently 
referred to as seigneuries, a feudal organization of land tenure. Land tenure, in the French case, 
meant that rents were collected on plots. Outright land ownership as a form of property was thus 
 
5 John Markoff, The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French 
Revolution (University Park: Penn State Press, 2020), 55. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Rafe Blaufarb, “The Great Demarcation – The Decree of August 4, 1789,” Modern European  
History Colloquium Lecture at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, April 23, 2018. 
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rare. A rigid separation between owning land and the ability to exploit or sell land (alienation) 
was codified into French law from Roman and medieval legal precedents.8 The rarest of land 
classification was the Dominium plenum, also referred to as an allodial.9 Allodial land was by 
definition something that could be owned, divided, and sold in its entirety. It was the critical 
designation for land that reformers of the eighteenth century believed was vital to increasing crop 
yields and profits. 
The French Revolution served as the catalyst for physiocratic-inspired reform of land 
systems in France and beyond, including Bavaria. Allodified land as Dominium plenum was the 
key to higher crop yields. The French revolutionaries abolished the archaic property definitions 
of the ancien regime on the night of 4 August 1789.10 Allodial property replaced the old land 
system. French reforms inspired many beyond the Republic’s borders and the armies of France 
brought the land system, as well as other legal reforms, with them. The new land system was 
appealing for various reasons. The new land system was studied by civil servants across 
Continental Europe who were in the process of studying physiocratic literature from the mid-
eighteenth century. Bavarian civil servants were no exception. Proponents of allodified land 
promised higher crop yields. This meant more profit for farmers and merchants. It would also fill 
state coffers by increasing tariff and toll revenue. For emergent states like Electoral Bavaria this 
project could assist the ruler in his effort to secure state sovereign power. Reformers Franz Karl 
von Hompesch-Bollheim and his protégé Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin (the later Graf von 
Montgelas) sought to introduce such a project. Significant obstacles barred the implementation 
 
8 Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 27. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Rafe Blaufarb, The Great Demarcation: The French Revolution and the Invention of Modern 
Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 5. 
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of such a land system. An ill-defined process of land and economic management known as 
cameralism served as the sinews of the Elector’s decentralized control. Cameralism was common 
in the German states. The system relied on intermediaries (known as cameralists or cameral civil 
servants). Any reform of land would mean the augmentation of cameral institutions to a role of 
greater importance as institutions of centralized state authority. Hompesch and Montgelas 
believed that realizing such a plan began with a vast alteration to the legal and economic 
classification of Bavarian land. Academic reform, internal conflict of the estates of Bavarian 
society, and the exigencies of the Napoleonic Wars both complicated and assisted Montgelas’ 
reforms. The Bavarian state was committed to large-scale land allodification by the time Anna 
Maria Meierl levied her complaint against the breakup of her fief. 
The Meierl case is thus an excellent place to begin an examination of the prime 
importance of land ownership and use in the early-nineteenth century Kingdom of Bavaria. 
Meierl’s concerns were not only common but were quotidian for Bavarian bureaucrats from the 
moment of the Kingdom’s inception through the next three decades. Meierl’s consternation 
about the loss of a fiefdom as property therefore requires important background information 
regarding the nature of Bavarian land law. In addition, the term “property” itself is loaded: what 
constituted property in the early nineteenth century is not consistent with its present-day 
definition. Property consisted of “movables” and “immovables,” as it does today. The former 
referring to a tangible good ranging from crops to lumber. Immovable property refers to land, 
forests, or any defined piece of geographic space that could not be physically relocated. Land 
itself, was rarely categorized as an immovable property, however. Land was property that was 
subject to a blend of older legal traditions ranging from loosely interpreted Roman precedent, 
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Rhenish traditions, and the institutions of the Holy Roman Empire.11 Land could be rented out to 
peasants, divided in common fields, and, in rare cases, owned exclusively in all legal terms, by 
an individual. In Bavaria, land classification was no different. This would all change beginning 
in 1808.  
Bavaria’s key land reformer, the First Minister Graf Montgelas, allodified Bavarian land 
through his efforts to implement the first Bavarian constitution in 1808. The constitution 
eliminated lingering feudal privileges, including special tax rates and pensions, for Bavarian 
landed lords. Land was thus deemed an immovable property but the Bavarian state, acting as a 
property broker, still needed to buy the land where feudal estates once existed. This process, 
known as “redemption,” would occupy much of the attention of the Bavarian state during the 
allodification process. Montgelas’ goal was to allodify and redeem all land before supporting its 
mass transformation into highly productive enclosed plots. Montgelas’ plans faced significant 
pushback from internal opposition from Güter feudal estate lords, the need for consistent crop 
production to feed the Bavarian population, and the exorbitant demands of erstwhile ally 
Napoleon Bonaparte who required significant resources for his military campaigns. The 
allodification process supported the centralization of the Bavarian state under its King Max 
Joseph and, despite the various challenges posed by internal and external factors, was largely 
successful in surviving the Napoleonic era. 
Historiography 
The historiography of Bavarian, and by extension, German law, forms the first integral 
point of introduction to this dissertation topic. The legal status of property in Bavaria, according 
 
11 Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany, 
trans. Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 13. 
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to German legal Historian Franz Wieacker, was the product of a synthesis of French (Rhenish), 
German (Holy Roman Empire), and Roman legal traditions strengthened by a search for 
agricultural and jurisdictional solidity in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War.12 Wieacker’s work, 
A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany, forms an essential 
basis for understanding the legal traditions so rooted in Bavarian society. Bavarian reformers 
contended with a wide array of laws and local customs during their land allodification project. 
Providing a standardized model of land administration and state sovereignty was thus a 
challenging task.  
Explaining power relations in Bavaria is therefore also important. An analysis of the 
interaction of the Bavarian estates also helps readers understand the prevailing Gutsherrschaft 
and other land systems of the era. Historian and sociologist Werner Sombart, 1903 book The 
German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 
neunzehnten Jahrhundert) contended that this system (Gutsherrschaft) was popular due to its 
stable crop production and the connection of power and property through inherited titles.13 
Sombart explained that crop yields and the relationship between land and the power structures of 
the era were important institutions for economic and social stability and also a powerful bloc to 
be overcome by reformers. Further entries enhance Sombart’s analysis of subsistence-based 
agriculture and the power balance between estates in German polities. Subsequent studies in the 
field enhance our knowledge regarding expected crop yields and the day to day operation of 
subsistence-based German agriculture. Wilhelm Abel’s 1967 History of German Agricultural 
Economy from the Early Middle Ages to the 19th Century (Geschichte der deutschen 
 
12 Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany, 13. 
13 Jerome Blum, The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1978), 5. 
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Landwirtschaft vom frühen mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert) elucidated the instability of 
agricultural crises in Germany and why such a stable, yet inflexible system, was necessary.14 
Abel underscored the persistence of famine and crop failure in German agricultural history. 
Another facet of Abel’s research is the truncated nature of his research which emphasized the 
physiocratic break in the continuity of German agricultural history. Abel contended that one of 
the boldest aspects about agricultural reforms of this era, including those undertaken in Bavaria, 
was the disruption of the entrenched and tested systems of semi-feudal agriculture and estate 
lordship.15  
Peasants also stood by the system as a mark of consistency and mutual assistance. Thus, 
the conservative nature of Bavarian agriculture was in part the maintenance of a tested system 
and opposition to its disruption or destruction. Mutual aid was an important aspect of the 
subsistence economy and altering this system would affect many. Private land ownership on a 
large scale meant competition and a massive alteration of tested, traditional forms of agriculture. 
Lords had responsibilities to care for the common weal. German historian Renate Blickle 
identified the critical expectations of stability due to an economy of need over want during this 
era in her 1987 American Historical Association paper, "From Subsistence to Property: Traces of 
a Fundamental Change in Early Modern Bavaria."16 Blickle concluded that land was a shared 
responsibility of lord and peasant prior to its designation as private property. The shared roles of 
agricultural production and checks on the exploitation of labor were important points of trust in 
Bavarian society among the estates’ social hierarchy. Any reformer who sought to change the 
 
14 Wilhelm Abel, History of German Agricultural Economy from the Early Middle Ages to the 
19th Century (Stuttgart: Eugen Ulmer, 1967), 288. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Renate Blickle, "From Subsistence to Property: Traces of a Fundamental Change in Early 
Modern Bavaria." Central European History 25, no. 4 (1992): 377-85. 
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existing agricultural system would face considerable opposition not only from above but from 
below. Changing a way of life also posed legal challenges. 
In the specific case of Bavaria, one must examine the legal codes used by the state to 
assess the value of existing property in this society of need. Legal guidelines delineated property 
classifications and the financial and privileged benefits of estate ownership. The precedent for 
property distinctions was Elector Maximilian III of Bavaria’s Maximilian Bavarian Civil Code of 
1756. Another key text to consider is that of the Celle based agronomist Albrecht von Thär, who, 
like Elector Maximilian III, provided a historical basis for the existing agricultural order. Thär’s 
work, the Grundsätze der rationellen Landwirthschaft (1809–1812) (Principles of Rational 
Agriculture) examined the history of German agriculture and related laws while also calling for a 
break from restrictive manorial controls on agriculture and subsistence farming.17 Thär’s 
historical analysis and land-related theories were popular with Bavaria’s future reformer 
Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin (the Graf Montgelas) and thus merit our attention as historians. 
Agricultural reformers like Thär and Montgelas were fixated on ideas of land as a potent source 
for the amelioration of all mankind that were encapsulated in physiocracy.  
The Enlightenment school of physiocracy gained wide purchase in the German states and 
was widely applied for the purpose of land renewal and profitable trade. The transformation of 
land as a productive good drove Montgelas’ application of the theoretical concept of 
physiocracy, best detailed in principle and varied forms of interpretation by historian Liana Vardi 
in her monograph The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment.18 Vardi’s work is a key 
 
17 Theodor Freiherr von der Goltz, Geschichte der Deutschen Landwirtschaft (Stuttgart: Scientia 
Aalen, 1963), 7. 
18 Liana Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 115. 
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entry for anyone who wishes to understand the broad applications of aesthetic, scientific, and 
agricultural necessity for land reform that was so important to physiocrats. Physiocrats believed 
that land use was critical for improving society. Many European statesmen interpreted these 
physiocratic ideas as endorsements of farming enclosure. Vardi’s descriptions of physiocrats 
reveals them to be enterprising and knowledgeable but hesitant to compromise. One can deduce 
that these bold theories were popular with state reformers for their ability to generate greater 
state revenues. These theories, however, were much like other Enlightenment ideas in that they 
had a limited penetration beyond a narrow literate stratum of society.  
Any reformer would have to contend with the reality of considerable popular opposition 
to change and the challenges posed by the application of theories. In the Bavarian case, Eberhard 
Weis’s sweeping biography, Montgelas, detailed the key reformer’s narrow interpretation of 
physiocratic though among his other major ideas for reforming Bavaria reformer.19 Weis 
characterized Montgelas as intelligent, intrepid, and, at times, intransigent. Yet Montgelas is 
well-defended by Weis as a champion of much-needed state reform in the pattern of Enlightened 
absolutism. Montgelas was not quite the radical that many of his contemporaries believed him to 
be. As First Minister Montgelas brought coherence and direction to land policies and cemented 
the authority of Bavaria’s rulers during a challenging time of war when a clear, cautious path 
was impossible to pursue. The funds and personnel at Montgelas’ disposal were less than what 
many possessed in larger states such as Austria and Prussia. Weis noted that Montgelas was also 
not the only German statesman to seek agricultural and state reform to be met with many 
challenges along the way. 
 
19 Eberhard Weis, Montgelas, 1759 – 1838, Eine Biographie (München: C.H. Beck), 2008, 8. 
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Montgelas was thus not alone in seeking the dramatic transformation and sale of land as 
private property in late eighteenth century Germany. For other attempts at applied physiocratic 
reform one must turn to David Warren Sabean’s influential 1990 study, Property, Production, 
and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, which detailed the complexity of village life in 
Bavaria’s neighboring state of the Duchy of Württemberg. Sabean’s work is a masterful and 
detailed examination of village life and the nature of property inheritance and laws, both codified 
and understood on a verbal, common level.20 Village traditions were cemented in law and oral 
agreement. They were a marker of consistency in village life and were a key component of 
interpersonal relations as well. Land was the basis of crop production but was also a family 
affair. The introduction of physiocratic reforms, as Württemberg’s civil servants also attempted 
in the late eighteenth century, posed a serious challenge to traditions and family life. This created 
problems for Württemberg’s reformers as well. Traditions in larger states like Prussia were 
equally difficult to disrupt. 
William W. Hagen’s Ordinary Prussians: Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500-
1840 considered land reform attempts in the Kingdom of Prussia in a sweeping chronicle of 
Prussian agriculture and village life.21 Even the mighty King of Prussia had to make 
compromises with estate notables called Junkers. Hagen recorded the preeminence of rank, 
privilege, and staunch conservative resistance to private land sale. Incentives for military rank 
and land allotments were given to the Prussian Junker notables in exchange for maintaining law 
and order and providing their sons as military officers. The scope of Hagen’s study also 
 
20 David Warren Sabean, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
21 Paul Warde, The Agricultural History Review 51, no. 2 (2003): 242-43. 
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demonstrates how persistent patterns of Prussian agriculture and power relations were difficult to 
alter. A common trend throughout the German states, including Bavaria, was stalled, complex 
efforts to compromise with notables and to alter existing agricultural systems.  
Ferdinand Kramer’s essays “Bayern” (Bavaria) and “Bavaria: Reform and 
Staatsintegration” highlight the trusted systems of Bavarian society in the form of the Stände, or 
the estates of Bavarian society. Kramer’s work provides a reader with a detailed overview of the 
semi-feudal constraints of the estate-based, privileged nature of land ownership, jurisdiction, and 
tax making policy in eighteenth century Bavaria known as Ständeschaft.22 Bavarian estates were 
powerful and well-supported by notables and peasants. Reformers faced a momentous task when 
they tried to alter the system, consolidate power in the hands of the Elector, and then obtain 
European respect for Bavarian sovereignty. Reform projects would necessitate a fundamental 
shift in the role of German, and by extension Bavarian, civil bureaucracy to implement any 
changes. 
 The world of civil servants who interpreted property and law transactions, as well as the 
great reforms begun by Montgelas, was dominated by the economic and social policing theories 
of cameralism. German sociologist Max Weber’s pioneering research on cameralism in the early 
twentieth century is instrumental for analyzing the power relations of civil servants in the 
modern age.23 Weber’s rational legal model of the development of civil bureaucracy 
demonstrates that such a pivotal, powerful role of bureaucracy did not exist in eighteenth and 
 
22 Ferdinand Kramer, "Bayern." Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte 37 (2003): 5-24. And Ferdinand 
Kramer, “Bavaria: Reform and Staatsintegration,” German History 20 (June 2002): 370. 
23 Max Weber, Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society, Ed. and Trans. by Tony Waters and 
Dagmar Waters (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 50. 
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early nineteenth century Bavaria. Cameralism, in its place, maintained the connections, at times 
tenuous, between powerful interests. The existing systems in German localities were a rebuke to 
strong bureaucratic control and the power of centralized states. Shifts in cameral thought began 
in educational institutions where concerns for land and its varied usage abounded. David 
Lindenfeld’s The Practical Imagination: German Science of State in the 19th Century is an 
expansive, coherent guide to shifts in cameral theory in German universities by the late 
eighteenth century that emphasized the critical role of physiocracy and the need for state 
centralization to buttress the authority of German rulers.24 Cameral academies produced the first 
of many reformers in Bavaria that would eventually include Montgelas. Lindenfeld’s scholarship 
thus allows historians to view the limits of cameral reform under bureaucrats like Montgelas and 
to understand how difficult implementing reform really was. Montgelas came to view property as 
integral to the financial success of the Bavarian state and the role of the cameral civil servants as 
paramount.  
Such a definite shift in responsibilities thus constituted a controversial shift towards the 
centralized primacy of the state and its ruler from what historian Andre Wakefield would later 
describe in his book The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice 
as a disconnected, inconsistent process of mediation and negotiation on the part of the 
cameralists.25 Cameralism was designed to operate as an intermediary system between the estates 
in Bavaria. The faculties of cameralism maintained a way of life and estate relations and were 
therefore not a place for reformers. Bavaria’s cameral officials, like other smaller German states, 
 
24 David Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: German Science of State in the 19th Century 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 35. 
25 Andre Wakefield, The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 2-3. 
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occupied a limited role in a small state surrounded by larger powers with better equipped 
officials. 
 Thus, analyses of diplomatic statecraft and the transformative role of estate mediation 
performed by such officials are crucial for any examination of state building in the late 
eighteenth century. Montgelas’ preeminent biographer Eberhard Weis described the cameral 
official as intelligent, secretive, and paranoid in the author’s complex examination of the 
official’s life, Montgelas, 1759-1838, Eine Biographie.26 Montgelas believed that a centralized 
state bureaucracy needed to take a commanding role in driving land reform. Montgelas’ plan 
called for the expansion of the size of the Bavarian civil service and the scope of its 
responsibilities. Montgelas articulated these thoughts in the Ansbach Memorandum of 1796.27 
The path to state supremacy amidst the turmoil of estate power and foreign meddling was thus 
complex and tumultuous. Historian Karl Otmar von Aretin’s Bayern’s Weg zum souveränen 
Staat, Landstände und konstitutionelle Monarchie, 1714-1818 (Bavaria’s Path to Sovereign 
Statehood, Territorial Estates and Constitutional Monarchy, 1714-1818 ) chronicled the 
impediments that Montgelas, and other reformers faced, when they forged a unified state from 
the Bavarian Electorate’s porous borders and disjointed collection of estates.28 The predatory 
larger states of the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia coveted Bavarian lands. 
Compromises were frequent and sweeping reform was abandoned for incremental gains. Seeing 
Montgelas, or other reformers, as failures, however, is misleading. Similar forces challenged the 
 
26 Eberhard Weis, Montgelas 1759 – 1838, Eine Biographie, 8. 
27 Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, “Maximilian von Montgelas, "Ansbach Memorandum." 
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smaller state of the Archbishopric of Mainz in the Rhineland. Tim Blanning’s Reform and 
Revolution in Mainz, 1743-1803 traced the origins and conduct of similar reactions to reform 
from traditionally bound domestic interests similar to the obstacles that plagued Bavarian 
reformers.29 Mainz’s emulation of the French Revolution met with a bloody riposte at the hands 
of the Prussians but Bavarian Elector Max Joseph and his First Minister Montgelas made the 
daring, and costly decision to side with the French to leverage the surging tide of the 
revolutionary wave to fund and legitimize land reform. 
 Understanding foreign influence on Bavarian state building, especially from France, is 
thus of paramount importance. Montgelas and Max Joseph tied Bavarian fortunes to the rising 
tide of Napoleonic victories, hoping to overcome the impediment of a small state budget and 
larger rival military powers with French assistance. The result was a complex and costly fifteen-
year period of constitutional legal changes to Bavaria and disastrous participation in France’s 
war, less as a partner state and more as a vassal. Historians such as Eberhard Weis, whose 
Bayern und Frankreich is a brief overview of the two state’s close relations during the years of 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts, highlight the complexity of navigating interstate 
relations for smaller powers like Bavaria.30 Bavaria was besieged by foreign powers’ and their 
predatory designs on land. An alliance with France offered the opportunity to secure Bavarian 
sovereignty in central Europe by allying with the rising tide of the French Revolution and its 
application of Enlightenment ideas. Weis’ scholarship is helpful for contextualizing Montgelas 
and Max Joseph’s embrace of the Enlightenment and the nature of a centralized bureaucratic 
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state with the exigencies of border security and even aggrandizement.31 Montgelas was also 
obsessed with developments in land law and legal distinctions in Revolutionary France. French 
revolutionaries destroyed the connection between privilege and property, a topic explored in 
Rafe Blaufarb’s The Great Demarcation: The French Revolution and the Invention of Modern 
Property.32 Blaufarb articulated the distinction of land designations, the creation of private 
property in France, and the sweeping influence such a program had in Enlightenment era Europe. 
The legal revolution of this “great demarcation” popularized ideas of mass allodification and the 
destruction of the notable challenge to the state.  The reforms and the success of the French 
Revolutionaries’ armies drove Montgelas and Max Joseph towards an alliance with Paris.  
When Bavaria’s leaders made this alliance, they planned to use French influence to drive 
a similar program of allodification. The French presence made the Bavarian state stronger, in the 
inchoate years of its status as a Kingdom from 1806-1808, and Napoleon’s victories greatly 
assisted the drive to claim noble lands from cash poor elites. Such a program was strictly 
voluntary and was known as “redemption.” Redemption is discussed by German historian 
Friedrich Lenger in the Economy and Society” subsection of Jonathan Sperber’s Germany, 1800-
1870.”33 Lenger identified that the problem with the redemption process was that reformers like 
Montgelas did not have strong enough bureaucracies to convince elite landholders to sell more 
estate land for cash payouts. Civil servants could not be everywhere, and landed notables were 
not willing to give up their titles and land without a fight. Compromise was not a defeat for 
Montgelas but a stark reality of the complex nature of land transformation. The idea of 
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allodification was possible in theory but reclaiming and transforming land required significant 
pressure and the maintenance of law and order. Support for notables was crucial to stabilizing the 
internal cohesion of Bavaria and bringing coherence to Montgelas’ land program as well. 
Bavarian civil servants lacked the trust of the local populace when they carried out 
Montgelas’ reforms. Such was the case throughout Germany as well. Inconsistent behavior and 
broad interpretation of reforms produced conflict. The boundaries of state control appear to be a 
common theme of the era as Hans Rosenberg observed in the much larger Kingdom of Prussia in 
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy, the Prussian Experience 1600-1815.34 Rosenberg’s 
analysis demonstrates that civil servants were inconsistently trained, not always ethical or lawful, 
and lacked sufficient support for their appointed tasks. The limits of the Bavarian state’s power 
were no different. A theoretical understanding of such obstacles can be found in historian W.R. 
Lee’s rejection of Reinhart Koselleck’s modernization theory. Koselleck advanced that German 
states in the key Sattelzeit era (1750-1850) underwent massive economic, political, and 
infrastructural developments that brought the standardization of governmental trends and the 
domineering, ever-present control of armies of civil servants.35 Lee, and Richard Evans, in an  
essay entitled “The German Family,” demonstrated that the impact of “flattening” the same 
trends of modernization that Koselleck so passionately advanced, were frequently overstated by 
specialists keen to advance a progress arc for the duration of the Sattelzeit era.36 Montgelas’ great 
theories were tested by events that destroyed these flattening trends. Inconsistencies and the 
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chaotic nature of the early-nineteenth century wars, famines, and periods of mass civil unrest 
destroyed even the best laid plans of state building. 
 The collapse of Montgelas’ system, and that of the Napoleonic supported system, 
demolished notions of rapid economic and social progress in land reform by 1815. Bavaria’s 
outsized exploitation of Napoleonic success is featured in the comprehensive Napoleon’s Wars, 
An International History, 1803-1815 by Charles Esdaile.37 In part, Esdaile explained how 
Napoleon demanded draught animals and food from Bavaria as well as a 30,000-soldier levy for 
his campaign against Russia, making the cost of these wars questionable for the small south 
German state.38 Napoleonic success was crucial to Bavarian survival. The suppression of local 
notables and the imposition of Bavarian law rested on the support of the French military 
presence. If Montgelas was the prime Bavarian reformer, it was Napoleon perhaps more than 
Max Joseph, who was his principal supporter and benefactor. The collapse of the Grande Armée 
in 1812 forced Max Joseph, at the behest of his son, the Crown Prince Ludwig, to terminate the 
alliance with Napoleon to salvage Bavarian sovereignty in 1813.39 The fallout from French 
defeat weighed heavily on Bavaria’s leaders. Land was overused and famine set in. Thomas 
Schuler’s, “Wir sind auf einem Vulkan,” Napoleon und Bayern best explored the collapse of the 
Franco-Bavarian alliance. Schuler examined the actions of the Crown Prince (and future King) 
Ludwig to the Russia campaign and his animosity toward the French. These events informed his 
role as a key figure of Bavaria’s postwar diplomatic mission to the Congress of Vienna in 
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1815.40 Ludwig’s immediate role is given more depth in the comprehensive biography of his life 
by German historian Heinz Gollwitzer in his Ludwig I of Bavaria. Gollwitzer presented a man 
who contrasted sharply with his father. Max Joseph was austere and well-read. Ludwig was a 
dandy known for his ostentatious tastes and for being a dilettante. Ludwig fancied himself a king 
with limitless power but was ultimately forced to compromise with notables, sharing power to 
salvage the Kingdom his father created. 
Ludwig played a crucial role in the dismissal of Montgelas in 1817 and the drafting of a 
second constitution in 1818. The constitution allowed private landholders to be approved by the 
King for service in a legislative body known as the Landtag. Ludwig’s role in the Bavarian state 
became greater by 1818 as his father’s health failed. The drafting of the second Bavarian 
constitution provided a much-needed systemic overhaul to the operation of state ministries. The 
Landtag was also crucial in guiding state reforms by reviewing and commenting on the King’s 
proposed legislation. Bavaria’s new stratified legal and political system was itself riven with 
rivalries but also constrained by the King’s ability to dismiss sessions of the Landtag. The 
complex innerworkings of the Landtag and its politics are deftly explained by Dirk Götschmann 
in Bayerischer parlamentarismus im Vormärz. Die Ständeversammlung des Königreichs Bayern 
1819–1848 (Bavarian Parliamentarianism in the Vormärz Era, The Meeting of the Estates in the 
Kingdom of Bavaria 1819-1848). Here Götschmann guides readers through the process by which 
key advisors, handpicked by King Ludwig, deliberated over his proposed reforms.41 The number 
of state ministries increased and the growth of the Landtag as a legislative body posed new 
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challenges for the King. In time, Landtag members complained of their limited role in the 
machinery of state. In its early years, however, Landtag members buttressed the state Montgelas 
created and improved it. The members of the Landtag also proved to be staunch defenders of the 
King and the need for compromise within the Kingdom. 
The historiography of Bavaria that covers the ten years after King Max Joseph’s death 
(1825-1835) presents a rich history of economic expansion and the persistent need to negotiate 
trade and diplomatic entanglements within central Europe and beyond. As King, Ludwig was 
more concerned with expanding his role as a sovereign rather than serving as a constitutional 
monarch. Agricultural land was in a constant state of degradation in large part due to new 
protectionist tariffs levied by rival grain markets in much larger states. The Landtag scrutinized 
rent, tax, and pension payments from estates while rendering assistance when and where it could 
for estate holders. These events in Bavaria are given greater context within the world of Vormärz 
German states by Theodore Hamerow’s study Restoration, Revolution, and Reaction, Economics 
and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871.42 Hamerow’s analysis in part traces the development of the 
Bavarian state to the mid-nineteenth century but focuses a great deal on the 1830s when King 
Ludwig proposed a trade bloc with the bordering states of Baden and Württemberg. This South 
German Customs Union, Hamerow explained, was intended to benefit Bavaria but was eclipsed 
by the stronger Prussian-dominated Zollverein (Customs Union) to the north. W.O. Henderson’s 
book, The Zollverein, featured a strong argument that the greater regional dominance of the 
expanding Prussian Zollverein bloc crippled the Bavarian system and subordinated the smaller 
south German state to a broader integration into Berlin’s orbit. as explains so well.43 Bavaria’s 
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leaders thus faced consistent opposition and competition from abroad throughout the 1820s and 
1830s. This was like the Kingdom’s ordeal during the Napoleonic Wars. Compromise in the 
Zollverein negotiations, like the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, were therefore, a consistent 
trend that complicated Bavarian efforts at land and state reform through the 1830s. 
Argument and Sources 
The Kingdom of Bavaria had a diverse array of legal land classification that reformers 
sought to change in 1808. Land in Bavaria was property, but property was usually associated 
with title, privilege, and jurisdictional rule. Land was not, however, immovable property which 
could be bought, sold, or transferred from one owner to another.44 In the Kingdom of Bavaria 
land was mostly part of a semi-feudal arrangement. This Gutsherrschaft system of feudal rents 
was how most Bavarians saw land. Several plots, and a divided common land, were rented on 
each manorial estate (Güter) and used, by law, for the mutual benefit of lord and peasant. The 
Maxmilian Code, the guiding legal charter and property guide in the Electorate of Bavaria in 
1756 stated, “while the law has different meanings, here it signifies a vessel, that is a sovereign 
command which in matters relating to the common best (interest) is stipulated for the subject.”45 
In rare cases, the Grundherrschaft system, more common in the militaristic Kingdom of Prussia 
to the north, entailed protection in exchange for loyalty.46 The rarest land property classification 
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was the Allodial-Gut, an Allod or a defined, enclosed piece of land legally defined as a piece of 
property that could be bought and sold. In 1808, the Allodial-Gut would become incredibly 
important. That year the Kingdom of Bavaria would implement a new constitution that 
eliminated feudal privileges including jurisdictional claims. The Bavarian state thus turned all 
land into allodial property. This shift in the property definitions of land in Bavaria was crucial to 
state centralization and was a key reflection of broader alterations in the Kingdom’s economy 
and social order. The archival sources used in this dissertation, including land allodification and 
redemption negotiations, price indices, and pension support for landed notables reveals the 
complexity of land reform when confronted with real problems when applied in practice rather 
than existing as mere theory. Anna Meierl’s complaint is a great way to examine the intricate 
effects of the allodification process in the Kingdom of Bavaria. 
Late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Bavarian civil servants, beginning with 
Montgelas, allodified all the territory’s land as part of a program to boost agricultural production. 
A succession of Bavarian state bureaucrats sought to centralize power under the Elector, later 
King of Bavaria, to control the ownership of land. Bavarian authority over agricultural land also 
necessitated the expansion of a centralized state bureaucracy to manage these resources. The 
nature of the Bavarian civil service, and that of the Elector’s rule, however, did not allow for 
total ownership and authority over land. Instead, the Bavarian civil service, much like the 
administration of other smaller German states, was driven by the mercantile and legal philosophy 
of cameralism. Cameralism was a broadly defined German system of commercial and social 
management to mediate the interaction between different estates (or orders) of Bavarian society 
including the Catholic Church, noble elites, and Bavaria’s sovereign. Thus, cameral officials 
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were not civil servants with broad powers who answered only to the ruler.47 The idea of mass 
land allodification was the product of reforms first in cameral institutions and the examples 
presented by other European forays into claiming land, compensating nobles, and selling plots to 
amenable, physiocratic minded owners. This effort was part of a crucial, successful effort to 
centralize Bavarian power, economic activity, and social cohesion under the rule of the King. 
Allodification was but the key to the elevation of the Bavarian King, his civil servants, and the 
political and economic independence of the new Kingdom. 
The introduction of new ideas and shifting scholarship prompted cameral officials and 
German leaders to assess what the scope of a cameral official’s responsibilities should be. 
Physiocracy was but one important Enlightenment school of thought that spread to Bavaria by 
the mid-eighteenth century. Physiocrats, the philosophes who promoted physiocracy, were 
prominent in both France and Great Britain in the mid-eighteenth century. These thinkers were 
motivated by the idea that the productive use of land was key to the revitalization of state 
economies.48 By the 1760s, professors at Bavarian cameral institutions, namely the University of 
Göttingen, began to include physiocratic ideas in their curricula.49 Professors like Johann 
Stephen Pütter, called for the role of the cameralists to be fundamentally altered.50 Pütter 
proposed that cameralists take a more forceful role in state administration of economic activity 
and the legal interpretation of land ownership. This new direction in cameral science was 
therefore controversial. Land reform entailed allodification. Allodification inferred that the 
Bavarian leader would possess greater authority over his subjects’ land and titles. This shift 
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potentially deprived landed elites of their sources of income in the form of rent collection and 
pensions based on the possession of a manorial estate. 
New content in cameral instruction was appealing to students who believed the 
cameralists needed to be the central agent for the introduction of physiocratic reform in Bavaria. 
Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin (the later ennobled Graf Montgelas) was a promising cameral 
official in Bavaria who supported Pütter’s cameral approach.51 Worth noting is that many of 
Montgelas’ peers agreed with Pütter. Montgelas agreed with Pütter that the state, as a 
representative body of the Elector, should rule over Bavarian estates.52 The young cameral 
official also railed against the Catholic Church as a moribund, dysfunctional institution that had 
too much influence over the Elector. Unsurprisingly, the Catholic Church in Bavaria took issue 
with Montgelas, and using his staunch anti-clericalist beliefs and membership in the Illuminati 
against him, pressured the Elector Karl Theodor to dismiss and exile the young civil servant. 
Karl Theodor himself failed at a land reform project, further crystallizing Montgelas’ belief in 
the necessity for a more powerful civil bureaucracy.  
Elector Karl Theodor proposed a series of land-related exchanges and taxation shifts in 
the 1770s with little success, demonstrating that major impediments stood in the way of 
reformers from both within the Bavarian state and from beyond its borders. The Elector Karl 
Theodor proposed exchanging land to protect Bavarian territorial integrity in the 1780s to no 
avail.53 Bavarian notables blocked his bid at reform and foreign powers (Austria and Prussia) 
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wished for more Bavarian land. Karl Theodor’s reign (1778-1799) taught reformers like 
Montgelas two crucial lessons: any land policy would meet with significant resistance from the 
powerful interests of Bavarian estates and that governing, not just reform, would always be 
influenced by the more powerful states looming on the Electorate’s border. 
Montgelas found support for physiocratic influenced reform of cameral land policy in the 
court of the Duke Maximilian Joseph (Max Joseph) of Zweibrücken. Max Joseph was, like 
Montgelas, a student of the Enlightenment. A member of the minor line of the Wittelsbach 
dynasty, the ruling family of Electoral Bavaria, Max Joseph coveted the throne and sought to 
become an Enlightened ruler.54 Max Joseph made Montgelas an advisor and supported the 
reforms he suggested for the small ducal territory. Montgelas’ first major reform program was 
the Ansbach Memorandum of 1796.55 The Ansbach Memorandum contained Montgelas’ major 
ideas for the reform of Electoral Bavaria. Montgelas declared that the responsibilities and role of 
cameral ministers were archaic and needed to be changed. The solution was the training of a new 
type of civil servant with broader legal responsibilities and a key, cameral focus on Ökonomie, 
land-related management.56 Reforming the Bavarian state, Montgelas would learn, was more 
difficult than simply addressing the shortcomings of its cameral civil servants. 
It was the latter threat that surrounded Max Joseph’s accession to power in 1799 and that 
complicated Montgelas’ dramatic implementation of the reforms entailed in the Ansbach 
Memorandum. Max Joseph became Elector upon the death of Karl Theodor in 1799. The 
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Elector, with Montgelas as his key advisor at his side, looked to legitimize the central role of the 
state above the powers of the estates. Max Joseph, like Montgelas, looked to Revolutionary 
France as a positive example for state reform, including the revolutionaries’ approach to land 
classification. The French Revolutionaries allodified land by abolishing feudal titles and 
privileges, and with them, the connection between property title and the land itself.57 Such a 
distinction was critical for Max Joseph and Montgelas. If the two could emulate such a process 
within the Electoral state of Bavaria they could accomplish two key goals of state building. The 
first was breaking the power of the notable held estates. The second was transforming land into 
property owned by those landholders who shared a physiocratic approach of productive land use. 
This transformation was more easily proposed than implemented. The project also hinged on the 
Elector and his advisor leveraging the fortunes of war by making a key alliance with France to 
both protect Bavarian sovereignty and to crush the established Bavarian estates. 
Thus, Montgelas’ proposed reforms of a centralized state led land allodification program 
hinged upon an alliance with France. This brought early benefits due to Napoleonic success and 
disaster as the French Empire disintegrated. Max Joseph gravitated towards the revolutionaries in 
1801 when French forces defeated an Austrian army on Bavarian soil.58 The two powers signed a 
peace treaty at Lunéville shortly thereafter. Large segments of land were redistributed to many 
German states because of French victories in 1803. Bavaria was given more land from several 
archbishoprics as part of the Final Recess of the Holy Roman Empire 
(Reichsdeputationshauptschluss) that year.59 The reduction in power of the Catholic Church in 
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these lands paved the way for the secularization of Church land in Bavaria. Montgelas achieved 
two major goals of his program by eliminating the political power of the estate of the Church and 
by allodifying its land, separating the manorial jurisdiction from the Church’s authority to that of 
the Bavarian state. Subsequent French victories over Austria brought greater security to 
Bavaria’s borders and Napoleonic recognition of Bavaria’s status as a Kingdom rather than an 
Electorate in 1806. 
The Establishment of the Kingdom of Bavaria was a high point for Bavaria’s leaders as 
the power of the monarchy finally superseded the authority of the competing estates. The 
limitations of bureaucracies of this era were also on display. Montgelas worked quickly, 
establishing a centralized bureaucracy containing finance, interior, and justice ministries. Max 
Joseph approved the first Bavarian constitution in 1808 abolishing all feudal privileges, titles, 
and special tax rates.60 This allowed Montgelas to pursue his long sought-after goal: the 
allodification of all manorial land. The process of allodification was followed in Bavaria by 
“redemption.”61 Redemption of land, plots voluntarily sold to the state for resale, revealed a key 
shortcoming of the more powerful state ministries, though. Cameral civil servants could not be 
everywhere and could not personally enforce every law. Systemic control by an ever-present 
bureaucracy was a century away at least.62 Redemption was thus done on a voluntary basis. 
Estate lords were cash poor due to war in Europe. Montgelas believed that this desperation 
would make the lords sellers. Instead, they demanded the legal fulfillment of past due pensions. 
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In addition, the health and vitality of their lands was critical to the Bavarian food supply and 
trade. Elsewhere protestations to the new system were stronger. Land ownership traditions of 
Tyroleans were challenged by the Bavarian state.63 A revolt followed in 1809, and French 
assistance was needed to suppress it. Montgelas’ program of allodification was failing to pay 
dividends but not exclusively his fault. Bureaucracies of the time were limited in their scope of 
power. Bavaria was also a smaller state making the power of its centralized authority difficult for 
its comparatively smaller and poorer bureaucracy. The alliance with France, so integral to the 
foundation of the Kingdom of Bavaria and the land reform project, would unfortunately bring 
famine, debt, and disorder beginning in 1812. 
 The allodification and redemption project stalled and collapsed amidst the implosion of 
the Napoleonic system and alliance from 1812-1815. Napoleon demanded more from Bavaria 
every year as the French viewed Bavaria more as a tributary vassal state than an equal partner. 
Napoleonic trade controls in the form of the Continental System, the internal blockade intended 
to cut Britain off from trade, had dire consequences for Bavaria.64 Crops, draught animals, and 
conscription of Bavarian subjects for military service left farmland in disrepair and agricultural 
yields plummeted. The failure of Napoleon’s Russian campaign destroyed Bavarian sustenance 
and ability to maintain its sovereignty independent of the coalition. The greatly weakened 
Bavarian state was now challenged by its more powerful regional enemies, Austria and Prussia. 
Facing this pressure, Max Joseph left the Napoleonic alliance at the behest of his son, the Crown 
Prince Ludwig, in 1813 and defected to the side of the Sixth Coalition, the allied powers 
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determined to defeat Napoleon.65 The cost of the war was immense and state debt and famine 
conditions ravaged Bavaria. Though allied to the victorious coalition, the most prominent of the 
major powers’ leaders, Austrian Prince Klemens von Metternich, viewed Max Joseph as 
untrustworthy. Bavaria was also perceived as a state that benefitted from its close alliance with 
Napoleon until his demise. The survival of state sovereignty was in jeopardy when Europe’s 
powers met in Vienna in 1815. 
 Montgelas’ system, however damaged by conflict, survived the postwar era due to 
skillful negotiations with Austria and Metternich’s support of constitutions in the German states. 
The Bavarian state was stripped of territory at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and Austria took 
land on its periphery the following year in the Treaty of Munich.66 Bavaria was stricken by 
famine, mounting state debt, and the deterioration of land quality. Famine in 1816-1817 
produced dire consequences for many Bavarians. State debt incurred from the conflict damaged 
the centralized state bureaucracy but did not destroy it. Some, like the Crown Prince Ludwig, 
blamed Montgelas for Bavaria’s misfortune. Ludwig led a successful effort to remove Montgelas 
from power in 1817. It was now time to find a structured solution to the damage incurred during 
the conflict. 
The Crown Prince Ludwig represented his ailing father King Max Joseph during the 
drafting of a second constitution in 1818 intended to provide greater transparency and 
bureaucratic cooperation within the Bavarian state. Ludwig blamed Montgelas for Bavaria’s 
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catastrophic participation in the Napoleonic Wars. The former First Minister’s efforts, however, 
established a centralized state with Max Joseph as its ruler. Montgelas’ land system, and the state 
ministries that controlled it, needed to be reformed not eliminated. Graf Georg Friedrich von 
Zentner, a trusted legal theorist and civil servant under Montgelas provided a solution to the 
perceived flaws of the state ministries and their land system. Zentner drafted the second Bavarian 
constitution in 1818. This constitution created a bicameral legislature, the Landtag, that included 
some notables close to the King, as well as some non-nobles interested in land, into the 
government. The Landtag’s upper chamber gave many notables more representation than before 
and the lower chamber included some non-noble property holders. In sum, the system 
represented something of a capitulation to mediatized nobles (those who had been relieved of 
their privileges). The Landtag was to be a representative advisory panel for the King and not a 
substitute to his rule. A strong “monarchical principle” gave the King the right to propose 
legislative ideas and for the Landtag to review it.67 The Landtag was immediately inundated with 
complaints (Beschwerde) about deteriorating land conditions and assistance paying noble 
pensions and salaries. These complaints were inescapable as the years passed and a series of 
agricultural crises impacted Bavaria into the 1820s. The death of Max Joseph in 1825 brought 
Ludwig to the throne and forced him to further compromise with notables to preserve Bavaria’s 
economic integrity. 
Ludwig attempted to stabilize the Bavarian state during 1825-1835 by offering 
concessions with landholding notables and attempting to create a trade bloc to protect the 
Kingdom’s export economy. Ludwig was forced to compromise with landed nobles. Ludwig 
helped notables, in a limited sense, keep their agricultural lands, now owned as property and 
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rented by tenants, stable. In the late 1820s Ludwig also attempted to create the South German 
Customs Union for the purpose of protecting regional trade.68 Ludwig also believed that such a 
trade bloc would privilege the Bavarian economy while opening its merchants and landholders to 
new markets. The plan backfired. Prussian leaders created a much stronger Zollverein (Customs 
Union). Ludwig joined the Zollverein in 1830 surrendering to the stronger market forces and 
political power of the Kingdom of Prussia. Bavarian leaders, once again, were stymied by the 
larger forces on the periphery of their lands and by the domestic need for stability and 
agricultural production. 
This dissertation, therefore, advances that the element of compromise complicated but 
did not deter Bavarian efforts at state-guided allodification during the late eighteenth century and 
early nineteenth century. Montgelas’ reforms must be viewed within the context of their era. 
Challenges from notables and peasants alike complicated the process of reform due to the serious 
disruption to consistent, well-tested forms of agricultural production and mutual aid in a 
subsistence-based economy. Reformers of this era lacked authority to enforce sweeping changes 
to the character of everyday life. Civil servants, though given broad mandate by new state 
bureaucracies, were ill-equipped to change the nature of agricultural usage or to destroy the 
much needed, stabilizing influence of rural lords. The reforms of Graf Montgelas in this era did 
not fail they instead provided the crucial foundation for the reformation of the Bavarian economy 
and the secure power of the Wittelsbach Dynasty. They were imperfect in an era of chaotic 
interstate relations, savage war, and unbearable famine. The ultimate success of land 
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allodification was in the state’s retention of the program through these crises. Reforms followed 
upon reforms and Bavarian land production, state power, and the quality of life were improved in 
the long term. 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter one of this thesis explores the estate-based structure of Bavarian agriculture and 
social organization. Titled and untitled nobility owned land and peasants paid rents for their 
plots. The estates were also a significant political bloc in Bavaria, as was the Catholic Church. 
This chapter also includes a description of the vital cameral reforms of the eighteenth century. 
New curricula borrowed physiocratic elements for a new reinterpretation of private property law 
and influenced future reformers such as Montgelas. 
 The topic of chapter two contextualizes the formation of the Kingdom of Bavaria amidst 
the climate of the French Revolutionary Wars and the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte. Max Joseph, 
as Elector, and his First Minister, Montgelas, were drawn to France as it was a purported beacon 
of Enlightenment virtue. French armies arrived on Bavarian soil and handily defeated Austrian 
forces. Max Joseph benefitted from the redistribution of German principalities defeated by 
Napoleon in 1803. The Kingdom of Bavaria was formed through the consent and support of 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Montgelas’ massive expansion of bureaucratic led land reform of 
allodification was given the martial backing of French forces. Foreign intervention was crucial to 
solidifying the power of the new Kingdom of Bavaria. The 1808 constitution was a founding 
compact of the enlightened absolutist model of the new Bavarian state. Max Joseph used the 
constitution to crush the power of the competing estates leaving himself as sole ruler. King Max 
Joseph’s successes and failures were buoyed by Napoleonic support through 1809. 
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 Chapter three concerns the connection between the collapse of the Napoleonic alliance 
and Montgelas’ property system. The inextricable link between the redemption process of land 
and the strength of the state centralization of bureaucracy was compromised by Napoleonic 
policies. The imposition of the 1810 Napoleonic Continental System, an internal blockade of 
European powers occupied or allied with France brought debt and famine. Napoleonic demands 
on Bavaria’s leaders for resources crippled the small German state and led to its near ruin when 
the French Army was defeated in 1812. The Crown Prince Ludwig I convinced his father King 
Max Joseph to defect to the side of the Austrian and Prussian-dominated Sixth Coalition by 
1813. In addition, the collapse of the Napoleonic order brought debt, destroyed agriculture, and 
the threat of conservative reaction from the Habsburg dominated Congress of Vienna system to 
Bavaria. Montgelas’ efforts as First Minister ended in 1817 when he was dismissed by the 
Crown Prince Ludwig. Montgelas’ reforms were critical for the future success of Bavaria’s 
economy and the power of the King. 
 The creation of a compromise driven parliament (the Landtag), an advisory assembly of 
titled and untitled nobles and educated professionals, led by the monarchical principle of rule 
forms the basis of chapter four. Attempts at land redemption were relegated to a diminished role 
while support for mediatized, cash poor notables increased. Graf Friedrich Georg von Zentner’s 
1818 constitution produced a more structured state bureaucracy while strengthening the existing 
state dominated land law reforms of the Montgelas’ era. A sense of order and systemic 
application was present in this system. Those notables who sought assistance for their destroyed 
lands and pensions to pay debts disagreed. 
 Finally, an epilogue discusses the swirling market forces that brought Bavaria into a 
Prussian-dominated trade bloc of the Zollverein over the last attempt at a state driven, 
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agriculturally driven economy. Bavaria was once again besieged by stronger economic forces 
and the further reduction of its political autonomy. 
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Chapter 1. Redrawing the Map: The Role of Land in the Growth of Electoral 
Bavaria 
Late-eighteenth century Electoral Bavarian civil servants faced significant challenges in 
their effort to transform agricultural land from its connection to semi-feudal jurisdiction to 
private ownership as property. Several impediments stood in the way of such a large-scale 
overhaul of land ownership. Landholding requirements were a deeply entrenched part of 
Bavarian life. Bavarian land was largely organized into Gutsherrschaft estates (Güter), a semi-
feudal agricultural and social model, as well as the Grundherrschaft tenant farming system. The 
Catholic Church also had extensive lands managed using the Gutsherrschaft system. This model 
brought stability and reinforced the role of law and order in rural areas in the wake of Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648).69 Electoral Bavaria was a patchwork of these estate lands, as well as 
the political and social pull of the Catholic Church and mendicant orders (like the Jesuits and 
Norbertines), and the limited authority of the Elector. The Elector was a leader that bound these 
institutions together less through real power than from his title and historic importance. The 
sinews of state control were managed by cameral civil servants, or cameralists. Cameralists were 
officials who were schooled in the German economic management school of cameralism. A 
cameralist’s career hinged on currying favor with the Elector and negotiating the web of 
powerful interests that both advised and constrained his rule. Such a system provided functional 
relations between the estates but left Bavaria weak in a turbulent sea of alliances, expensive 
wars, and shifting borders.   
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Physiocratic influence from beyond Bavaria’s borders influenced shifting notions of 
cameral responsibilities. The role of the state in Bavaria, as well as in continental Europe, was 
increasing. Ideas concerning land usage, including physiocratic inspired notions of maximizing 
lucrative crop yields, were of interest to enlightened bureaucrats. The presence of these concepts 
in Bavaria became controversial. Aspiring reformers adopted these new ideas and promoted the 
notion of an expanded state that would drive agricultural development. In turn such agricultural 
development would fund the primacy of a more robust centralized leadership. 
This chapter examines the stagnant, if stable, organization of agricultural land in the 
Electorate of Bavaria from 1648 through the conclusion of the late-eighteenth century. The 
period in question is of critical importance for Bavarian and European history. Ambitious civil 
servants advanced Enlightenment-inspired reforms that would fundamentally change the nature 
of land ownership and use. The new system would mean mass, state-sanctioned private land 
ownership and the elimination of feudal privileges associated with estates. This meant altering 
Electoral Bavarian legal traditions. The confusing array of legal codes were a product of 
institutions of the Holy Roman Empire and the various influences of Roman, French, and 
German law. Feudal property arrangements, including the collection of rent, were normative. 
Land as privately held property was uncommon. Several attempts at land reform, including an 
overhaul of the tax system failed due to the intervention and obstinacy of the landed nobility. 
Finally, in the 1750s, a new legal guide to land ownership, rents, and inheritance, the Codex 
Maximilianeus Bavaricus, Civilis. Oder Neu Verbessert- und Ergänzt- Chur-Bayrisches Land-
Recht – or “Maximilian Code” was introduced to provide clarity to land ownership distinctions.70 
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A handful of German civil servants first proposed a mass rewriting of the laws that governed 
land ownership and privilege by the mid-eighteenth century. One enterprising civil servant, 
Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, the future Graf Montgelas, generated controversy by proposing 
to expand the size and role of a unitary civil bureaucratic state led by an unchallenged sovereign. 
Such a program was intended to manage Bavaria’s economic interests, with a special focus on 
agricultural benefit, for the advantage of a more robust state. 
Electoral Bavaria and Central Europe in the Wake of the Thirty Years’ War 
Electoral Bavaria, the predecessor of the Kingdom of Bavaria, maintained a system of 
shared jurisdictional responsibilities between ruler (the Elector), notables, the Catholic Church in 
Bavaria, and subjects during 1648-1799. Bavaria, in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648), was a patchwork of estates, bishoprics, and free cities. The Electoral Bavarian state owed 
its sovereignty to the Peace of Westphalia. Lessened, yet unbroken, Imperial authority gave 
Bavarian leaders more latitude. According to Robert A. Kann, “After 1648 every major move of 
the emperor had to be based exclusively on the strength resulting from the rule in the hereditary 
lands and those of the eastern crowns.”71 The elite assembly of the Holy Roman Empire, the 
Imperial diet, met for the last time as a complete and functional assembly of estates with decision 
making power in 1653-1654.72 The product of this diet was the “electoral capitulation” 
(Wahlkapitulation) of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I in 1654.73 Leopold effectively 
divvied up electoral states while severely curtailing the land rights and responsibilities of the 
major contingents of the Electoral Bavarian state: Old Bavarian (Altbayern) and Palatinate 
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(Oberpfalz) lords.74 Subsequent Imperial decisions by Leopold reinforced the subservient role of 
electoral states like Bavaria. In addition, the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I did not consult the 
electoral states or the landed gentry when making military decisions.75 Kann, however, 
concluded that the subsequent sessions of Leopold I “gave little additional leverage to Habsburg 
power in imperial domestic matters.”76 The electoral states lost their representative voice in the 
Imperial diet (which reconvened in 1663) but gained increased autonomy over their own polities. 
Leaders of electoral states, like Bavaria, turned to new forms of agricultural production and rural 
jurisdiction to bolster their power and to turn a profit. 
Many Bavarian landed elites adopted the German Gutsherrschaft manorial system by the 
mid-seventeenth century to provide stable agricultural production and social control.77 The 
Gutsherrschaft model, along with the Grundherrschaft model, was the basis of Bavarian 
agricultural production, landholding rights, and law and order for over a century and a half. 
German-speaking central European land was devastated by the Thirty Years’ War. Bavarian land 
was no exception. The priority of Bavarian rulers was agricultural stability. Recovery efforts 
were slow. Gutsherrschaft manorial estates (Güter) were the centerpiece of agricultural 
organization.78 The Güter Domainen (domains of the estate) frequently, but not always, included 
 
74 Karl Otmar von Aretin, Bayerns Weg zum souveränen Staat: Landstände und konstitutionelle 
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a Vorwerk (manorial office).79 Agricultural organization, along this model, was decentralized 
during the seventeenth century.  Electoral Bavarian Güter Domainen were among the many 
Gutsherrschaft estates to undergo an agricultural and labor reorganization called Bauernlegen 
during the seventeenth century.80 This process entailed the appropriation of peasant land 
followed by land rights transferred back to peasants based on rents.81 Peasants would also repay 
manorial lords with a portion of their crop yields. Gutsherrschaft practices in northeastern 
German states entailed serfdom but Bavarian subjects escaped such an ordeal. Bavarian peasants 
benefitted from the close cooperation of the Catholic Church and the Electoral state’s process of 
confessionalization that, in part, protected Güter laborers from abuses.82 According to historian 
Renate Blickle, Güter law included the adherence to a 1616 labor code that restricted services 
and work for lords for “subsistence” related matters rather than for luxury.83 Bavarians 
experienced stability during the latter half of the seventeenth century with farming as the basis 
for sustenance and social order. 
The strengthening of the Gutsherrschaft system transformed both the organization of land 
and the legal responsibilities of landholders and estate lords. Güter lands were rented to peasants 
in exchange for as much as one third of all crop yields, livestock, fish, or wildlife.84 Land was 
divided into furlongs (Felder) and then three separate large fields (Zelgen).85 The periphery of 
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land was for the cultivation of flax and hemp.86 Arable land, unfortunately, was overused to the 
point of soil depletion. Slash and burn farming techniques were common and parts of fields were 
left fallow.87 Innovation or adaption was infrequent and life on the Güter estate could be 
Hobbesian. Peasants were born and died on estates. Labor obligations to lords supplemented 
crop payments. A “fitting subsistence” of “domestic necessity” – Hausnotdurft – unified the 
subjects and lords in a mutual respect for legal and moral boundaries.88  A series of legal and 
religious principles also reinforced this hierarchical yet symbiotic relationship between noble and 
peasant.  
There were few developments in land-related legal theory in German-speaking central 
Europe that concerned Bavarian lords. Instead, there was, in general, a shared concern for the 
potential abuse of regional jurisdiction by estate holders and its impact on the common weal. 
German legal thought, at its most theoretical, included the jurist Samuel Pufendorf’s combination 
of the established traditions of Roman legal codes with the socially compassionate influence of 
Christian natural laws.89 Pufendorf delineated the “entia physica (the features of external nature) 
and entia moralia (the components of the social world of ethical freedom).”90 In practical terms, 
Pufendorf’s ideas, and those of other thinkers, were not considered by either Bavarian lords or 
peasants. Meierrecht guided Bavarian law. Meierrecht, an unwritten but mutually understood 
agreement between tenant and lord, provided a notion of relative fairness.91 Verbal agreements 
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between tenants and lords governed everything from inheritance laws and debts to where 
cottages could be built. The basis of these legal principles kept the relationship between Güter 
lord and subject less than amicable, but it was a consistent and understandable arrangement. 
Güter law was, however, not necessarily profitable.  
Concerns about abusive profiteering and the exploitation of peasants by elite estate 
holders are present in the communal social contracts of German-speaking villages. These 
concerns did not result in any change in the enforcement of Meierrecht. Changes came only to 
address specific times of poverty or famine. The lingering devastation wrought by the Thirty 
Years’ War handicapped the development of agricultural land, and the amelioration of 
peasant/noble relations, for long after its conclusion. There were few draught animals, limited 
arable tracts of land, and many people were killed before the conclusion of hostilities. Labor 
from subjects was limited to the number of workers available and the skills they possessed. 
Peasant farmers were busy with cultivating crops, the main form of rental payment and export 
profits for estates, and with the putting-out system of producing proto-industrial goods through 
the semi-profession of contracting known as Vorlegen.92 Rudolf Vierhaus recorded in Germany 
in the Age of Absolutism, “At the end of the seventeenth century noble estates in Bavaria are 
thought to have had less than one half – indeed sometimes only one third or one quarter – of their 
prewar value.”93 In sum, Gutsherrschaft was not necessarily an ideal system for agricultural 
productivity, efficient labor use, or profitability from the standpoint of successive generations. 
Stability, through consistent crop yields and the maintenance of social order, however, was the 
paramount component of mid-seventeenth century rural life, and trumped demands for 
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productivity, efficiency, or the amelioration of everyday peasant life. Private landownership, 
limited to parts of common lands, and the much rarer allodial-Güter (land owned outright by 
individuals) was equally rigid in its construction and maintenance by the Güter lords. 
The strict, private property semi-ownership within the Gutsherrschaft regime was the 
Hoffuss system. This system provided a rigidity to private land ownership. Hoffuss land was 
derived from the Hufe (literally hooves and in low Latin, Hoba) and existed in Bavaria since the 
eighth century CE.94 The origins of the system are murky. The term mansus also appear in 
conjunction with the Hoffuss-system as a form of small household connected land ownership.95 
Hufe land was understood by Bavarian peasants as the responsibility of families.96 Common land 
on the Gutsherrschaft estate was also open to shared pasturing and division.97 This also stymied 
the development of productive rural agriculture. Koppelwirtschaft (crop rotation) was the 
predominant form of cultivation that produced enough foodstuffs for personal consumption and 
payment to the estate lord.98 Hoffuss, much like the jurisdictional function of the Gutsherrschaft 
estate was ideal for the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bavarian farmer because it was 
stable. Historian W.R. Lee also noted that common pasturing and division of land had a 
peacekeeping element in everyday life, augmenting the role of the Catholic Church as a system 
that produced a semblance of equality and fairness in living conditions.99  
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Consistent, subsistence-based crop yields, however, were not suitable for the potentially 
productive nature of Bavarian agriculture. The natural order of things, as they were, did not 
always sit well with Bavaria’s electors. In the first half of the eighteenth century crop prices 
soared in the city markets of the German states.100 The Electoral Bavarian state profited from this 
uptick at the expense of its estate holders and small land holders through the imposition of steep 
land taxes and, indirectly, the extraction of cash crops from small farmers.101 Bavarian taxes, 
increased by the beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century. A full thirty percent of 
all Bavarian state tax revenues were deducted from estate land and common landholders.102 
Bavarian Electors also counted on beer, wine, and meat taxes to produce significant revenues 
ever since the implementation of market and tavern taxes in the sixteenth century. By the 
eighteenth century, as much as fifteen percent of all tax (Steueren), toll (Zölle), and extra charges 
(Aufschläge) revenues came from the consumption of Bavarian beverages and meats, amounting 
to the impressive sum of roughly 500,000 to 600,000 gulden collected from the various estates, 
cities, and towns of the Electorate.103 These revenues, though impressive, were consistently 
collected in peace time but did not provide room for growth if the need for increased state 
spending arose. It was a predictable pattern of production and consumption typical of the 
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centuries old Hoffuss model. The Bavarian state, though flush with the profits of such 
consumption, faced the difficult challenge posed by the wars and political crises on Bavarian 
borders during the eighteenth century. Reform of this system would require a reconsideration of 
its value by administrators. 
Early Cameralism and the Limits of the Bavarian State, 1700-1745 
Cameralism became the next iteration in Bavarian land management, agricultural reform, 
and the foundation of mercantilist law by the eighteenth century. The end of the seventeenth 
century in Bavaria was stable politically but not necessarily profitable. Farming was 
unsustainable and attempts to produce export cash crops failed. The eighteenth century witnessed 
the advent of new social and political ideas concerning state management and economic 
production. One of these ideas was that of cameralism: the scientific policed order of economic 
and social activity. Electoral Bavaria’s cameralists thus had responsibilities that were vaguely 
defined. This was not uncommon in the eighteenth century. Like much of Germany, Bavaria’s 
use of the Gutsherrschaft system decentralized power in the hands of Güter lords who were 
given special privileges, a pension, and jurisdictional authority over their estate land. The 
German sociologist Werner Sombart commented on this arrangement, “in earlier times wealth 
followed upon possession of power.”104 Privilege, in the Bavarian context, meant social status 
and a degree of local legal power. The application of laws, taxes, and tariffs were inconsistent, 
and many subjects sought a rational order to them.  
Cameralists rose in prominence in the late-seventeenth century and early eighteenth 
century to address these calls for a semblance of legal and commercial order.105 Cameralists were 
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the forerunners of the latter Kingdom of Bavaria’s Finance Ministry in the nineteenth century 
and were equally unpopular as less state reformers and writers and more stereotyped as hated tax 
collectors.106 Collecting funds was no easy task. Even with the advent of cameralism, Bavaria’s 
disparate estates, bishoprics, cities, and townships were difficult to reach. Johann Justi, arguably 
one of the foremost theorists of cameralism, wrote, “money is the blood of the state, just as the 
government its heart. Taxation brings blood to the heart and in a healthy system the government 
would pump it back into the veins.”107 Justi, however, served the warlord King Frederick II 
whose vast armies scoured his small Kingdom of Prussia for what meager resources were drafted 
into the King’s service. Bavaria, by contrast, lacked the resources of a centralized state 
government or an army to police its subjects. If Bavarian cameralists were to develop a robust 
economy, they would need an Elector committed expanding their limited powers. 
Cameralism in a broader German context brought the means of economic and social 
control to monarchs and princes but failed to cement the unchallenged rule of the leaders of 
small states (Kleinstaaten). American sociologist Albion Small defined cameralism in 1909 as an 
administrative technology,” and continued, “it was not an inquiry into the abstract principles of 
wealth, in the Smithian way.”108 Similarly, historian Marc Raeff commented on the main goal of 
the more formally defined Polizeiwissenschaft as, “a major purpose of these police ordinances 
was to instill and encourage active, rational, and production-oriented attitudes in society.”109 
Cameralism was also influenced by the economic theories of mercantilism.110 A small army of 
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cameral bureaucrats were required to enforce state economic restrictions and social and political 
controls. Cameralism suited the Bavarian electoral state because of its paradoxically less visible 
yet ever-present nature.111 The state Finance Ministry of several small German states was called 
the Fiskus (treasury) which controlled trade and collected tariffs and the proceeds of even a 
fraction of illegal transactions.112 Historian Mack Walker describes German cameralism, in 
general, thus “state administration of detail was weak, the cameralist combination of central 
administration in the state itself with differentiation among places and social estates…”113 
Specialized bureaucracy did not have either the training or the numerical presence to affect the 
daily lives of Bavarians. Wealth collection thus followed upon conserving the status quo of the 
Gutsherrschaft system of estate rent and crop payments and the reciprocal pension assistance 
from Munich. Walker concluded that cameralism sought harmony not reform and was designed 
to collect tariffs, tolls, while preserving the established social order of the old regime.114  The 
cameralist bureaucracies of small German states thus existed to work within the system of 
absolutist structures of law and order, agricultural production, and the ability for electors and 
princes to perform various functions, namely raise armies.  
Elector Charles VII of Bavaria and his heir, Maximilian III, worked within this narrow 
bureaucratic structure to adapt to rising debt concerns or the exigencies of sudden warfare. The 
relationship between the rural Stände (estates of the Church and landed nobles) and the Elector 
was still defined by the semi-feudal Gutsherrschaft system in the mid-eighteenth century. This 
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system, a stable and secure economic model of agrarian production and social order, failed to 
produce enough resources for the Bavarian state. Charles VII, the Bavarian elector and Habsburg 
Emperor, was tested by the Bavarian Landesverordnung, the estate hierarchy between ruler and 
landed elites. Bavaria’s vulnerable, ill-defined borders of estates and titles throughout Germany 
and the Low Countries, were breached by foreign forces and the Electoral State became a 
battleground. The authority and production of crops of the rural estates were broken by invasion 
and conflict.  
Charles VII lacked the resources to fight Bavaria’s wars and sought new means to rein in 
spending and the burden imposed on estate holders.115 News of military movements and rural 
destruction filled the yearly surveys and broadsheets in the Electoral State and free cities alike. 
The Jahresübersicht (yearly overview) of Augsburg in 1743 referenced the dangers of foreign 
forces operating on Bavaria’s borders. The author of the Jahreübersicht stated, “…22 batt. along 
with grenadier company and 6th cavalry regiment and such all the rest marching near Bavaria.”116 
Conflict exacerbated debt concerns. Charles VII clashed with Bavarian elites over state debt. 
State debt in the 1740s reached 7.8 florin.117 The death of Charles VII in 1745 triggered another 
round of lively debate surrounding state debt. Maximilian III, the heir of Charles VII took power, 
and struggled to assert control over the disparate territories of the Electoral State. Charles VII, 
and his father, pledged support for France in exchange for French acknowledgment of 
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Wittelsbach claims to the Bavarian crown.118 The authority of Bavaria’s electors thus remained 
limited. Wars and debts plagued Bavaria in the mid-eighteenth century and the state lacked the 
resources to combat external and internal enemies. New means to categorize and marshal the 
resources of Bavaria, however, presented the opportunity to create more unified and functional 
system of managing the Electoral State. Such reforms would require a properly motivated 
Elector and the political capital to sponsor and enact changes in cameral institutions. 
Habsburg Attempts at Reform and Bavaria’s Uncertain Future 
The wars of the eighteenth century exposed the feeble authority of the Bavarian state, its 
inadequate military, and the wasteful spending of an ample yet overburdened treasury and 
taxation system. Electoral Bavaria was occupied by the Habsburg Empire in 1704-1715 during 
the War of the Spanish Succession.119 Bavarians suffered from privations and violence 
reminiscent of the Thirty Years’ War. Vienna coveted Bavarian lands as early as 1680, its 
leaders being particularly fixated on the fertile Innviertel and Salzburg that bordered German-
speaking Habsburg land.120 Habsburg occupation intensified in the 1740s when Bavaria allied 
with France before losing the Battle of Pfaffenhofen in 1745. Maximilian III, the Holy Roman 
Emperor, became prince-elector of Bavaria, and ruled the electoral state in 1745-1777.121 
Maximilian’s positive programs in Bavaria featured the artistic contributions to Munich 
including the establishment of the Royal Porcelain Manufactory.122 Maximilian’s military 
expenditures, however, had an adverse effect on the Electorate. According to historian Andreas 
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Kraus the cost of each Bavarian military unit added to the state payroll represented a consistent 
drain on Munich’s finances. Maximilian raised an army so expensive that it cost 1.5 million 
gulden to simply maintain its strength each year.123 Kraus concluded that Maximilian’s profligate 
spending on the arts and military glory presided over the terminal decline of the already 
overburdened land taxation scheme.124 Maximilian’s spending, however, was tied to a more 
important and lasting legacy of increased cameral activity in the role of quantifying financial 
assets and the best means by which to expand the profits and political reach of the Hofkammer. 
Information Revolution: Bavaria and the Churbaierisches Intelligenzblatt, 1745-1768 
Electoral Bavaria’s cameral institutions, like its borders, were in flux during the reign of 
Maximilian III. Economic management, specifically crop production and the collection of rents, 
was not a uniform process. The Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia embraced cameral 
bureaucracy through the training of civil servants including much maligned tax collectors. Both 
empires were led by energetic enlightened despots committed to reform and training those who 
would carry out new laws. So complete was the reach of Prussia’s cameral officials under 
Frederick II that Berlin enforced a 1749 decision to ban “the sale of all ‘scandalous and offensive 
books’ published outside Prussia.”125 Electoral Bavaria, by contrast, did not have a cohesive civil 
service to implement and enforce legal decisions. The lack of consistent publications of vital 
information regime broadsheets (Intelligenzblatt and Regierungsblatt) in the eighteenth century 
infers certain limitations hampered the accurate reporting of events or resources in the Electoral 
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state.126 Charles VII and Maximilian III remained dependent on the estate lords to carry out their 
decisions.127 The finances of Maximilian III were in poor condition towards the end of his reign 
due to Electoral Bavarian participation in the War of the Austrian Succession.128 The idea of 
increasing taxes on estates was not discussed. Instead, tradition and the notion of limited peasant 
autonomy persisted in a time when the programs of Frederick II, Maria Theresa, and Joseph II 
attempted to place the state in a more powerful, wealthier, and centralized status. The means to 
address such reforms did not exist in Electoral Bavaria. Bavaria’s state administration lacked the 
personnel or the census information to pursue concrete reform. 
 Electoral administrators responded to the disordered nature of Bavarian finances, taxes, 
and decentralized rule by creating a broadsheet with economic data and current affairs in a 
simple, digestible broadsheet format. Finally, the current affairs, local ordinances, and economic 
assets included in Bavarian territory were presented in one singular publication. This played a 
transformative role in providing the data necessary for Electors to understand the economic 
products of Bavarian agriculture and trade. Informational guides in broadsheets existed for a very 
limited literate cross-section of the Bavarian populace beginning in the 1720s. Such sources, 
however, had a limited impact outside of informing local lords who were literate, cameral 
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officials, or merchants.129 New schools for noble education, however, changed this to a minor 
degree. 
A differing educational approach enhanced the assimilation and impact of new 
agricultural and commercial information. The introduction of state-published economic data 
came at a time when aristocrats began sending their children to Ritterakademien, schools 
designed to teach Latin and to provide a basic education.130 Other schools, called the Gymnasia 
Illustria, offered an alternative to the more numerous schools with Latin education and 
instruction focused on more practical skills including French language instruction for the 
purposes of diplomacy and political theory.131 In Bavaria, and southern Germany in general, 
Jesuit education combined religious instruction with a humanistic approach to language learning 
and other disciplines. This educational shift coincided with the broader European reading 
revolution of the eighteenth century. Electors, civil servants, and merchants were not only 
capable of reading about affairs of state and trade, they possessed an eagerness to quantify and 
analyze such data. New toll regulations in 1762 reflected a need to collect and compile all toll 
rates, policing information, and crop prices. This demand yielded the idea of the Churbaierisches 
Intelligenzblatt (the Electoral Bavarian Intelligence Sheet), a project first discussed in the court 
chamber (Hofkammer) in 1762.132 Unfortunately, the court found such a task beyond the 
capabilities of the existing cameral institutions. By 1765, Bavarian officials tasked highly 
educated scholars with the Academy of Sciences to collect and publish the appropriate toll and 
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pricing information of all Electoral Bavaria.133 The Churbaierisches Intelligenzblatt was first 
produced in April 1765. Finally, the data needed to inform land policy and taxation was available 
to Bavaria’s leaders.  
The Intelligenzblatt served as a source for communicating ordinances, crop prices, and 
news information from throughout Europe. An official compendium of cereal and meat prices in 
market cities, for instance, informed a more active and engaged Hofkammer.134 Church 
ordinances were also included in the Intelligenzblatt. The Churbaierisches Intelligenzblatt 
project became the responsibility of the Munich-based cameral official Franz Seraph von 
Kohlbrenner. Kohlbrenner was the chancellor of the electoral court (Hofkammerkanzlisten) as 
well as the secretary of toll policy (Mauthdirektionssekretär [sic].”135 Kohlbrenner’s vision of 
the Intelligenzblatt also went beyond the notion of its use as a state tool of communicating 
Electoral ordinances and crop prices. By 1767-1768, the Intelligenzblatt became a platform for 
moralizing articles, the promotion of general education, and an agent of expanding state 
authority in Bavaria. Such sources were common in German states at the time. Bavaria’s version, 
the Intelligenzblatt, became a monthly publication, and, in time, a biweekly broadsheet, during 
Kohlbrenner’s tenure.136 However limited the role of Bavarian civil servants in 1760s, the 
Intelligenzblatt was a powerful tool for economic knowledge and at least the concept of a 
comprehensive, well-informed state administration.  
A typical Intelligenzblatt issue featured seven articles, beginning with a public 
declaration from the Elector himself. “The 25 January 1768 edition of the Intelligenzblatt begins 
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with a salute to, “...the glorious rule of our Highness Elector Maximilian III of the highest order, 
generalities, and commands and prohibitions.”137 Bulletins and regional information follows 
including commands for taxation and social order, sanctioned by the Elector himself, followed. 
This represented a key extension of the Elector’s power in the hands of mayors, patricians, and 
guild leaders in the disparate towns and villages of the Electorate. The Intelligenzblatt from 5 
March 1768 provides an instructive example. This issue leads with a public declaration from 
Michael Bauer, the mayor of Rothgerber zu Landsberg.138 Bauer, “[the] subject of Rothgerber zu 
Landsberg offered the inland public piece: each center for four florin.”139 The desire to 
understand and guide the direction of rural policies was central to the ambitions of cameral 
officials of the Royal Academy of Science is present in the regional announcements. Cameral 
officials in Bavaria, like the Holy Roman Empire, as historian Andre Wakefield observes, were, 
“certainly not neutral or universal. It was an extractive logic, attuned to the particularity of local 
places and populations. It was also a creative logic, producing knowledge even as it yielded 
revenue.”140 The creation of regional jurisdiction offices and a concern for economic products 
was thus common for cameral regimes. Article five of the Intelligenzblatt records the 
construction of a town hall for the purpose of benefitting manufactories and merchants.141 
Stimulating trade in Bavaria and accounting for profits were chief goals of Bavarian cameral 
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officials during the 1760s, reflecting a desire to overhaul taxation and state control over lucrative 
industries. 
Electoral Bavaria’s trade status, including debts, was also available to those sufficiently 
privileged to read and understand the complex nexus of merchants, banks, and exchange rates in 
Europe. The existing legal framework for categorizing and enforcing property law was the Codex 
Maximilianeus Bavaricus, Civilis into the 1760s. The Codex stated, “Of legal erudition and 
justice, of rights and duties writ large. Each [item] of legal scholarship or juris prudence consists 
of not only of thorough knowledge of its laws, but also the correct application of the same 
occurring cases.”142 The compact, created by Elector Maximilian III, made very general 
distinctions for property rights, inheritances, and authority.143 It reflected both the rudimentary 
laws of Bavaria and the limits of the knowledge possessed by the Elector and his court of what 
economic assets existed in the Electorate. Maximilian III was, however, not to be deterred. 
Elector Maximilian III planned to control the leasing of tobacco importation in 1768, and again, 
in a broader 1770 toll reform program.144 This testifies to the ambitious role that Bavaria’s 
Electors and cameral officials began to play in the attempt to quantify and exploit the mercantile 
assets of the Electoral State.145 The cameralists of Bavaria, like their other overly-analytical 
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brethren in other German states, were members of a, “ravenous fiscal-juridical chamber that 
devoured everything in its path.”146 In theory, no singular point of datum related to trade escaped 
the grasp of the authors of the Intelligenblatt. For example, page 97 of the report detailed, 
“London. Rational debts from the previous year finalized at 129 million: 724 thousand, 936 
Pound Sterling…”147 Financial data compiled in the Intelligenzblatt goes beyond a simple 
accounting of state debt with a single creditor. A list of trading hubs and price comparisons 
follows the report of state finances. Prices for wares appear in the Intelligenzblatt are converted 
to florin (fl.), kreutzer (kr.), and the Austrian Landmünze (M.)148 The inclusion of the 
Landmünze, a regional southern-German currency introduced in 1754, demonstrates the close 
ties of the Electoral Bavarian state to the Habsburg imperial court and to the greater regional 
trading circles. This categorization of trade and commercial activity exhibited the growing status 
of the Bavarian economy and the information available to the Elector. 
Further data revealed the now global reach of Bavarian trade and the Elector’s desire to 
understand and exploit markets. The lengthy list of exchange rates for goods ranging from coffee 
from the Levant and Souriname [sic] or pepper, either English or Danish, were part of a new web 
of information that cameral officials provided to the active market climate of the Electoral 
Bavarian state.149 The Hofkammer recorded market activity in and beyond the boundaries of 
Altbayern for the benefit of state profit. Current events, especially those affecting the acquisition 
of luxury goods, were recorded in detail, often by aggregating international financial and 
political news. The articles towards the end of the Intelligenzblatt commented on a diverse range 
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of topics from ethnography to politics. Consumer trends are the most consistent trend. One 
speculative paragraph is a summary that reads, “One can read, in one of the English papers, a 
Russian calculation which England may conclude from the trade with Corsica; it reads that the 
free Corsicans invite us to trade with them.”150 The Intelligenzblatt authors dutifully reported, 
“Corsica brings wine, oil, wax, and other products forth. English wares are, woolen wears, 
manufactured wares of metal, porcelain, and clothing.”151 The article emphasizes the value of 
British trade: “England needs wares of the sum of 4 million florin or 400,000 sterling.”152 Market 
prices informed Bavarian trade, a source of indirect state income through tolls. A desire to 
categorize global information including trade and current events represented Bavaria’s 
engagement with broader European trends including the creation of centralized, royal 
bureaucracies (however marginal Bavaria’s administrative prowess was), the desire to increase 
revenue from merchant activity, and the acquisition of rare and valuable wares for the Residenz, 
the palace of the Elector. Reform, if possible, could utilize the powerful, yet limited, tools of 
state management for the purpose of enriching and enlarging the power of Bavaria. Bavaria, 
however, required an Elector committed to exploiting this data collection and to augmenting the 
role of the sovereign in everyday life. 
 
 
 
150 Ibid, 167. German: “In einem der englischen Blätter liest man die Berechnung Russens, den 
England aus der Handlung mit Corsica ziehen könnte; es heist die freien Corsen laden uns ein 
mit ihren zu handeln.” 
151 Ibid. German: “Corsica bringet Wein, Öl, Wachs, und andere Artikel hervor, Englands 
Waaren sind, Wollenwaren Fabrictwaren von Metall…Porcelan, Galanterieswaren.” 
152 Ibid. German: “…Waar England brauchet so wäre es schon eine Summa von 4 Millionen fl. 
oder tt (400,000 Sterl.)” 
 
 
56 
 
The Abortive Reforms of Karl Theodor, 1777-1784 
A shift in Bavarian rule came in 1777, with the accession of Karl Theodor, a reform-
minded, ambitious leader who wished to centralize power in his person. Karl Theodor ruled from 
Munich and was willing to trade various territories to foreign powers to solidify both his own 
rule and the territorial integrity of Bavaria from foreign invasion. Elector Maximilian III died 
without an heir in December 1777. Karl Theodor, the elector’s successor, was born in the 
Palatinate and belonged to the Wittelsbach-Sulzbach line.153 The new elector was responsible for 
the first cohesive, yet failed attempt to collect revenue from Güter estates by placing tight 
controls on the transfer of land.154 Perhaps the most trenchant example of Karl Theodor’s 
ambitions was his decision to move his court in Mannheim to Munich.155 Karl Theodor felt no 
compunction against parting with his former home to secure power in Bavaria. The Elector also 
traded the familiar confines of his territory in the Austrian Netherlands to the Habsburg Empire 
in exchange for the Wittelsbach throne.156 Karl Theodor’s accession also involved a complex 
plan of land exchange from Bavaria’s disparate estates to secure the elector’s stake to power.  
These moves nearly sparked the worst European war in fifteen years to Bavaria and 
central Europe. Prussia’s enlightened despot Frederick II wished to stave off Austrian influence 
in Bavaria and further incursion into the German Kleinstaaten. Austrian troops arrived in Bavaria 
in mid-January 1778, angering Frederick II who demanded the territorial concession of Ansbach 
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and Bayreuth, which Prussia had laid claim to for many years.157 A larger war was averted when 
the Treaty of Teschen on 13 May 1779 granted Prussia its demands and solidified the Austrian 
presence as a close, influential ally of Bavaria. Karl Theodor staved off a larger conflict by being 
willing to part with Bavarian territories and a semblance of regional autonomy. His very 
presence on the throne was viewed by some as that of an interloper rather than a worthy 
successor to Maximilian III, and Karl Theodor, in many ways, struggled to win the hearts and 
minds of his new subjects.158 
 Karl Theodor’s willingness to trade land, and other Bavarian assets, was part of a larger 
plan to operate beyond the confines of his ostensible authority to restructure the land tax and 
organization of estate pensions. These reforms were carried out by a reluctant state bureaucracy. 
The Güter elites protested vociferously and frequently. The Steuerstreik of 1778 witnessed an 
unprecedented rejection of the prince-elector’s rule eventually leading to the suspension of land 
taxes.159 Karl Theodor was shocked that the estates broke with imperial laws governing land 
taxation without the consent of Munich.160 Bavarian land institutions were, at least in theory, 
practical, functional, and the basis for a cameral bureaucracy that collected and categorized rents 
and social order without interfering greatly in the everyday lives of Bavarians. Upsetting such a 
system would thus spark a certain degree of controversy. Karl Theodor launched an ambitious 
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plan to trade Bavarian land, at will, for guarantees that his rule would be respected and protected 
from internal and external threats. The plan, however, was organically Karl Theodor’s. Karl 
Otmar von Aretin, in his comprehensive, Bayerns weg zum Soueveränen Staat: Landstände und 
konstitutionelle Monarchie 1714-1818 outlines how such an exchange of land (die Tauschpläne) 
was not a product of foreign pressure itself but an abortive ploy to solidify the power of and 
reputation of Karl Theodor himself.161 The “exchange project” itself was the product of Karl 
Theodor’s desire to work beyond the constraints of Bavaria’s Güter elites and the established 
social order of the Electorate.  
The controversial exchange plan was announced in 1782 and brought security to 
Bavaria’s borders at the price of internal turmoil. Karl Theodor took the unprecedented step of 
raising the case of his own legitimacy not with the Ritter (knights), Praläten (prelates), or the 
general nobility of Bavaria but with the sovereigns Joseph II and the Catherine the Great.162 Karl 
Theodor communicated his desire to acquire the Austrian Netherlands, the territory of his birth, 
with Graf Romanzoff, the Romanov ambassador, before consulting the emissaries of Frederick II 
in Berlin.163 Karl Theodor expressed his willingness to part with, among other regions, including 
the valuable Innviertel, and with it, Salzach, near the profitable city of Salzburg, to Habsburg 
authority.164 Bavarians were notably absent from these discussions. Nevertheless, the prince-
elector raised his plan to Bavarian bureaucrats and the elites of the Stände in the Reforminteresse 
of 1783.165 Karl Theodor added the profitable agricultural lands of the Duchies of Jülich and 
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Berg in his exchange plan thereafter to appease the demands of Habsburg foreign minister the 
Prince of Kaunitz.166 In theory, this decision to cede these pieces of Bavarian territory was 
mutually beneficial to the Stände and prince-elector. Bavarian autonomy would remain intact 
and the support of Güter lords could be retained despite the expense of sacrificing fertile 
farmland and the valuable commodity of salt and iron ores. Karl Theodor, instead, believed that 
the promotion of intrastate trade would more than compensate for such losses.167 The plan, in 
theory, clashed with Bavaria’s elites who cared little for their prince-elector or such land 
exchanges. The Tauschpläne was agreed upon by Frederick II and Joseph II in 1784 despite its 
widespread controversy amongst the Stände in Bavaria. 
Karl Theodor’s plan to exchange land for sovereignty provoked a strong rebuke among 
the Bavarian elites (Adelstände) in electoral Bavaria and the Kammer who used new means of 
census data to evaluate the worth of land-based on its prospective utility. The Tauschpläne was 
completed in December 1784, netting the Bavarian state one million florin for an enlarged 
Austrian Netherlands and territories in the porous border area of Alsace.168 The concerns of royal 
families and the boundaries of ancestral lands formed the basis for treaties and compensation. 
The quality of this land and its financial ramifications were the basis for criticism from a rising, 
ambitious segment of educated and revolutionary future reformers. Tauschpläne land transfers 
were in large part the result of a clash between tradition and a small cameral bureaucracy 
concerned with economic gain.  
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Chief among Karl Theodor’s powerful critics came from his most senior cameral official, 
Baron Franz Karl Joseph Anton von Hompesch and his dedicated subordinate Maximilian Joseph 
von Garnerin. Hompesch acted as the Electorate’s treasurer since 1741, and, since 1778, the 
senior cameral official of Karl Theodor’s court.169 Baron Hompesch was responsible for, 
“financial, economic and the affairs of the treasury in the electoral-Bavarian, Neuburg, Sulzbach, 
Jülich and Bergisch lands.”170  Sulzbach, Jülich, and Berg were new acquisitions of the 1784 
plan which Hompesch presided over at the will of the Prince Elector. Hompesch was given a 
manor and land in Berg am Laim in 1778 after the accession of Karl Theodor and would do 
much to advance the cause of an interventionist, centralized Electoral State. Hompesch was a 
dedicated cameralist who committed the Bavarian state to a course that emphasized exploiting 
internal tariffs and intrastate trade over the predominance of the land tax system.171 The Bavarian 
Finance Ministry, a modest cameral institution, collected tolls for the use of limited canals and 
roads, as well as profits gained from the trade of valuable salt deposits.172 The pivot of 
Hompesch’s bureaucracy also offered welfare assistance (Wohlfahrts) to promote the 
transportation of salt and other valuable goods within Bavaria.173 Hompesch served Karl 
Theodor loyally but mentored one of the prince-elector’s most vocal critics: Maximilian Joseph 
Garnerin. Garnerin, a junior cameralist, represented a new challenge to Karl Theodor and his 
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exchange of land with foreign powers. The basis of Garnerin’s opposition, then marginal, would 
have greater import in subsequent years due to a shift in cameral instruction. 
Reforming the Cameral Sciences: The Education of Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin 
The rise of Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, and the growing prominence of Bavarian 
cameralists, owed much to their own cameral education as well as the influence of the 
Enlightenment. These forces created an expanded, more interventionist state bureaucracy. 
Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin was born in Savoy to a noble family in 1759. Garnerin was 
heavily influenced by French culture through his early education and his French language skills 
likely surpassed his abilities in German.174 The early education of Garnerin featured the study of 
existing cameral theories of state administration or Polizeiwissenschaft. Swirling Enlightenment 
ideas developed by philosophes on the periphery of the Savoyard Kingdom also played a 
formative role in Garnerin’s development both as a civil servant and as a person. Garnerin’s 
cameral education was drawn primarily from the cameral faculties taught at a series of academies 
within German-speaking central Europe. The main academies included Lautern, Stuttgart, 
Giessen, Mainz, and Ingolstadt – the last being located within the Electoral State.175 The kind of 
education Garnerin received was rooted in the shift in cameral sciences featured in the research 
and instruction of Johann Stephen Pütter, and a later successor, Johann Beckmann, at the 
University of Göttingen. 
Pütter and Beckmann broadened the economic approach of cameral education and 
advanced a more informed, powerful role for the cameral civil servant. Pütter broadened the 
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narrow focus of the cameral faculties by combining notions of Politik (newly defined political 
science) with a general education in mathematics, history, and law among other subjects.176 
Pütter’s work also provided a hybridized form of Roman and German laws that primarily 
protected the state in its limited and non-invasive capacity from the Church and estates alike.177 
Pütter’s contemporary at Göttingen, Johann Beckmann, education was drawn from an initial 
focus on Ökonomie and mathematics followed by later studies of Polizei and finance. This 
steered his research toward the reorganization of the educational system at the academies. 
Beckmann’s 1769 work Principles of German Agriculture, a philosophical rather than practical 
agricultural guide detailed the inclusion of Ökonomie in Kammeralwissenschaften.178 This 
cameral science included the assessment, leasing, and sale of property. Polizei concerned the 
science of the ruler’s will over estates. These scholars shaped Garnerin’s views of what a 
cameral bureaucracy was and what its powers should be. Garnernin’s formal education was 
completed by 1779 when he was appointed to the office of censorship by Karl Theodor himself. 
The position was somewhat ironic given that Garnerin was also drawn to the secretive 
Enlightenment society of the Illuminati in Ingolstadt and soon became a covert member.179 
Garnerin’s membership in the Illuminati influenced his decision to pursue bolder Enlightenment 
theories of agricultural reform and anti-clericalism. 
Ingolstadt also offered Montgelas access to a nexus of public Enlightenment inspired 
debate surrounding the role of cameral science and its officials.  Ingolstadt was home to the 
prestigious Bavarian University of Ingolstadt where Franz Xaver Moshammer, professor in the 
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“faculty of state administration” (Staatswirthschaft (sic)) taught. Moshammer was discreet in 
what he chose to publish or argue in favor of in his lectures.180 The Ingolstadt faculty, including 
Moshammer, however, were influenced by the well-known cameral scholar Friedrich Casimir 
Medicus, the director of the cameral academy in Lautern, and spread his ideas freely.181 
Medicus’ new ideas centered around a well-informed Polizei, the principal agents of cameralism, 
using statistical data compiled from censes to take a more active role in state centralization and 
the development of economic production.182 Professor Medicus’ ideas, on the surface, called for 
a very modest proposal – the use of numerical data on population, land, and economic products 
to guide state decisions. The accumulation of data, however, required the expansion of the 
cameral institutions of Bavaria. Karl Theodor trusted Medicus as a scholar of his native 
Palatinate and tasked him with the reorganize the faculties of the Kameralwissenschaften from 
Ingolstadt. The new curricula of the cameralists led to a clash between cameral reformers and the 
more entrenched interests in Bavaria. 
 Ingolstadt was also the nucleus of Jesuit activity in Bavaria including schooling and 
moral instruction that led to friction between cameralists and the Jesuit order. Although the order 
had been dissolved in Bavaria in 1773, many of its former members remained a persistent 
influence in Electoral society.183 These former Jesuits voiced their opposition to the proposed 
expansion of state authority. The Jesuits were formerly one of the many Prälatenorden – 
landholding clergy - in Bavaria that included, among other orders, the Norbertines and 
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Augustinians.184 The Catholic Church, and the various confraternities of mendicant orders, 
played a critical role in ensuring social discipline and religious leadership. This fit into the 
harmonious relationship between cameral institutions, the Church, the Bavarian estates, and the 
Elector. The religious orders saw a redesigned cameral faculty, and its implications of an 
expanded state bureaucracy, as an existential threat that would supplant the role of the Church as 
a powerful social, religious, and political force.185 The ex-Jesuit father Ignaz Frank protested and 
managed to have Medicus’ Ingolstadt curriculum reduced to thought provoking, well-staffed 
faculties that ultimately had little bearing on reforming the cameral institutions of the state.186 
This caused a rupture in cameral reform and the diffusion of their faculties in Bavaria. 
The main faculties were moved to Heidelberg and the Catholic Church, exerting its role 
in the “disordered police state” (as historian Andre Wakefield described cameralism), quelled 
any broad reform projects. By 1786 the would-be reformers were defeated by a more 
conservative approach of slow, largely ineffectual token reforms. Karl Theodor, much maligned 
by Bavarians (and Bavarian historians), however, simply worked within the existing framework 
of his Electoral state that was divided between powerful, competing institutions. Garnerin’s 
experience in Ingolstadt, though he was a marginal figure as a cameralist, made an indelible 
impression. The role of the Catholic Church and Jesuit order in blocking the reform of cameral 
faculties in universities and training a new generation of civil servant left him with a lifelong 
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antipathy for the political role exercised by organized religion.187 Garnerin’s education and 
professional life were forever changed in 1786 by both personal and broader European events. 
1786-1789: Maximilian Joseph Garnerin and His Service to Maximilian IV Joseph 
 1786-1789 proved to be signal years in the career of Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin and 
the eventual trajectory of enlightened state reform in Bavaria. Garnerin’s disappointment with 
the failure of cameral reforms was punctuated by his removal from the Hofkammer in 1786. 
Garnerin sent anticlerical letters to the Zweibrückner Zeitungs criticizing the Jesuit influence in 
Bavaria.188 Karl Theodor, and the other contingents of Bavaria’s elite estate, who reacted in 
horror to the French Revolution, terminated Garnerin’s appointment. The swirling Enlightenment 
and anti-clerical sentiments of the Revolution produced animated, and disdainful, debate in 
European courts. Garnerin’s membership in the anti-clerical Enlightenment society, the 
Illuminati, was suddenly called into question during his time in Sensheim. Montgelas blamed 
Jesuits for his removal. The Jesuits in Bavaria, however, were superseded by Karl Theodor, the 
Elector, and the Catholic Church in Electoral Bavaria in noble law.189 Regardless of whomever 
was responsible for his dismissal, the incident fostered a lifelong distrust of the Jesuit order, and 
all Catholic clergy, in Garnerin.190 Garnerin was purportedly broken by these events. His own 
religious views turned to a collection of views somewhere between a degree of Voltairean 
atheism and deism.191 Garnerin’s prospects in Bavaria faded and he left the Electorate. Adrift, 
Garnerin arrived in the Duchy of Zweibrücken and became the personal secretary to the Count, 
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Max IV Joseph.192 Although Garnerin’s desire to reform the Bavarian cameral institutions failed 
he began to work for Maximilian IV Joseph, a count in Zweibrücken, thus beginning a thirty-six-
year partnership of reform and state building in Bavaria. 
 In Zweibrücken Maximilian Garnerin became the private secretary and eventual advisor 
to Count Maximilian IV Joseph.193 Max Joseph was born in Mannheim in 1752 and belonged to 
the House of Pfalz-Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld.194 Following the onset of the French Revolution, 
Max Joseph fled to Ansbach in ducal Zweibrücken because of his previous service in the Royal 
Alsace Regiment of the French Army in Strassburg.195 Max Joseph became a member of the 
branch line (Nebenlinie) of the Wittelsbach Dynasty, the ruling family of the Electorate of 
Bavaria, by becoming a Landesherren, or a landed lord.196 Max Joseph was not a typical estate 
lord. Those close to the count described him as “easy going” (leichtliebige) and an avid reader of 
Enlightenment texts including the Baron de Montesquieu and the French naturalist Georges 
Louis Leclerc, the Comte du Buffon.197 Both Max Joseph and Garnerin watched the French 
Revolution unfold more with fascination than the revulsion typical of many European elites. 
A French Connection: The French Revolution and Land Reform 
French property reforms created private property and abolished seigneurial dues owed to lords 
rather than the state. The National Assembly abolished tenurial holding, the privately held power 
of nobles for policing and land rents on 4 August 1789.198 In France no outright ownership of 
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land existed. The Kingdom of France possessed land and held it while private property existed in 
the role of purchased title and authority, often referred to as “venal office.” What French 
revolutionaries did was separate the ability to own land as property from owning titles by 
resurrecting the sixteenth century concept created by the jurist Charles Loyseau called an allod – 
or “free-hold” property.199 In pre-revolutionary France those who possessed land did not own it, 
their property of noble titles permitted them to grant rights to peasants (which they rarely did), 
and to continually restructure seigneurial dues, or rents on land plots.200 Free hold property was 
rare in the Electorate of Bavaria and was known as allodial-Gut in the Codex Maximilianeus 
Bavaricus, Civilis.201 Peasants could refuse to pay rent but were subject to arrears payments.202 
The creation of free hold property under the allodial system created the Seigneurie Privée, in 
essence, land as privately held equity.203 Rents were paid to the revolutionary government in 
Paris, not to seigneurial lords. The 4 August 1789 declaration provided, as historian Rafe 
Blaufarb contended, a “great demarcation” between property and public power but did not lead 
to the rise of distinctly middle class “liberal power.”204 Such a revolution in property holding 
organization harkened back to French legal traditions of absolutism but was also inspired by 
prevailing Enlightenment trends in Europe that focused on land reform and more productive use. 
Germans took an interest in French reforms, and military activities, as the revolution’s turbulent 
course spilled across the east bank of the Rhine River and beyond. 
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The French Revolution’s property reforms and alleged economic liberalization inspired 
many in German polities in the Rhineland. In Mainz, a rule of enlightened absolutism had been 
underway since the mid-1740s. Friedrich Karl, Mainz’s Archbishop and Elector in 1774-1802, 
looked on the French Revolution with a sense of horror.205 A series of revolts in border villages 
and towns spread throughout 1789 ranging from a near riot over forest rights in Boppard, in the 
Electorate of Trier to the harassment of an official who heard discussions of events in Paris.206 
Reports of a revolt in Aschaffenburg in 1790 proved to be false including an outlandish 
description of the Electoral chateau being burnt to the ground.207 Lookouts were instructed to 
identify and stop French infiltrators and propagandists. France declared war on the German 
forces on 20 April 1792 and advanced towards Mainz. The French Army defeated a German 
force at Valmy on 20 September 1792, causing a disorganized retreat. French forces entered 
Mainz on 21 October 1792. The French representatives worked with Clubists, Jacobin inspired 
collaborators to push revolutionary reforms such as the abolition of guilds – a measure that met 
with a strong rebuke from the Handelsstand, Mainz’s merchants. Mainz was divided between 
revolutionaries and a mainly clergy-led opposition by 1793 but by 1795 was recaptured by 
counterrevolutionaries who reinstated Friedrich Karl to power. The example of Mainz was 
violent and divisive but more instructive examples of French and Enlightenment inspired reform 
swept Germany. 
 The Margraviate of Baden provided a more stable and productive example for Bavarian 
reformers through its program of physiocratic land management. In 1771, the Margrave Karl 
Friedrich reunited the territories of Baden-Durlach and Baden-Baden. Karl Friedrich tasked his 
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Kammerrat (finance councilor) Johann August Schlettwein with the experiment of physiocratic 
trials beginning in 1770.208 Physiocracy was a diverse and complex product of the Enlightenment 
that advanced, broadly, that land reform could be used as an agent of social and economic 
improvement.209 Physiocrats believed in the merits of land use through artistic, craft-based, and 
scientific lenses. Francois Quesnay, perhaps the leading exemplar of the physiocratic school, 
advocated for using agriculturally productive land as the means for transforming the wealth and 
character of states.210 Quesnay’s 1758 Tableau Economique (Economic Table), a pioneering 
survey of economic data, provided physiocrats with the solution to agricultural reform and 
growing state wealth through the renewable, “annual reproduction of a marketable surplus.”211 
Baden attempted to increase crop yields in the villages of Dietlingen, Balingen, and Teningen per 
physiocratic principles.212 The project, deemed a failure at its conclusion in 1802, did not change 
peasant farming techniques.213 Historian Richard Bowler finds that the failure to lift excise, 
trade, and consumption duties thwarted any positive conclusions from the trial study.214 Those 
who engaged in scientific experimentation in the German states remained committed to the 
examination of tinkering with crop yields through modifying farm management and encouraging 
larger surplus yields. 
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 Finally, in Germany, including Bavaria, a fascination with agricultural science, in part 
inspired by the Enlightenment, and the success of the English enclosure movement, led to a rush 
to study and experiment with new techniques to maximize crop production. The guide for many 
a German cameral official was English agronomist Arthur Young through the translations of 
Albrecht Thär. Arthur Young’s findings from farming in England and his travels and 
observations in France led to the publication of The Annals of Agriculture from 1784-1806.215 
This publication consisted of 46 volumes of substantial research about crop production.216 
Young, writing in 1771 in The Farmer’s Tour through the East of England, concluded that 
“enclosures, the use of marl (a kind of soil consisting principally of clay mixed with carbonate of 
lime, forming a loose unconsolidated mass, valuable as fertilizer), new rotations, turnips, clover 
and rye grass, long leases, and ‘by the county being divided chiefly into farms,” were the keys to 
increased production.217 Albrecht Thär, a Saxon born in Celle in 1752, translated Young’s work 
into German and established agricultural curricula based on the Englishman’s research.218 Celle 
became a buzzing hub of activity for cameral officials seeking to learn about physiocracy and 
Young’s research. The impact of Young’s research was also felt in Bavaria. In the 1780s the 
Bavarian Elector Karl Theodor initiated cultivation of crops in swampland in Donaumoos 
between Neuberg and Ingolstadt.219 Permanent cultivation proved impossible but the investment 
in the project with a joint stock company to seize estate land using feudal laws represented an 
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attempt by the Elector Karl Theodor to augment the agricultural output of the Bavarian state.220 
Beyond Bavaria, Maximilian IV Joseph of Zweibrücken sent cameral officials to Celle to study 
Thär’s translations.221 This interest in developing land, however, took a secondary role to the 
immediate dangers of the escalating war in Europe. 
The Path to Reform: Balancing Bavaria’s Future between Larger Powers 
 War placed Bavaria in a powerless, weakened role between Republican France and 
Habsburg Austria. Garnerin, in exile in Zweibrücken, gravitated towards the revolutionaries due 
to his Illuminati connections and anticlerical views. An ebullient Garnerin wrote to a friend 
regarding the French Revolution, “I applaud the downfall of the clergy.”222 In Bavaria, Karl 
Theodor brought the Electorate to the side of the Habsburg Empire, issuing the 11 September 
1789 “Prohibition of the Sale of all Printed Works of the French unrest.”223 Austria wished to 
contain France at the expense of Bavarian territory.224 By 1795 the unrest in France produced 
great consternation in Munich.225 French forces would invariably head east through the most 
western lands of Electoral Bavaria’s Palatinate lands, altering Garnerin’s view of the conflict and 
the opportunities it presented. 
The French advance made a lasting impression on Max Joseph and Garnerin as leaders of 
a small state amidst a larger European conflict. Duke Max Joseph sent emissaries to Berlin 
seeking an alliance with Prussia to protect his sovereignty to no avail.226 On 7 September 1795, 
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with French influence looming, Max Joseph avoided Vienna and sought an alliance with France 
only to be rebuked.227 Zweibrücken sided with France through the Convention of Pfaffenhofen 
leaving Electoral Bavaria isolated and within the orbit of Austria.228 The following year, 1796, 
went poorly for Austria and Bavaria. The French Army of Italy, led by general Napoleon 
Bonaparte, humiliated the slow moving and ineffectual Habsburg Army in northern Italy, 
extracting an indemnity of 45 million francs and looting upwards of 12 million francs worth of 
valuables.229 Bonaparte carved out territory to form the future Cisalpine Republic. On 10 
September of 1796, Garnerin played a central role in mediating Franco-Bavarian peace talks and 
thus solidified his role as Max Joseph’s principal advisor.230 In September 1796, Garnerin used 
this new position from which to plot the path for future Bavarian land reforms. 
The Ansbach Memorandum and Bavarian Land Reform and State Centralization 
 On 30 September 1796 Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, the closest advisor to Count 
Maximilian IV Joseph of Zweibrücken issued the Ansbach Memorandum, a sweeping proposal 
for the dramatic expansion of centralized state authority and the modernization of the Bavarian 
economy. Garnerin used the advantageous position afforded by the French victory, his own 
promotion to a more senior advisory position, and the waning fortunes of Bavaria and Austria, to 
announce an ambitious plan for state reform. Garnerin began, “One of the greatest flaws of the 
Bavarian administration lies in the defective organization of the central ministry. A precise 
division of the departments, so useful for maintaining the order without which business cannot 
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be carried out in a regular fashion, is absolutely unknown there.”231 A decentralized bureaucracy, 
lacking authority and sufficient personnel is outlined as the central issue, something Garnerin 
later recalled in his memoirs.232 Garnerin continued, “This arrangement, which was fine for the 
Middle Ages, when the simplicity of handling things facilitated and lessened the work of 
government officials, is no longer suitable today, as matters have become much more 
complicated.”233 The expanded bureaucracy, alien to the ideas outlined in earlier cameral texts 
and practices, required a larger staff and presumed the enhanced role of the state over other 
Bavarian institutions such as the Church or the elite estates.  
Garnerin’s reformist ideas were sweeping in scope and would entail the reordering on the 
Bavarian cameral profession in the image of the scope and size of French republican 
bureaucracy. Garnerin outlined the creation of a Foreign Ministry as well as those ministries 
attending to finance and justice.234 An army of bureaucrats, like those of larger states, would 
require new training and to be obedient to First Minister and Elector alike. In Prussia, for 
example, such a system was based on “personnel management on a flexible combination of 
calculated external pressures and inducements and internal incentives.”235 Garnerin was most 
emphatic about reforms when he addresses the question of land. In the second of his four guiding 
principles for reform Garnerin advances, “The abolition of the financial prerogatives of the 
privileged estates in the various provinces, the creation of a carefully drawn-up land registry that 
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establishes a fairer proportion in direct tax levies, the abolition of several levies that impose too 
great a burden on subjects, and the cessation of the disastrous system of Bavarian customs duties 
clearly demand the attention of the legislator in the various branches of this vast 
administration.”236 Montgelas’ key focus, however, was land. 
 Land formed the basis for state reform. The abolition of feudal privilege, of the Güter 
estates, and the power of the clergy were the central reform programs of Garnerin. Crucial to 
Garnerin’s plans featured this program of state centralization, the development of land for 
productive means, and the imposition of uniform tolls.237 In addition, Garnerin proposed for 
universal state control over forests, mines, and “care for” (Betreuung) of commerce, industry, 
and manufactures.”238 Negotiations with seigneurial estates was also a responsibility of the 
Finance Ministry.239 In Germany, seigneurial rents soared, peasants revolted, and in Munich, 
Nuremberg, and Ulm sporadic rioting shook Karl Theodor and his court.240 Max Joseph, if not 
Garnerin’s role in Bavarian state building through land reform reached a critical phase by the end 
of 1796. As the Treaty of Campo-Formio finalized the cessation of hostilities in northern Italy in 
1797, Max Joseph and Max Joseph von Garnerin were poised to assert their new role as 
intermediaries to enact state reform in Bavaria. 
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Conclusion: Bavarian Land in the Age of Revolution 
 Both the reform and maintenance of the Gutsherrschaft system were contingent upon 
internal educational and information reform as well as foreign pressure on Bavaria’s borders. 
The system of land management created in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War, the 
Gutsherrschaft, created stability and order. It was slated for replacement with a state 
administered agricultural program based on surplus crop production and a uniform tax and toll 
regimen. Bavarian means of commercial and administrative management maintained feudal 
landownership and the role of the Catholic Church to preserve order and sustainable crop yields. 
Attempts at reform failed due to half measures, a dizzying array of legal traditions, and the 
intentional shortcomings of cameral institutions as the connective tissue of archaic, feudal 
institutions of Bavarian life. The Enlightenment, the reform of cameral institutions, and the 
upheaval caused by the French Revolutionary Wars placed Bavaria at the crossroads of mass 
state guided land reform. Though untried, Bavaria’s leaders elevated the mechanisms for such 
massive reforms to a more powerful role. 
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Chapter 2. A Struggle for Property: State-Guided Allodification (1799-1809) 
 Maximilian IV Joseph of Zweibrücken became Maximilian I (or Max Joseph) Elector of 
Bavaria in February of 1799. Max Joseph would give Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, the later 
ennobled Graf Montgelas, unparalleled authority to carry out unprecedented, state-guided land 
reorganization and the restructuring of the civil service. These reforms centered on allodification 
of land by removing the privileges and titles connected to estates. In its place, the existing 
nuances of Bavarian land law as dictated by the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus, Civilis would 
be replace by Montgelas’ fiat. Montgelas envisioned the dramatic transformation of Bavarian 
agriculture in private hands. Land enclosure, higher crop yields, and bountiful tax and toll 
collection would follow. The centralized bureaucracy would guide these reforms and in turn 
would be strengthened by their products. Yet such a program required a climate of conflict and 
chance to make successful. The authority of the Bavarian state was also not as powerful as it 
seemed to its leaders. War and a costly alliance would be the price for the allodification process. 
The demands of this conflict would destroy Bavaria’s agriculture, leave the state indebted, and 
the populace in poverty but would provide a functional basis for the rule of a centralized state. 
Therefore, this chapter explores the execution and consequences of Max Joseph and 
Montgelas’ sweeping property-based reforms from 1799-1809. Max Joseph, Elector, then King 
of Bavaria, sought to transform Gutsherrschaft estates, Church lands, and the domains of former 
free imperial cities into privately held, enclosed land. This process was also known as 
allodification and preceded Montgelas’ plan to apportion land into privately owned tracts. 
Montgelas served as the architect and catalyst for this Bavarian property reform. Montgelas first 
presided over an ambitious expansion of centralized bureaucratic control over estate lords, the 
Catholic Church in Bavaria, and urban patricians. Güter land was to be transformed in 
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accordance with Enlightenment era theories that emphasized productive and profitable 
agriculture. Bavaria’s reforms, however, could not be undertaken while the polity was a 
marginal, impoverished state. Bavaria would need powerful outside assistance to keep nobles 
and foreign rivals alike at bay. Montgelas and Max Joseph’s mutual affinity for France, the 
French Revolution, and Enlightenment ideals led to Bavaria’s closer relations with Paris between 
1799-1805. The diminished status of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg Empire allowed 
Bavaria to secularize Church lands in 1803, to eliminate the political role of prelates, and to 
claim territories overrun by French forces for its own. Max Joseph and Montgelas used the 
Austrian defeat at the Battle of Austerlitz, and the subsequent Treaty of Pressburg, to declare the 
foundation of the Kingdom of Bavaria in 1806. French influence indirectly facilitated the 
drafting of a republican inspired constitution in 1808. Max Joseph made Montgelas and civil 
bureaucrats, as well as a select group of reform minded nobles, the nucleus of Bavarian power. 
Estates titles were taken by the Bavarian state but the sale of land as private property was limited 
by insufficient state authority. The drafting of the 1808 constitution represented Montgelas’ 
attempt to cement the primacy of Max Joseph and the state, using land reclamation as an 
economic and political tool for the transformation of the Kingdom of Bavaria into a sovereign 
polity. 
Karl Theodor’s Last Stand: The Collapse of Electoral Bavaria (1795-1797) 
Bavarian Elector Karl Theodor was forced to mobilize the Electorate’s resources to 
prepare for war at the expense of land reform, poor relief, and the support of Bavarian notables 
during the War of the First Coalition (1792-1797). Electoral Bavaria was officially neutral during 
the War of the First Coalition, a conflict in which the royals of Europe’s ancien regime 
attempted to crush the French Revolution before reinstalling the deposed Bourbon Dynasty. Karl 
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Theodor faced considerable pressure from both major warring factions, Austria and France.241 
The Elector was thus presented with the single greatest challenge to Bavarian territorial integrity 
since the War of Bavarian Succession nearly twenty years prior. The Austrian Army encroached 
upon Bavarian territory when it moved across the Inn River to counter French forces in the 
Rhineland. 242 French forces, now east of the Rhine River, created an atmosphere of anxiety in 
Munich. In 1795 French forces invaded Bavaria. Karl Theodor ordered Sir Benjamin Thompson, 
the Count Rumford, to plan and then implement a strategy to strengthen Munich’s defenses.243 
Rumford persuaded Karl Theodor to destroy existing city walls and to build isolated strongpoints 
to defend certain parts of the city instead while land outside of Munich was zoned for the 
construction of new structures.244 Such a plan provoked a strong rebuke from nobles because 
they believed the removal of city walls would leave the city weaker against a siege as well as the 
Elector claiming and using land for his own purposes. A French attack posed the risk of causing 
major disruptions to commercial activity within Munich and outlying areas. 
Rumford’s idea to destroy sections of Munich’s city walls was complicated by the influx 
of indigent Bavarians. The limitations of the Bavarian state were soon laid bare. Plans to feed 
Munich’s population, including the rising number of newly arrived refugees, were destroyed by 
French armies living off the land and seizing Bavarian food stuffs and draught animals. The 
hasty construction of segmented lines of defense also provoked anger from a broad cross section 
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of Munich’s population, specifically due to the removal of the bastion near Karlstor and the 
destruction of available farm land.245 In sum, any transformation of Munich’s existing defensive 
works faced the prospect of intense and spirited disagreement between Karl Theodor and 
Bavarian elites over how best to use land. The dispute regarding the defensive walls is also an 
instructive example for the examination of the barriers, physical and metaphorical, to programs 
of land reform in late-eighteenth century Bavaria. 
 Karl Theodor, acting on Rumford’s instructions, sacrificed Bavarian land to an invading 
force that did not respect the Electoral state’s neutrality, in turn eroding what remained of his 
reputation with the Bavarian Adelige Stände – the elite nobility of the Güter estates and Church. 
This continued a pattern of inaction on Karl Theodor’s part that stemmed from earlier losses of 
territory including Mannheim which fell without resistance in 1795.246 Karl Theodor was thus 
seen as an unreliable defender or even advocate for Munich’s defense let alone the welfare of all 
Bavarians. The Elector had also been attacked in the past by nobles for his Tauschpläne of 1792-
1794 that proposed exchanging the valuable land in the Innviertel near Salzburg to Austria in 
exchange for a title in the Austrian Netherlands.247 Karl Theodor further weakened his status 
among Bavarian nobles by overlooking the value of land for tax and credit collection, a system 
widely controlled by the very nobles it taxed.248 The resources of surrounding land, much like 
 
245 Bauer, Geschichte Münchens, 91. German: “Es muss nicht erwähnt warden, das salle diese 
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246 Andreas Kraus, Geschichte Bayerns Von den Anfängen bis Gegenwart, 361. 
247 Karl Otmar von Aretin, Bayerns Weg zum souveränen Staat: Landstände u. konstitutionelle 
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those nearly surrendered to Austrian demands, were jeopardized when Rumford executed his 
defensive plan. 
The sudden, wide-ranging designs for Munich’s “defortification” and urban expansion 
also comprised an early assertion of broad royal authority over the social transformation of 
Munich, and to a greater extent, Bavaria. The land was also vital to a much larger program 
Rumford was designing (and published in 1796) to feed Munich’s poor through the 
establishment of new workhouses where homeless persons would be used as a conscripted labor 
force.249 Rumford’s essays on poor relief and urban pacification, written explicitly for Karl 
Theodor’s use, included a detailed list of instructions to police and exploit Munich’s have 
nots.250 Rumford, writing in an aloof, if not patronizing tone, informed Karl Theodor, “As 
nothing is so certain fatal to morals, and particularly to the morals of the lower class of mankind, 
as habitual idleness, every possible measure was adopted, that could be devised, to introduce a 
spirit of industry among the troops.”251 This essay, entitled Of the Prevalence of Mendicity in 
Bavaria at the Time When the Measures for Putting an End to it Were Adopted, floated the idea 
of paying poor Munich residents poverty wages to motivate their service as laborers.252 Bavarian 
farmers on Güter estates remained committed to subsistence agriculture for over a century and a 
half after the Thirty Years’ War, believing that the production of any foodstuffs would 
intrinsically be profitable.253 Subsistence agriculture, however, was a well-established pattern of 
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crop production that was propagated by peasant farmers and estate elites who knew no other 
form of land management. 
Rumford’s new land management plan met with predictable, if not sensible, objection. 
The plan disturbed the foundation of the Gutsherrschaft model and the power and privilege of 
the landed elites. Rumford’s attempt was met with praise from Montgelas who decried the 
obstinacy of the landed elites. Montgelas, writing from the Duchy of Zweibrücken, seethed at 
what he believed was a missed opportunity to produce profitable, surplus bumper crops from 
arable land. The exiled Bavarian wrote, “Bavaria is the most fertile province in Germany and the 
one with the least spirit. It is an earthly paradise that is inhabited by fools."254 The behavior of 
Karl Theodor did little to counter Montgelas’ appraisal. Karl Theodor was detached, indifferent, 
and more interested in art, literature, and attempts at placating elites. The Elector was not 
interested in fully committing to reform. Firm leadership was also needed due to Bavaria’s 
precarious border security. Austrian and French armies converged on the Electorate. The 
Electorate’s land was soon both the battleground and the potential prize for invaders from both 
east and west. 
Karl Theodor, uninterested in a defensive campaign against invaders, signed a 
humiliating treaty with Austria in January 1796. The treaty formally placed Bavaria under 
Austrian protection but revealed the extractive and predatory nature of the much larger Empire 
upon the Electorate’s land. The elector’s endorsement of a controversial plan for urban renewal 
during invasion was juxtaposed with this latest capitulation. Critics assailed Karl Theodor as 
indifferent to Austrian domination. Bavaria was forced to fight France by Austria. Now a 
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combatant power in the War of the First Coalition, Bavaria was invaded by French forces. The 
“positional lethargy” of Karl Theodor was made apparent as the French Army dealt a series of 
defeats to the Austrians and overran Bavarian farmland in the Rhineland.255 French forces under 
general Jean-Baptiste Jourdan penetrated a defensive position on the Main River and advanced 
unchecked into the Upper-Palatinate.256 Another French force under Jean-Victor Marie Moreau 
exploited these gains by crossing the Upper Rhine in southern Bavaria shortly thereafter. Karl 
Theodor sent emissaries to negotiate a ceasefire with both generals Jourdan and Moreau before a 
treaty was signed on 7 September 1796.257 Bavaria’s negotiations with the French commanders 
were brief and one sided. Moreau’s armies circulated revolutionary pamphlets and encouraged 
the open activities of previously secretive Jacobin organizations.258 Austria continued fighting 
France’s Army of Italy and left Karl Theodor to pay a 16-million-franc indemnity to Paris 
following a separate treaty.259 The collapse of Bavaria exacerbated shortages of arable land, 
cereals, and draft animals by 1797. Bavaria capitulated first to Austrian demands then French. 
Confidence in Karl Theodor plummeted. The future of Bavaria’s integrity was in question as 
quality of land products was destroyed. 
Bavaria’s relative isolation during the last year of the War of the First Coalition had a 
deleterious impact on grain markets and supply for the electorate’s population. Broadsheets from 
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1797 turned to reporting criminal activities and food prices rather than the ongoing war. The 
Münchener Intelligenzblatt from Saturday 26 August 1797 featured a lengthy criminal report on 
the theft of mares during the night of 13-14 August 1797, a much valued commodity.260 The 
report is followed by tables detailing the price of corn, maize, oats, and barley commodities from 
both Bavarian and foreign sources.261 No price information is available for neighboring Salzburg 
while Ulm, a Free Imperial City occupied by Bavaria to the west, had the most expensive prices 
at 18 florin 30 kreutzer per bushel (Scheffel), possibly due to the French presence in the 
region.262 Market activity was negatively impacted by the conflict. The conclusion of hostilities 
brought much-needed relief to Bavarians by the fall. Austrian forces collapsed in Italy leading to 
the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio on 17 October 1797. Austria received more territory 
in the vicinity of Bavaria near the Inn River. 263 The Habsburg Empire regrouped but Electoral 
Bavaria found its treasury and army depleted.264 This campaign itself ended the following month 
and was followed by territorial negotiations in the Congress of Rastatt from November 1797-
1799. 
Bavaria as Spoils of War: The Congress at Rastatt (1797-1799) 
The treaty negotiations of Rastatt were of vital importance for Bavaria due to the loss of 
several vital Electoral territories. This complicated the position of Bavaria’s Elector. The 
Congress of Rastatt negotiations concerned land exchanges as part of the settlement of French 
victory in the Rhineland and northern Italian provinces previously under Austrian control. 
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Bavaria was not mentioned directly as a major participant. Delegates from the German states and 
republican France met in Rastatt between November 1797 and April 1799.265 The German states 
were dominated by Austria and Prussia who angled for territorial aggrandizement rather than 
demonstrating a unified front against the upstart French Republic.266 Historian James Sheehan 
underscored how the Congress at Rastatt was a clash of cultures; decadent and indulgent 
Habsburg envoys such as Franz George Karl Count Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein, the 
father of Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, and a pragmatic and austere French delegation 
concerned with territorial expansion and the spread of revolutionary values. Europe’s ancien 
regime suddenly found itself at the mercy of the revolutionaries. Bavaria, however, was treated 
less as a power and more of land to be divided between major states. 
Austria’s new ministers were forced to accept the terms of Rastatt impacting the future of 
the Habsburg Empire and, by extension, neighboring Bavaria. The director of the foreign affairs 
of Austria, Baron Thugut, the hastily appointed successor to the recently deceased Prince 
Kaunitz, was forced to make peace with France to end hostilities and help the Habsburg Empire 
save face.267 Thugut found the peace terms unacceptable but, Austria, as a participant, came 
away from the Congress at Rastatt with added territory.268 If Austria, Prussia, and France came 
away from Rastatt either as winners or losers, Bavaria participated as merely a spectator. Bavaria 
surrendered territory to the north on the periphery of the Austrian Netherlands and eastern 
Bavaria, including Mannheim to France, as well as ceding land near the Archbishopric of 
Salzburg to Austria in a separate treaty.269 The Austro-French agreement concerning Bavarian 
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territory was kept secret.270 Austria agreed to respect French territorial claims to the eastern bank 
of the Rhine River in an effort to protect the integrity of the Holy Roman Empire without 
Prussian influence.271 The traditions of the Holy Roman Empire, which purportedly protected 
Bavaria were effectively removed through the negotiations at Rastatt. 
The institutions of the Holy Roman Empire were the strongest traditions that dictated 
economic and social behavior in Bavaria. Bavaria’s relationship with Austria remained 
subordinate. The Reichshofrat (the imperial court council) in Vienna, as well as the Aulic 
Council, mediated disputes and acted as a central arbiter and interpreter of the combination of 
unique legal trends from German, Imperial, and Roman laws present in the Empire.272 In theory 
these institutions formed a well-used, routine forum for disputes between lord and peasant. In 
practice, however, the courts and councils made Bavaria more beholden to Austria for the 
purposes of legal legitimacy and functional interstate cooperation.273 Historian Karl Otmar von 
Aretin described these important structures of cameral bureaucracy as a “German form of 
revolution.”274 However relevant these systems of law and Polizeiwissenschaft were to Germans, 
their existence and authority were intrinsically tied to Vienna. Bavaria, and other Reichstädte, 
also paid additional taxes to maintain the court and council from 1797 onward. Prussian military 
and political influence were also felt in Ansbach during the 1790s. Finally, the terms of the 
Congress of Rastatt were dictated to the Reich by Paris. In sum, the ability for a small German 
state, even a larger, wealthier state like Bavaria, to act independently within the Reich system, let 
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alone on the European stage, was an unrealistic expectation. Karl Theodor, unable to act 
independently within the constellation of the Bavarian estates and the Church, was certainly ill-
equipped to navigate the diplomatic challenges posed by Rastatt.  
Rastatt afforded Montgelas the opportunity to openly criticize Karl Theodor’s policies. 
Montgelas, who represented the Duchy of Zweibrücken at Rastatt, laid out extensive programs 
for the integration of German states, as independent entities, into a larger, cooperative alliance. 
These plans, like Karl Theodor’s, however, were equally ignored. In Bavarian terms, reform of 
any kind required approval from the Church and the Güter lords, elites fundamentally opposed to 
increasing the power of the elector. Karl Theodor, mocked for his ostensible inaction, was thus 
constrained by the intransigence of the noble Stände and the moribund system of decentralized 
Bavarian estates. This was, however, irrelevant to Bavarians of the era. Montgelas’ plan and 
confidence demonstrated a more coherent, powerful approach to statecraft. Montgelas too would 
have to contend with the great challenges that obstructed Karl Theodor’s attempts at reform. 
The source of Karl Theodor’s power, the support of the Güter lords, Church (the 
Pralätenorden), and the cameral officials of the Electoral court, failed to assist in Bavaria’s 
defense. These estates also failed to muster the resources or provide consent for the completion 
of any program of social policing or tax reform. Funding for a competent military was thus 
insufficient. Nevertheless, Karl Theodor’s court provided propagandized reports of contributions 
of materiel from the Güter estates for defense.275 Güter domains provided the basis for Karl 
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Theodor’s revenue stream through taxes and provided the material support for the Electoral 
court.276  This essential Bavarian land was under constant threat by foreign powers and 
appropriated at will via invasion and treaty negotiations. The lords of the Domainenbesitz, the 
privileged estate of Bavaria, continued to contribute resources to Munich while protecting their 
legal and societal standing. This concept was referred to as Bauernschutz.277 Electoral records of 
Güter resources contributed to defense, however, highlight the diminishing assets available to 
their estates, the very backbone of the Bavarian treasury. Bavarian notables, as a privilege of 
their estate status, also enjoyed a separate tax administration. 
Contributions to the Electoral treasury were contingent upon what notables agreed to pay 
and depended heavily on the value of their assets.278 Electoral court secretary Josef Diezenberger 
publicized a September to December auction of a vast collection of items from the estate of 
countess Bechischen .279 The 26 December 1798 Münchener Wochen und Anzeigsblatt featured 
an estate liquidation of the countess’ assets to be auctioned off to other “subservient elites” via 
the court market.280 Such an announcement is consistent with the operation of the Electoral 
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treasury in 1798. Bavaria’s Hofmärkte (the court treasury) practiced escheatment: the transfer of 
non-land property (including jurisdictional and even royal titles) to the state when there was a 
lack of an heir.281 The legal presence of Bavarian notables was codified through the Estate 
Commission, which, although not having met since 1699, consisted of sixteen members, eight of 
whom were estate holders.282 In the case of the aforementioned estate (Verlassenschaft – the 
assets) were transferred at a special court decided rate for countess Bechischen’ estate.283 The 
treasury also set the value and price by consulting key notables interested in the Verlassenschaft. 
The report emphasizes the value of the estate through the assertion that, “…the most compliant 
elite of some interested parties, and according to the most recent gracious revision resolution 
passed on December 10th, decreed that the estate, which is worthy of the treasury, namely the 
court markets…”284 The estate in question was also evaluated based on its movable, trade goods 
related, assets. The first sentence of the announcement makes reference to rice tenders on the 
Meuse-Rhine border region as the result of a transaction concluded on 14 September 1798.285 
Such was another legacy of the swirling forces of Karl Theodor’s reign and the destructive 
nature of the War of the First Coalition: bankruptcy and inflation.286  
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These issues were mostly a burden carried by landed elites and Bavarian peasants. Estate 
lords, regardless of legal, tax, and pension privileges increasingly faced crop failure, shortages of 
liquidity, and likely the loss of their labor force due to a 5.9% population decrease during the 
1790s.287 Bavaria’s Güter lords adapted their agricultural approach by shifting their focus to the 
cultivation of potatoes.288 The specific case of the Bechischen estate’s sale to rice farming buyers 
in the Meuse-Rhine area appears to be a pragmatic solution to a failing agricultural estate: 
transferring a rice cultivation area during a large scale shift to growing potatoes. The swirling 
crises caused by conflict, debt, and flagging estate worth were insurmountable obstacles for even 
the most capable and energetic leader and his limited yet educated ministers. Karl Theodor, 
regardless of skill or interest in these issues was poorly equipped to protect and expand the 
Bavarian state at a most critical point in the dramatic transformation of central Europe. 
Life After Death: Karl Theodor’s Legacy, 1798-1799 
By 1798-1799, the Elector Karl Theodor’s legacy was that of a leader who failed to 
preserve Bavarian territorial cohesion from invasion by foreign powers. Karl Theodor, despite 
the limitations imposed by the elite Stände, was remembered perhaps mostly for his effete and 
non-committal approach to reform that frustrated his cameral officials and opponents alike. 
Franz Karl von Hompesch, the First Minister, who, with Count Rumford, made critical state 
decisions, was tasked with finding new ways to secure the integrity of the Bavarian state. 
Territorial cohesion was of paramount importance but the Staatsgedanke – the idea of a unified 
Bavarian state remained a controversial. This idea, so crucial to any functioning model of 
independent sovereignty, was widely rejected by competing interests such as Güter lords and the 
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Catholic Church.289 The task of the Bavarian state, Hompesch, Rumford, and the small cameral 
staff, was preserving the very legitimacy of the Wittelsbach crown.290 Karl Theodor trusted 
subordinates to maintain Bavaria’s borders but lacked the power to support them. 
Preserving Bavarian territorial integrity may have been beyond the powers of even the 
most talented statesmen of the era. Georg Friedrich von Zentner (1752-1835), a future minister 
of greater importance in the scope of Bavarian history, advised Karl Theodor on legal matters 
pertaining to his Electoral issue and how best to utilize diplomatic channels with larger European 
powers.291 Zentner, like Karl Theodor, was born in the Palatinate.292 Zentner possessed a talented 
legal mind and was educated in Ingolstadt, the heart of new approaches to state management 
techniques in Bavaria. In addition, Zentner was well-traveled, having spent time in Berlin and 
Vienna before studying recent developments in German legal theory at the Georg August 
University in Göttingen.293 Therefore, Zentner made an ideal choice for Bavaria’s diplomatic 
missions. Despite Zentner’s apparent skill, little could be done to protect Bavaria from invasion 
and dissolution. 
Instead, Karl Theodor died on 17 February 1799 leaving Bavaria adrift. The deceased 
Elector’s capital, left to the ambitious, yet incompetent hands of Count Rumford. Electoral 
Bavaria was in crisis. Munich’s population swelled to 40,000 by the end of the eighteenth 
century of which 2,000 were beggars.294 Rumford’s plan to feed and house Munich’s poor with 
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the construction of great halls and ample portions of Rumfordsuppe, a barley and pea soup, were 
well-meaning but lacked sufficient planning and resources for proper execution. Rumford’s land 
reforms and defortification of Munich destroyed arable land and supplies of bread, barley, while 
other ingredients for Rumford’s soup dwindled.295 Rumford’s impractical and detached approach 
to bureaucracy, urban planning, and poor relief are perhaps best encapsulated from his essays on 
handling Munich’s homeless problem. Rumford wrote in his 1796 essay, “An account of the 
Taking up of Beggars in Munich,” an uninspiring, and possibly contrived scenario in which he 
enforced Munich’s new poor relief laws; 
We were hardly got into the street when we were accosted by a beggar, who asked us for 
alms. I went up to him, and laying my hand gently upon his shoulder, told him, that from 
thenceforwards begging would not be permitted in Munich;—that if he really stood in 
need of assistance, (which would immediately be enquired into,) the necessary assistance 
should certainly be given him, but that begging was forbidden, and if he was detected in 
it again he would be severely punished. 296Rumford’s authority as military leader and 
First Minister in 1799 was stretched thin and, without an Elector present, it was certain to 
be relieved of his authority upon the accession of a new leader.  
Rumford’s limited authority still operated within a relatively unchanged nexus of political, 
economic, and religious powers present when Karl Theodor acceded to the throne in 1779.  
The authority of the Elector was limited by the regional jurisdiction of Güter lords who 
opposed any attempts to secure the Wittelsbach role of Fideikommiss, an entrusted property 
holder (as an expression of authority rather than possession of land).297 The Catholic Church 
formed one of the most powerful blocs of estate holders throughout Karl Theodor’s rule as well. 
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Church lands accounted for 56% of all landholdings by 1799.298 Bavarians universally observed 
and heeded the spiritual commands of the Church through numerous devotions, observances, 
masses, pilgrimages, processions and festivals each year.299 Karl Theodor, by design of the 
Electoral throne, was the manager of the vital institutions of the Bavarian state from the Church 
to the Guter estates. The Elector’s real power resided in the expectation that he would coordinate 
the cooperation of each estate of the Electoral state rather than push for sweeping, unilateral 
reform. Karl Theodor’s legacy was that of a failed leader who halfheartedly committed to reform 
and the pursuit of centralized authority while fully indulging in art, theater, and urban 
beautification at the expense of practical or popular uses of the private treasury. Karl Theodor 
and Graf Rumford’s destruction of city walls yielded much consternation from the public as did 
the construction of an expensive baroque palace. 
The Accession of Max Joseph and Montgelas (1799) 
Max Joseph, Duke of Zweibrücken succeeded Karl Theodor as Elector on 16 February 
1799 beginning a path towards centralized authority in the hands of the Elector (then King) of 
Bavaria, a plan first outlined as early as 1796.300 The count of Zweibrücken arrived in Munich 
amidst a great deal of tumult in Bavaria and beyond. Karl Theodor had died without an heir and 
Max Joseph, a member of the minor line of the Wittelsbach Dynasty (Pfalz-Birkenfeld) was 
selected as the heir of the electoral issue.301 Max Joseph differed greatly in temperament, artistic 
taste, and ambition from his predecessor. The new elector was described as easygoing and 
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convivial in his encounters with a broad cross-section of Bavarian society.302 Max Joseph 
navigated the social atmosphere of courtly interests with ease but his decision making process, 
much like that of his predecessor Karl Theodor, could be “fickle and indecisive.”303 Max Joseph 
was aided in matters of state by his ambitious and radical advisor Maximilian von Garnerin, the 
future Graf Montgelas.304 Montgelas and Max Joseph worked well together in the Duchy of 
Zweibrücken where the latter had become duke upon the death of his brother in 1795. Both Max 
Joseph and Montgelas read Enlightenment texts regarding ideal forms of shared powers of 
government, physiocratic reform of land, endorsed the instrumental role played by well-educated 
bureaucrats, and critical to the future course of Bavarian policies, were both Francophiles who 
looked to the revolutionaries in Paris for inspiration in spite of the French occupation of the new 
Elector’s native Mannheim.305  
When Max Joseph became elector in February 1799 Europe was again in conflict, this 
time engaged in the War of the Second Coalition (1799-1802). Max Joseph would continually 
use the climate of conflict to leverage Bavarian reforms throughout his rule, enhancing and 
expanding his authority throughout the Electorate of Bavaria. Where previous Bavarian electors 
were wary of making public statements about military alliances due to the looming threat of the 
Electorate’s neighbors (namely Austria) Max Joseph was not subtle about where his personal 
sympathies would lie in the new war – on the side of France.306 Max Joseph wrote the French 
Directory in 1799, “I ask you to inform the director that he has no loyal friend but me. The joy I 
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felt every time I heard about the success of the Republic's weapons has shown me that I'm 
French.”307 Max Joseph, ever conscious of the exclusion of Bavaria from the Congress of Rastatt 
settlement, and wary of Austrian designs, however, remained in the Second Coalition against the 
Directory.308 Max Joseph, who perhaps exercised prudent caution over indecision when, despite 
his sympathies for the revolutionaries, kept Bavaria closer to its powerful neighbor Austria. Such 
a decision was critical to the stability of Max Joseph’s new rule and allowed for him to maintain 
at least tacit support among Bavarian notables. This was of vital importance as he pursued a 
greater role as a supreme authority in the Electorate over merely one instrument in a 
constellation of estates and interests. 
 Max Joseph solidified his role in the Electorate’s power structure by giving his full 
support to the sweeping reforms proposed by his principal advisor Maximilian von Montgelas. 
Montgelas had advocated for the rapid expansion of Bavarian civil bureaucracy in size, quality 
of civil servants, and powers in his 30 September 1796 Ansbach Memorandum or “Proposal for a 
Program of State Reforms.”309 The memorandum, addressed to Max Joseph, begins with the 
direct and declarative statement, “One of the greatest flaws of the Bavarian administration lies in 
the defective organization of the central ministry. A precise division of the departments, so 
useful for maintaining the order without which business cannot be carried out in a regular 
fashion, is absolutely unknown there.”310 Montgelas wrote from experience as a former civil 
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servant in the service of Karl Theodor. The Bavarian bureaucracy’s inadequacies, and the limited 
authority of the elector, played a large role in the ineffectiveness of Karl Theodor’s reforms, 
however non-committal they were. Any changes would require a strong executive and a 
dedicated team to execute his orders. Montgelas continued; 
Most of the ministers sit on the council merely as a matter of form. The chancellor is, 
strictly speaking, the only one who works. Everything is referred to him. He alone 
prepares and deals with all the questions on which the Sovereign has reserved the right of 
decision. This arrangement, which was fine for the Middle Ages, when the simplicity of 
handling things facilitated and lessened the work of government officials, is no longer 
suitable today, as matters have become much more complicated.311 
 
Montgelas identified the problem of limited, unskilled bureaucracy also emphasized the need for 
a larger, better trained bureaucracy than that which existed in Bavaria. Montgelas, however 
failed to mention the powerful forces beyond the crown. This was likely a deliberate choice 
influenced by his dismissal and the constraints imposed by prevailing German legal theories 
about the role of cameral officials.312 Max Joseph agreed with Montgelas’ ideas and made him 
First Minister. 
 When Max Joseph dismissed Count Rumford in 1799, he was also conscious, like 
Montgelas, that one man could neither fulfill all bureaucratic tasks nor could he persuade or 
manage the other personalities and leaders of institutions that dominated Bavarian society. 
Bavaria’s nobles were a powerful influence on the Elector. The Nobles also obstructed the 
efforts of Karl Theodor to exchange territory or to make serious alterations to Munich’s 
defenses. This was consistent with their defiance of Karl Theodor. The expansion of a civil 
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bureaucracy, and the investment of such a body with any measure of authority would be 
controversial. Bavaria, like Austria and Prussia, had a history of cameralists being the First 
Ministers of Electors. Unlike these larger powers, however, Bavaria had no traditions of elite 
service to the crown or respect for the centralized authority of a dedicated civil service.313 
Bavarian cameralists, unlike their Prussian counterparts in Berlin, did not have an arrangement 
with their nobles for loyal military and civil service in exchange for titles bestowed by a king.314 
Any state reform in Bavaria would require first the expansion of cameral roles was needed 
The role of cameral officials in larger states had more support than Bavaria where 
competing interests such as nobles and the Church blocked the expansion of centralized state 
power. Cameral officials were tasked with the broad, vague role of Polizei. As historian David 
Lindenfeld observed this was defined by Immanuel Kant as, “public security, comfort, and 
respectability...”315 The authority of cameral officials was also dictated by interpretations of 
“different rights of sovereignty (Hoheitsrechte) in German state law as developed by [Johann 
Stephan] Pütter and others.”316  Cameral officials, by 1799, still navigated broadly defined roles 
as agents of state administration and conflict resolution between the numerous powerful estates 
in Bavarian society. While historian Hans Rosenberg, wrote in his study, Bureaucracy, 
Aristocracy, and Autocracy, the Prussian Experience, 1660-1815, “Thus, the nobility of descent 
had lost ground, in terms of influence and numbers, in the exercise of the powers of leadership,” 
such could not be said of Bavaria. Neither Bavarian electors, nor cameralists, were, to paraphrase 
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the absolutist King Louis XIV, the state in and of itself. Any reform of a civil service would 
require the subordination of estate notables, the Catholic Church and mendicant orders, and the 
authority of urban patricians. Such a task could only be accomplished by the long-term project of 
establishing an enlightened absolutist state. Montgelas made his case for the drastic expansion of 
Bavarian cameral responsibilities to Max Joseph in 1799. 
 Montgelas’ theories of an expanded civil service were given practical expression in the 
1799 “Directive on Reforming the Training of State Officials.” Montgelas’ memorandum, issued 
on 25 June 1799, was a documented attempt to expand the civil bureaucracy for the purpose of 
asserting a more direct and powerful electoral authority from Max Joseph himself. Montgelas 
embarked on a long-term path to eliminate feudal privileges in 1799.317 The directive marked a 
strong departure in the training of civil servants from previous cameral universities. Montgelas 
established benchmarks for a general course of study for university students who sought electoral 
posts. The curricula for a prospective cameral official, in Montgelas’ opinion required one to; 
“…first strive to obtain practical experience at a rural court in the following areas: the course of 
judicial civil and criminal justice, the composition of legal documents and interrogations, 
inventories and inspections…”318 Such training required a prospective civil servant to play an 
active role in also keeping abreast of the shifting demands of German agriculture and the legal 
approach to land use. 
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 Montgelas anticipated the inclusive nature of civil bureaucracy despite the lack of 
centralized control exercised by Munich. The 1799 directive also required legal training to 
include, but not be limited to, “guardianship and deposit affairs, matters relating to the church 
and charitable foundations, the tax system, the oversight of military billeting, as well as other 
matters associated with the state police, national culture, and the polity.”319 This directive was, 
however, purely theoretical. Any expansion of the civil bureaucracy into a functioning, all-
encompassing, professional staff required a further revolution in the establishment of the elector 
as a sovereign beholden that was not beholden to any of the estates. Many elements within 
Bavarian society, especially the Catholic Church and mendicant orders (Jesuits and Norbertines), 
viewed such a French inspired, Enlightened bureaucracy as a danger to Bavaria.320 Other 
Bavarians looked to Prussia as both an ideal model of enlightened absolutism as well as a potent 
ally to stave off Austrian influence.321 Montgelas and Max Joseph, French educated and 
sympathetic to the revolutionaries, looked to Paris for inspiration instead. Montgelas and Max 
Joseph thus faced the crises of debt, declining agricultural production, foreign influence, and the 
challenge of the elites within Bavaria.  
 Max Joseph was energetic and eager upon assuming the throne in 1799. Yet the new 
Elector was immediately frustrated by the issue of tremendous state debt and the financial 
insolvency of Bavaria’s Adelige Stände – the estate nobility who were key junior partners in his 
rule over the Electorate.322 Montgelas, paranoid and suspicious of the religious orders and estate 
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lords, was confrontational and insisted on controlling all aspects of reform.323 This was also 
necessary due to the powerful influence of these blocs. The 1799 directive offers precisely what 
Montgelas’ looked for in his subordinates: professionalism and loyalty. Montgelas’ concluded 
the directive with the statement, “Although this administrative training is obligatory, partly for 
the sake of educating, partly for the sake of examining the aspiring counselors of justice, without 
regard to rank, it is not a guarantee of an actual right to employment; rather, when vacancies 
occur they will be filled by the trainees who prove to be the best qualified. Montgelas wished to 
create a professional, permanent bureaucracy to replace existing notions of Polizei. The training 
of bureaucrats echoed the revolutionary, and controversial program to expand cameral training to 
a specialized civil bureaucracy in the service of an unchallenged sovereign. The idea of a more 
powerful sovereign in the model of an enlightened absolutist, however, was something that 
domestic pressures and foreign influence complicated if not made nearly impossible. Renewed 
conflict soon brought new problems and dilemmas to the Electorate in 1799. 
Bavaria in the War of the Second Coalition (1800) 
 Max Joseph’s participation in the War of the Second Coalition (1798-1802) was a 
hindrance to Montgelas’ efforts to concentrate power in the hands of the King. Bavarian war 
efforts also stalled Montgelas’ efforts to implement an Enlightenment-inspired state 
administration. Montgelas’ ambitious plans were stymied in 1799 when the French Army 
mounted an ambitious offensive in the direction of southwest Germany, exploiting their victories 
won in the Rhineland and the subsequent territorial gains agreed upon by the Austrians and 
Reichstädte at the Congress of Rastatt. Bavaria was limited to the status of a present power at the 
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negotiations but not one with much of a voice. Electoral representatives, led by Georg Friedrich 
von Zentner, watched as Mannheim, and much of the Rhineland Palatinate regions of Bavaria, 
became the spoils of war for both victors and vanquished. When war resumed, Bavaria found 
itself in a familiar place, sidled between the aggressive postures of Austria and Prussia.324 Some 
of Bavaria’s most fertile and valuable land was in the west where vineyards and large-scale 
cereal agriculture produced significant profits for Güter estates.325 Austria moved against France 
to protect their northern Italian territories, bringing the war closer to the south of Bavaria. The 
course of the war forced Bavarians to reassess how to protect agricultural lands. 
 The demands of the War of the Second Coalition forced the First Minister to reprioritize 
the defense of the Electorate over his plans to overhaul economic, social, political, and religious 
aspects of everyday life.326 France delivered a crushing blow to the Russian Army in Switzerland 
in 1799 and by 1800 was poised to strike deep into the heart of the Electorate of Bavaria. 
Napoleon Bonaparte, now First Consul of the Directorate, fought and won a major victory at 
Marengo over the Austrians, weakening the strength of the Habsburg defenses in the Rhineland. 
Montgelas, and Max Joseph, faced a critical and difficult quandary. Both men were students of 
the Enlightenment and championed the success of the French Revolution. French forces did, 
however, lay waste to much of Bavarian territory during the War of the First Coalition. The 
destructive foraging of the French Army deeply affected Bavarians. Bavaria thus contributed a 
token effort to the War of the Second Coalition, adding its meager forces to the Austrian 
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command fighting the French west of Munich. French forces, under general Moreau, defeated 
Austrian and Bavarian forces at the Battle of Hohenlinden on 3 December 1800. Austria, having 
lost the Battle of Marengo to Napoleon Bonaparte in June 1800 as well, disengaged from the 
conflict and thereafter, like Bavaria, sought peace terms from France. 
Making Peace and Preserving Bavaria: Lunéville and Bavarian Economic Growth 
 Max Joseph and Montgelas used the defeat at Hohenlinden to sign a peace treaty with 
France, giving Electoral Bavaria an advantageous position for territorial expansion at the 
Reichsdeputationschluss (RDH), the Final Recess of the Holy Roman Empire. The Austro-
Bavarian defeat at Hohenlinden produced a rift between Vienna and Munich. France’s victory 
caused the Austrian army to retreat eastward to defend Vienna from the French, abandoning 
Munich to general Moreau and French forces. Francis II, the Holy Roman Emperor, signed a 
new peace treaty with France at Lunéville in 1801 negotiating an end to hostilities while 
finalizing territorial agreements first advanced at Rastatt from 1797-1799.327 Lunéville cemented 
the presence of France on the east bank of the Rhine River as well as territory claimed by 
Electoral Bavaria. Article six of the Lunéville Treaty made specific reference to both Habsburg 
and Bavarian territories in Batavia (the Austrian Netherlands and the adjacent Electoral 
territories) as well as land in the Helvetic Republic, northern Italy, and territory in the Inn River 
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basin southeast of Munich.328 Any hopes of further integrating disparate Bavarian estates in the 
Palatinate and northwestern Europe were dashed when the French also demanded the “Thalweg 
of the Rhine” – a line connecting the lowest points of the River thus being ideal for navigating 
the various segments of the valuable trade and communication route. Montgelas’ modernization 
of Bavarian agriculture also depended on securing and promoting the useful transportation of 
goods, a concept known as Wohlfahrts (welfare transportation).329 Access to land was necessary 
for the development of Bavaria’s economy. 
 Max Joseph and Montgelas needed to protect Bavaria’s fertile land and river access to 
develop the funds necessary for state driven reforms. Bavaria, even prior to the reign of Max 
Joseph, possessed valuable salt reserves and held a monopoly on transportation of the 
commodity in southwestern Germany.330 Tolls on river-based movement of salt for trade were an 
integral part of the growth of the Bavarian economy by the early-nineteenth century. 
Transportation beyond waterways was also taxed by Munich at .0075 florin per kilometer 
Fuhrlohn (cartage) but was slow and inefficient.331 The frequency of conflict on Electoral land, 
as well as the division and exploitation of the various “spotted carpet” (Fleckerlteppich) estates 
and territories, made transportation of goods and the collection of taxable commerce difficult.332 
Protecting this land, however, could not be done without fending off the influence of the 
Habsburg Empire. 
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 The Habsburg Emperor Francis II, ostensibly a protector of the smaller German states, 
angled to solidify his territorial claims first raised at Campo-Formio and Rastatt, further 
complicating Bavarian attempts to maintain its security and the profitability of economic 
activity. In a secret exchange of the Treaty of Lunéville, ratified on 9 February 1801, France 
recognized Austria’s claim to Berchtesgaden and even more territory in the vicinity of the 
Archbishopric of Salzburg.333 The Habsburg acquisition of Berchtesgaden was disconcerting for 
Bavarians. Berchtesgaden was a provostry, an important cloister town between the Habsburg 
Empire and Electoral Bavaria became part of the Archbishopric of Salzburg in 1802. The 
provostry also had a profitable salt mine that fed into Bavaria’s vital commodity trading of the 
mineral and the transportation tolls Munich collected. In sum, Bavaria’s territories were scattered 
more so than prior to the treaties at Campo-Formio and Rastatt. Bavaria faced serious losses of 
high yield lands, lucrative salt mines, and the trade arteries that sustained Munich’s authority and 
the maintenance of Güter estates. Bavarian territory, however, was soon to expand as a result of 
French success in the Rhineland. 
By 1802-1803, Bavaria was a much smaller polity but, led by the regime of elector Max 
Joseph and his First Minister Maximilian von Montgelas, began to use the expanded power of 
the civil service to drive structured economic growth. Britain and France made peace in the 1802 
Treaty of Amiens, thus concluding the hostilities of the War of the Second Coalition. Electoral 
Bavaria now possessed the Duchy of Berg, Wurzburg, Bamberg, and Munich. Max Joseph 
possessed an outwardly optimistic view of Bavaria’s status as a minor power in 1803 yet 
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reevaluated the need for profitable industries. The thoughts of Max Joseph, and his ministers, 
conveyed in the 1803 Churbaierisches Intelligenzblatt, expressed a shared desire to spur trade in 
cities and towns. The Intelligenzblatt posed the frank question, “When will a manufactory be 
recreated in the former fortress city of Ingolstadt?”334 The report answered the question by laying 
out a plan to mobilize Ingolstadt’s residents for the purpose of the various benefits of economic 
development. Such taxable trades formed the new basis for revenue for the state coffers.335 
Munich’s civil servants recognized the various hardships posed by the years of war but offered a 
bold new direction for recovery.  
 Land reorganization was part of a broader plan to shift the Bavarian economy from one 
of subsistence to profitable, productive agriculture. One of the biggest challenges to this 
transformation was the attitudes of ordinary Bavarians towards land use. The 1803 
Churbaeirisches Intelligenzblatt reported; “It is difficult to lead people accustomed to a certain 
way of life on a different path; - misery alone … only, the police must remove …. such that the 
people who wish to stand upright again don’t despair…”336 Here, the Bavarian court and 
ministers repurpose the idea of the Hausnotdurft – a principle of mutually beneficial public 
works and a “domestic necessity” - common in Gutsherrschaft system to spur economic 
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activity.337 The state, acting as a more involved sponsor of Fabriken and Manufaktoren 
(protoindustrial craft industries), enhanced structured state guided economic growth. 
 Such productive industries were part of the so called “bureaucratic rationality” of the 
Montgelas’ state ministries. This produced the fulfillment in part of the Ansbach Memorandum 
and the directive on the training of new Polizei.338 A fragment of this report that remains for 
public use also communicated the benefit for Handelsmänner (merchants) who worked with 
Munich. The report’s authors explain that one beverage merchant in possession of a building 
would see an increase in profits if the space was expanded with help from the state; “because 
half of the remaining homes are destroyed, they only have a net yearly yield of 600 florin.; he 
had not required service of the of the last troublesome buildings possessed, so there was a net 
influx of 1,200 florin.”339 Profitability of industries and land development helped the state, 
landholders, and merchants. It also represented partly what economist Karl Polyani described as 
a “great transformation” of economies towards “possessive market society” in a broader 
European sense.340 Bavarian territory shrank from successive wars but the state bureaucratic 
impulse to engage with economic assistance and profitability of land use increased in scope and 
intensity. The shared idea of necessity of the very spartan Gutsherrschaft system, the Idee der 
Nahrung (the idea of subsistence) later defined by German economist Werner Sombart, were 
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well on their way to obsolescence. Further expansion of Bavarian territory and authority seemed 
to be the last barriers to a meteoric rise in profitability and prominence for the Electorate. 
An Independent Electoral Bavaria: The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803 and the 
Secularization of Church Land 
 Max Joseph’s interest in state sponsored economic growth and land development was 
assisted by territorial gains and a near complete legal departure from the institutions of the Holy 
Roman Empire in 1803. The availability of land for private sale also increased dramatically as a 
result of major territorial appropriation and annexation in 1803.  
The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (RDH), the Final Recess of the Holy Roman Empire 
of 1803, was the reorganization of the various duchies, free imperial cities, and archbishoprics of 
the Rhineland territories, all but in name shattering the final vestiges of imperial authority in the 
Reichstädte.341 The RDH was the project of Napoleon Bonaparte for the purposes of 
compensating Habsburg Austria and the German states for the loss of the Rhineland but was 
carried out by the Emperor Francis II.342 Francis II mediatized, or eliminated the privileges of 
small state elites and archbishoprics before offering unincorporated duchies, free imperial cities, 
and church affiliated lands to larger powers, even including Bavaria and Baden.343 The Final 
Recess of the Holy Roman Empire was finalized on 27 April 1803. In all, the RDH transformed 
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Germany through the elimination of over 60 ecclesiastical territories.344 The RDH was 
instrumental in helping to expand the territorial holdings of smaller German states. 
 In Electoral Bavaria, Max Joseph and Montgelas accomplished two major long-term 
objectives from the RDH: territorial expansion and independence from the legal and diplomatic 
institutions of the Holy Roman Empire. Bavaria gained valuable territory such as the Duchy of 
Berg in the Palatinate.345 The Duchy’s capital of Dusseldorf was situated in an ideal location on 
the Rhine River. Territorial expansion came at an ideal time for Bavarians. British grain prices 
fell during the early-nineteenth century and German cereal prices, including Bavarian crops, 
soared.346 Land redistribution was also a product of the RDH in Bavaria. Land was sold by 
princes, ecclesiastical bodies, and guilds while rents were shorter and more expensive (generally 
in three-year terms).347 The Gutsherrschaft system survived these land exchanges while urban 
speculators sold available land to peasants, driving up private debt.348 Land from the RDH was 
valuable for agricultural productivity but also opened more markets to Bavarian merchants and 
bankers. 
 Land was frequently sold off, with other assets, in state run auctions. The lasting effects 
of war and the collapse of Imperial institutions produced a cash and credit crisis leading to 
foreclosures.349 Bavaria was a minor power when compared to Austria or Prussia in Germany. 
The Electorate was, however, a much stronger polity than the sundry segments of land that it 
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received in the RDH. Bavaria was one of ten Imperial Kreise before 1803, comprising one of the 
smaller economies and a patchwork of territories.350 The addition of new territories in the 
Palatinate brought a more cohesive Bavaria to bear, including a corridor of land connecting the 
Duchy of Berg, Altbayern, and Franconia to the northwest of Munich.351 Bavarian, at times 
peasants but mostly wealthy urban patricians, benefitted from the availability of more land to 
rent but at much higher prices. Not all Bavarians possessed enough liquidity to participate in 
such a market. Land availability, especially in valuable former ecclesiastical areas, benefitted 
rural buyers or urban speculators who wished to acquire and sell parcels of land. Over eighty 
percent of all Germans lived in rural areas at the beginning of the century.352 Therefore, there 
were certainly enough interested parties willing and able to acquire newly available land even 
while the negotiations for the RDH were still being finalized.  
 There were also those willing to part with land, and immovable assets such as draught 
animals, to acquire much-needed cash by the beginning of 1803. A Churbaierisches 
Intelligenzblatt announcement for a cereal auction was posted on the authority of Karl Edler von 
Burger, high court representative, rural judge, and steward on 14 January 1803.353 Burger’s 
notification was for grain in the town of Mering near Augsburg.354 Mering had been a town in 
Electoral Bavaria long before the territorial expansion of the RDH. The auction of assets from 
Mering residents, however, were not subject for sale by a centralized bureaucratic authority 
before 1803. Max Joseph, having left the Holy Roman Empire through the RDH now shed the 
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religious and legal traditions of the Empire on the advice of Montgelas.355 Cereal prices, 
including barley, wheat, corn, and maize usually came at the end of each Intelligenzblatt due to 
their importance for a broad cross section of Bavarians ranging from the richest elites and 
merchants to poorer farmers selling their crops. Cereals for sale included 10 bushels 
(Schäffel)…1 quarter of a bushel of rye, and 31 bushels of barley.356 Such wares were available 
for purchase by the state at a time of major social transformations in Bavaria as well. Montgelas 
attempted to establish a “monocratic” state where the liquidation and auction of these items 
would be available for sale to a rapidly expanding, wealthier landholding segment of society.357 
Available land, even if it made requisitioning and auctioning off such foodstuffs, was a net 
benefit for Montgelas’ attempt to make the state the sole power in Bavaria under the leadership 
of Max Joseph. If the RDH helped Montgelas add more land to Elector Bavaria then the 
acquisition of Church land under the policy of secularization in 1803 fulfilled a second, if not 
more transformative moment in shifting Bavaria towards a more productive and profitable 
agricultural power. 
 Secularization in 1803, the forced state takeover of Church lands and abolition of 
ecclesiastical political power and jurisdiction, formed a key objective of Montgelas’ civil service. 
The secularization of archbishoprics and their land was a long-term goal of Montgelas, and, in 
part, many of his predecessors in the eighteenth century. The process of secularization was 
initially led by French Revolutionaries at home and spread as Enlightenment inspired groups 
aligned with Jacobinism emulated France.358 Montgelas’ primary interest in these institutions, 
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however, was the land and movable assets (i.e. trade goods and rents) they possessed. Bavarian 
ecclesiastical land was worth an estimated 11 million gulden.359 Such land was extremely 
valuable because of its arable soil and valuable goods it produced ranging from abundant cereal 
harvests to much desired beer and wines in former archbishoprics like that of Freising, just 
outside of Munich. Funds for the state were also desperately needed. Bavarian state debt rose to 
38 million gulden in 1803.360 Montgelas, having subverted the authority of the Church, not only 
seized much of their assets, mostly land, but did so by breaking with broader German and 
Imperial legal traditions.  
 German legal traditions, observed in Bavaria, were the synthesis of Canonical, Roman, 
and German schools of thought. Montgelas, like the Prussian and Austrian legal reformers of the 
early-nineteenth century, advanced his own program for legal reform beginning with civil 
service directive of 1799 and the first attempt at a draft resolution to establish a Bavarian 
Landtag to make laws in 1800.361 Montgelas combined the foreign and inner ministries and well 
as the Finance Ministry and made himself, with the assent of Max Joseph, the First Minister of 
all three.362 Therefore, Montgelas was in a legal sanctioned position to supersede established 
legal conventions and the recognized traditions of estate cooperation via cameral intermediaries. 
Put simply, Montgelas, acting on behalf of Max Joseph, was the Bavarian state. 
 Montgelas’ seizure of Church land and sale to private holders constituted a key moment 
in the transformation of Bavaria’s economy as well as the pivotal role of the state, not estate 
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holders and renters, in arbitrating and brokering land transfer. Having taken Church assets, 
Montgelas moved to implement physiocratic inspired reforms for land development emphasizing 
productive agriculture.363 The results of this transfer were significant. Historian Tim Blanning 
asserted that as much as 50% of all land was acquired by urban speculators and members of 
Bavaria’s middling order.364 In addition land transfer from Churches produced much 
consternation among Bavaria’s notables and poorest ranks alike. The sale of Church land was 
part and parcel of a, “huge wave of secularization [that] enabled the Bavarian state to strengthen 
the vital class of prosperous independent peasant proprietors [but was] less successful, however, 
in persuading the nobility to follow suit.”365 Church land was also integral to massive poor relief 
schemes independent of projects, like Rumford’s military workhouses, to feed the poor with 
cheap bread, beer, and other foods.366 Bavarian Burghers were less successful, if interested, in 
fulfilling a similar duty to the poor.367 This would have dire consequences for many of Bavaria’s 
neediest when the Napoleonic Wars began later in 1803. Specific property transactions were a 
daily occurrence.  
 Instructive examples of land transfer to ordinary Bavarian property buyers and titled 
nobility can be found in both regional announcements made by the state as well broadsheets. One 
notice published by the general commissioner regarding land jurisdiction and the availability of 
ecclesiastical land for sale was posted in the Churfurstl. Oberpfälzisches Wochenblat on 1 April 
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1803.368 The report details the removal of Church authority over land, something quite common 
in the wake of secularization as over 73 distinct Church territories of the Pralätenorden were 
now under Munich’s control.369 This specific land seizure stated, “…his prince-electorial 
Highness has deigned to appoint by highest decree of March 15th the unassigned parish Anzing 
in Bavaria to the spiritual council kanonifuss, Anton Buber, highly praised by the prince-
electorial Office of the General Commissioner.”370 Buber was praise as a representative 
appointed by a general commissioner in Freising to assume control over Church land in Anzing, 
an Upper Bavarian town. The presence of a state representative in the Freising in April 1803, 
however, is revealing. Montgelas’ regime acted quickly, bringing Freising, a valuable and 
historic center of Church activity in Bavaria, under Electoral control. Furthermore, state 
authority meant that an expensive standing army occupied new land and enforced the will of the 
Elector with unprecedented authority. The presence of Munich’s civil servants was inconsistent, 
but an attempt was made to assert direct influence over people living in Freising and Anzing to 
the north.  
 The role of the Bavarian state was a necessary vehicle for social and economic 
transformation regardless of whether, in the context of modernization theory, it was successful in 
this task.371 Munich’s enforcement of sweeping land reform was not the passive role played by 
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eighteenth century cameralists. Instead, both civil servants, and a military unit, the Fugger Light 
Cavalry Regiment, made Bavarian control in Freising, and its former archbishopric, a visible 
reality.372 The activities of religious life, however, were not subject to any French inspired 
control or domination. Upper Bavaria also remained mostly Catholic and its spiritual 
contributions for its parishioners remained largely unchanged.373 Protestant denominations were 
also protected under Bavarian rule with the Tolerance Edict of 1803.374 Montgelas’ ministries 
now played an active role in transforming the physical dimensions of Bavarian ecclesiastical and 
former feudal land, asserting authority through direct means of policing and legal authority, and 
the dissemination of Enlightened ideas of religious toleration. Threats of resumed European 
hostilities, however, threatened to bring war again to Electoral Bavaria, jeopardizing once again, 
any attempt at reform. 
Bavarian Plans for Land Amelioration and the War of the Third Coalition (1805-1806) 
 Montgelas’ efforts to expand integrate new Bavarian territories and seize former feudal 
and ecclesiastical land faced a significant test with the need to compensate landholders for lost 
tracts and to persuade common farmers to adopt new, experimental cultivation techniques. 
Bavarian ownership of Church lands and new tracts acquired during the Final Recess of the Holy 
Roman Empire in 1803 was central to funding Montgelas’ ambitious plans. Montgelas remained 
committed to a project of state centralization and the promotion of domestic and foreign trade of 
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grain, salt, wine, and other movable goods. Montgelas was impeded by the Gemenglage 
(mixture) of laws, traditions, and regional customs that made the integration and homogenization 
of Bavarian identity and governance difficult.375 In sum, in 1803 alone, Bavaria gained 288 
square miles of land, 843,000 new subjects, and the cities and towns of Würzburg, Passau, 
Freising, Eichstatt, and Bamberg.376 Revenue generated from land in the form of rents and land 
sales fueled much of Montgelas’ sweeping reforms. The process of transforming land after 
allodification was called “redemption” where land was bought and sold for cash 
compensation.377 
 Fears of governmental based oppression also abounded but the First Minister’s 
representatives discounted concerns of potential abuses by promising some titled landholders’ 
compensation or indemnities for the loss of land. A general report entitled, “The Indemnification 
of the Serene Electoral House of the Bavarian Palatinate” was an examination of the financial 
and political ramifications of efforts to assimilate new land, buyers, and to address compensation 
claims for those affected.378 The indemnification report chronicled the fears of those who lost 
land or had it purchased at lower costs by the state.379  The report, prepared for Max Joseph, 
features a rebuff of critics of secularization: “With the progress and the exercise of such regents 
[are] ordinances one must not fear from the secularization of the monasteries that an Egyptian 
darkness will break over the next generations.”380 Redemption, though a dynamic break from 
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land rights of the past, was more generously compensated in Bavaria than it was in other German 
states.381 Rural buyers, however, did not develop land as quickly or productively as Montgelas 
envisioned.  
Montgelas read leading agronomic theories from thinkers such Albrecht Thär and his 
translations of English agronomist Arthur Young. Max Joseph sent an official to Celle to speak 
with Thär regarding agricultural organization in enclosures to enhance production.382 Max 
Joseph’s subjects, however, were not agronomists. The Bavarian peasant farmer, like other 
Germans in the early-nineteenth century, was illiterate, superstitious, and stubborn.383 
Montgelas’ parochialism and expectation that farmers would embrace the rational, advanced 
notions of efficient cash crop production met with the practical, if hardheaded peasant farming 
approach. Still, Montgelas’ approach was bold and much-needed. Bavaria needed additional 
funds and greater crop yields to survive the climate of European wars. Peasant farmers could ill-
afford the resources necessary for the proposed improvements on their land. Credit was in large 
part unavailable to them as well.384 Larger obstacles to agrarian reform, however, loomed in 
1803 as Europe was once again at war and Bavaria, as it was in conflicts past, the battleground. 
 The War of the Third Coalition (1803-1806) provided Max Joseph and Montgelas with 
the opportunity to further cement the role of the Wittelsbach Dynasty in Bavaria, the role of the 
centralized state bureaucracy, and protection from foreign invaders wishing to appropriate the 
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Electorate’s resources. France, under the leadership of first consul Napoleon Bonaparte, was 
frustrated by the inability to retain control of Haiti and sold the Louisiana Territories to the 
United States on 30 April 1803 for 68 million Francs.385 Napoleon used the proceeds to prepare 
for an invasion of Britain at his base in Boulogne. Britain declared war on France on 18 May 
1803 over lingering tensions that failed to dissipate in the aftermath of the 1802 Treaty of 
Amiens. The Third Coalition was formed between Austria and Russia with Britain also at war 
with France, largely at sea. Austrian and Russian armies mobilized and planned an advance into 
France, again through Bavaria. Austria, in the words of military historian Charles Esdaile, hoped 
to contain France at the expense of Bavarian territory.386 Max Joseph sought to protect Bavaria 
from the fallout of a potential war fought in the Electorate. Napoleon crowned himself emperor 
of France on 2 December 1804, further provoking the coalition arrayed against him and 
increasing the chance of an armed struggle on Bavarian soil.  
France, Austria, and Russia all moved towards battle in 1805 while Max Joseph sought to 
avoid war. Max Joseph signed the defensive Treaty of Bogenhausen with France on 2 May 1805, 
removing Bavaria from hostilities and refusing to ally the Electoral state with Austria.387 This 
decision was critical to preserving Bavarian autonomy and the future expansion of the state 
under Max Joseph. Austria, as predicted invaded Bavaria in late 1805 as Napoleon moved his 
forces from Boulogne to confront the Austrian Army first at Ulm, on Bavarian soil, and then in a 
crushing victory, destroyed the combined Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz on 2 
December 1805. Bavaria, as a defensive, neutral power (as well as being a buffer state between 
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Imperial France and Austria, stood to benefit from a settlement ending hostilities between France 
and Austria. The Treaty of Pressburg (Bratislava) in 1805 resulted in Austria’s loss of territory in 
the Rhineland, northern Italy, and southeastern Bavaria.388 Max Joseph proclaimed the Kingdom 
of Bavaria in December 1805 after the Treaty of Pressburg. Max Joseph and Montgelas now 
stood to gain from further territorial adjustments as France sought to reorder client states in the 
German lands. 
An Independent Power or a Napoleonic Client State? The Kingdom of Bavaria 
 Max Joseph and Montgelas used the Treaty of Pressburg and the formation of the French 
led Confederation of the Rhine to cement the process of mediatization. This process was eased 
by the French recognizing and assisting a new Kingdom of Bavaria. Montgelas used the period 
between the Final Recess of the Holy Roman Empire and the 1806 Treaty of Pressburg to erode 
legal and rental privileges of much of the elite Stände (estate) and to secularize Church lands.389 
This process had been underway in France since 1789 and was known as allodification – the 
separation of land from privilege and title and its definition and privately held, immovable 
property.390 French occupation and influence east of the Rhine River lent support to the idea of 
estate allodification in the German states. The last vestiges of the Holy Roman Empire were also 
dissolved in 1806 with Napoleonic victories over Austria.  
Max Joseph, having established the Kingdom of Bavaria in December 1805, formally 
proclaimed himself of King Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria on 1 January 1806. Napoleon then 
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asked Max Joseph to marry off his daughter Augusta Amalie to Eugene Beauharnais, the stepson 
of the French Emperor.391 Thereafter, Napoleon recognized Bavaria as a Kingdom and also gave 
Max Joseph the cities of Würzburg and Salzburg in part because, “southern Germany [w]as 
central to the [French] Imperium.”392 For its part, “interest, complicity, and intimidation, “ tied 
Bavaria to France.393 Max Joseph and Montgelas made careful decisions in regards to 
Napoleonic France, hoping to leverage their favored status within the Imperium for their own 
ends. Bavaria ceded the Duchy of Berg, a loosely connected territory received in the 1803 RDH, 
to France.394 Napoleon established the Confederation of the Rhine in July of 1806, six months 
after he was victorious in the War of the Third Coalition. The Confederation of the Rhine 
included sixteen German states in three classifications; model states, dependent states, and 
smaller independent states that joined the Confederation later in 1806. The Kingdom of Bavaria 
was, ostensibly, a key dependent state of the Confederation of the Rhine and was rewarded with 
territories. Max Joseph was also required to furnish troops (30,000), draught animals, and food 
for Napoleonic forces.395 State debt, however, was reduced to 19 million gulden in 1806, 
demonstrating, that at least initially, Bavaria’s close ties to France were mutually beneficial.396 
Furthermore, if Austria and its allies ever challenged France again Bavaria would be again find 
itself at war, this time as a small combatant Kingdom and not merely a host for battles between 
larger powers. 
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 Montgelas attempted to use the strength of the Napoleonic alliance to advance and 
accelerate the process of allodification and redemption. Bavarian agriculture, though transferred 
to private holders, was not used productively. Broad trends for German farming included the 
uneven adoption of the three-field system with a four-segment left fallow with clover and turnip 
cultivation.397 Montgelas’ Finance Ministry was responsible for brokering land sales and 
encouraged the transfer of land at cash prices. Such a process could only be done voluntarily, and 
the enclosure of land among the nobility was an uncommon occurrence.398 The Bavarian 
ministries also could only purchase land back upon the consent of Güter elites.399 Montgelas 
hoped this scheme would lead to record profits generated by Bavarian agriculture. State debt, 
however, was out of control, rising to 80.6 million gulden in the span of only one year.400 
Montgelas needed funds to pay off this tremendous debt, spur economic growth, and provide the 
Confederation of Rhine with Napoleon’s expected levies. Montgelas’ initial intent was to 
encourage more domestic trade by reducing internal customs duties.401 Land taxes (Grundsteuer) 
were therefore increased to generate more revenue for allodified land.402 Montgelas’ plans were 
well-planned but the reservations of Güter lords impeded the fulfilment of any logical land-
related improvements. Land taxes were swiftly overhauled in all regions of the Kingdom of 
Bavaria, the effects of which were most felt in newly acquired lands. 
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 In May of 1806 Britain blockaded European ports controlled by France prompting 
Napoleon Bonaparte to form the Continental System, an internal blockade designed to destroy 
London’s economy, followed by a formal trade embargo in the Milan Decree of 1807. In 
Bavarians rankled at the various trade restrictions. The British trade blockade in May 1806 
destroyed the value of Bavarian grain. The sum of Bavaria’s 1806 crop worth was 445,203 
gulden for wheat, corn, and cereal owner’s profits respectively.403 This was a ten percent dip in 
crop worth compared to the previous month.404 This market was recorded by the Bavarian 
government (Churfürstl. Polizei) on 3 May 1806, just over one week before the imposition of the 
British naval blockade.405 Munich, and regional governments like Würzburg, were ill-equipped, 
however, to keep the grain market stable in the event of a severely depressed economic climate. 
In June, grain prices dipped suddenly. The sum of crops on Würzburg’s cereal market held on 30 
June 1806 plummeted to 352 gulden for wheat bushels, 115 gulden for corn, and 3 gulden for 
grain owners.406 The impositions of the campaigning season likely had an effect on depressed 
grain prices as Napoleon’s forces practiced foraging as they passed through Bavaria (and other 
territories). Napoleon defeated the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806 thus 
crushing the last German resistance to his military.  
Napoleon passed through Bavaria on his way to this confrontation, requisitioning food 
supplies from local sources. The sum total of grain values in Würzburg on 31 October 1806, over 
two weeks after the battle, had still not recovered. 272 gulden worth of wheat remained as colder 
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fall temperatures set in. Montgelas was still integrating new lands into the Kingdom of Bavaria 
while and mediatizing Güter estate land and Church plots. The plummeting grain market 
frustrated Montgelas’ plans.407 On 21 November 1806 a triumphant Napoleon issued the Berlin 
Decree, forbidding the import of British goods. Bavarian cereal worth soared but the value of the 
lowest prices of grain were not available for holders, perhaps implying that all grain reserves 
were sold or requisitioned by 10 December 1806.408 Bavarian markets, supported temporarily by 
Napoleonic victory, were not providing profits for most cereal wholesalers. Bavaria’s elite estate, 
the Adelige Stände, was also severely in debt and in search for credit and liquid assets.409 Efforts 
at integration produced dependency on the state and a coercive state of affairs (Sachezwang) 
governed centralization efforts, debt relief, and bankruptcy (Bankrott).410  
In 1807, state debt worsened, and the economic demands imposed by Napoleon 
increased. In December of 1807, Napoleon proclaimed the Milan Decree authorizing in article 3 
of the treaty the seizure of any goods from vessels flying the English flag or that stopped in 
English ports.411 In theory, the denial of English goods from the continents represented an 
appropriate protectionist measure, in practice it meant market restrictions for European states and 
a system of extraction brought by French domination. As markets were restricted and land 
development lagged, Montgelas sought to reaffirm the role of the centralized Munich ministries 
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in Bavaria. The state required legitimacy among its subjects and a fully articulated process of 
lawmaking and limited representation. 
The First Bavarian Constitution and Its Impact on Property (1808-1809) 
 Montgelas’ land reforms were well-planned and received great assistance from Napoleon 
Bonaparte through the latter’s military victories. The First Minister wisely allied with Napoleon 
but could not, like many other German statesmen, weather the storm of French embargoes and 
levies. Ordinary Bavarians paid the price for French trade restrictions. Montgelas proved more 
able than his predecessors in enacting land reform but could not overcome the power of estate 
notables or the destructive nature of the Napoleonic Wars. Hostilities and the extractive 
Napoleonic trade restrictions and military demands for campaigns further damaged the Bavarian 
state. Bavaria was plunged into debt including 10 million additional gulden (Neueverschuldung) 
in 1806 alone. Montgelas, who had spent the past ten years promoting the benefits of centralized 
bureaucracy and the eradication of elite privileges, struggled to contain the economic decline and 
failure to generate productive agriculture. The First Minister took advantage of the Final Recess 
of the Holy Roman Empire in 1803 to erode Church privileges and weakened guild power in 
urban centers.412 Bavaria had become more monocratic under the leadership of Max Joseph and 
Montgelas giving the state greater controls over agricultural production and the ability to assist 
flagging landed estates. French policies, so crucial to winning Bavarian sovereignty, produced 
new problems. Grain prices plummeted in 1806-1807 and a credit crunch hampered attempts for 
many Bavarians to buy and develop land.413 Bavarian woes were consistent with those faced by 
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other states in the German confederation demonstrating that Montgelas, while not at fault for 
Bavaria’s precipitous decline, was yet another victim of Napoleonic exploitation.  
Montgelas also pursued the abolition of the Güter estates at what was at first an 
opportune moment. French dominance destroyed all rivals to the Wittelsbach Dynasty and 
placed Max Joseph and his family in high standing. Napoleon’s endless appetite for war, 
however, destroyed these efforts. Max Joseph formally abolished Güter estates and set up a 
council of state with four administrative divisions in 1806.414 Montgelas envisioned a swift 
process of divvying up estates. The property market for estate land sales was now open. 
Purchasing power for most Bavarians was limited and estate holders were reluctant to give up 
land. By comparison, in 1807, Bavaria’s defanged northern rival, Prussia, implemented a new 
constitution that broadened property buying rights though it excluded many of the poorest of its 
subjects. Montgelas, thus facing internal and external pressure, persuaded king Max Joseph to 
support the drafting of a Bavarian constitution to codify and legitimize the primacy of the 
Bavarian state. The key mechanism for future agricultural development was the abolition of 
Güter estates and their connected privileges. Such a program was supported by the drafting of 
the first Bavarian constitution in 1808. This document gave Max Joseph the ability to transform 
Bavaria land for the betterment of the Kingdom, a crucial step for securing the economic vitality 
of his state. Napoleon’s demands, however, complicated these reforms.  
The product of this effort was the First Bavarian Constitution issued on 1 May 1808. The 
Constitution was a document that declared the legitimacy of Max Joseph’s rule as an 
unchallenged sovereign and his absolute support for the administrative powers of Bavaria’s 
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bureaucratic ministries under Montgelas’ direction. Max Joseph’s constitution asserted that, “We 
are governed by the conviction that as long as the State remains a mere aggregate of separate 
parts, it can neither achieve its full potential strength, for which it has the means, nor can the 
individual members aim to impart upon themselves all the advantages of civil union.”415 
Therefore, this Gemeindeedikt  (the Community Edict) made challenges from other institutions 
in Bavaria theoretically obsolete. The document continues, “We have sought already through 
many ordinances to eliminate the differences in the administrative systems in our Kingdom, as 
far as it was possible beforehand, to establish a more uniform system for direct and indirect 
obligations, and to make the most important public institutions of the collective more equivalent, 
through establishments that at the same time ensure their distinctiveness.”416 A large-scale 
reorganization of Bavaria followed based on Montgelas’ recommendations. Montgelas altered 
the Bavarian state by dividing it into fifteen administrative divisions (Kreise) in June 1808. This 
was done to further integrate the Kingdom’s new territories.417 In addition, Montgelas oversaw 
the creation of a uniform tax system and pension circulation scheme (section 8, article 3).418 
These pensions were necessary for the survival of Bavaria’s mediatized nobility. Max Joseph 
was now the sovereign of Bavaria with unprecedented power over the governance and salaries 
paid out by the Bavarian state. For ordinary Bavarians from noble to common subject alike, this 
was scant comfort. 
For Private land borders, however, land boundaries and pension payments were vague 
and ill-defined despite the expansion of Bavarian centralized authority. Land-related pensions, as 
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well as titles and privileges, were brought to the attention of the Bavarian state for years 
following the establishment of the First Bavarian Constitution. A report about former feudal land 
and ownership title was brought before the Finance Ministry in December 1808.419 This specific 
case, brought before the administrative authority of the Isar-Kreis near Munich, considered an 
ambiguous loophole (contra fiscum) in the feudal title of land compared to the new government 
sanctioned, private enclosure title.420 The Royal Finance Direction (Königliche bayerisches  
Finanz Direktion) of the Isar administrative division received the case on 30 November 1808 and 
a royal court resolution (Hofgerichts Resolution) preserved the fiefdom of Augustien 
Blaumuller.421 The central authority of Munich was now guaranteed by a legally binding 
document but compromises were still possible. Munich’s authority was now declared by official 
document, the 1808 constitution, but lingering financial and legal concerns regarding land title 
would persist for years to come. By 1808, however, land, the productive resource Montgelas 
intended to use to fund the independent status of Bavaria, was finally under state control. By 
1809, war again arose, this time The War of the Fourth Coalition, and Bavaria itself as a minor 
power, was threatened with the destruction of its allodification scheme and the centralized state 
bureaucracy that created it. 
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Conclusion: Land and the Process of Bavarian Statehood, 1797-1809 
 Allodification was a necessary paradigm shift in notions of private land ownership that 
laid the foundation for the modernization of an independent Bavarian state and the productive 
use of agriculture to spur economic growth and the power of the new Kingdom. Bavaria’s path to 
statehood was defined by the complex domestic challenge of feudal nobility and pressure from 
foreign powers. The Elector could not act independently and received scant support from 
notables. The legacy of Bavaria’s penultimate elector, Karl Theodor, was typical of the ancien 
regime. Karl Theodor’s regime was also handicapped by the power of Bavarian estates such as 
the Güter lords and the Catholic Church. In the elector’s defense, notions of a limited role of 
cameral officials and the financial capability to transform the taxation and landowning system 
was difficult process to execute without a major disruption to everyday Bavarian life. That task, 
and challenges, were undertaken by the Enlightenment-inspired leadership of Max Joseph, first 
as Elector then King, and his ambitious First Minister Montgelas. Montgelas and Max Joseph 
used the dangerous climate of European war from 1799-1809 to promote Bavarian statehood as a 
kingdom, independent of Austrian control. This process hinged upon the productive use of land. 
Land was allodified through the separation of feudal title and the possession of land. This 
affected landed nobility and the Church the most. The complicated, expensive process produced 
mixed results and was not fully understood by Bavarian subjects. The territorial expansion and 
spread of state authority from 1803-1809 also produced friction between subject and leadership. 
Bavaria’s close ties with Napoleonic France, key to its recognition as a sovereign state in 1806, 
threatened to bankrupt and destroy the southern German kingdom by 1809 when renewed 
conflict threatened to destroy every reform attempted, or accomplished, by Max Joseph and 
Montgelas. 
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Chapter 3: Bavaria and the Congress System: Postwar Allodification Efforts 
(1809-1817) 
 
Bavarian state guided allodification (the separation of land possession from title or 
privilege) was severely disrupted by the costly demands of Napoleon Bonaparte during his 
campaigns from 1809-1815. The Kingdom of Bavaria’s resources were so depleted that the wars 
caused famine and debt crises for years following their conclusion. Bavaria became a dependent 
state in the Confederation of the Rhine system (1806-1813). Montgelas capitalized on the 
battlefield successes of Napoleon Bonaparte to build a centralized state bureaucracy against the 
wishes of Bavarian notables and the defeated Habsburg Empire and Kingdom of Prussia. 
Napoleon also recognized Bavaria as a Kingdom and gifted the new state additional lands at the 
expense of its defeated neighbor, Austria. Montgelas made all Bavarian laws part of a unitary 
system of rule under King Max Joseph. This new centralized law was implemented through a 
general community edict (Gemeindeedikt) and was enforced by state bureaucrats. Montgelas’ 
opportunism was well-timed and well-planned. The unification of Bavaria under a single ruler 
and his civil bureaucracy provided a vital foundation for the future economic health of the 
Bavarian state. Napoleon’s seemingly unending wars and exploitation of client states, including 
Bavaria, however, nearly destroyed all the important land-related reforms of the era. 
Chapter three is therefore concerned with the consequences that the Kingdom of Bavaria 
faced in large part due to the unceasing was of Napoleon Bonaparte. Montgelas pursued a long-
term goal of transforming Bavarian land into productive plots.422 Land was to be “redeemed” on 
a voluntary basis from its elite holders. This redemption program, unfortunately, stagnated and 
 
422 Treml, Geschichte des modernen Bayern: Königreich und Freistaat, 13. 
 
 
128 
 
yielded few practical, immediate benefits for the state. Landed elites were cash poor and sought 
greater assistance for their pensions and haggled endlessly over the price of their land.423 The 
simultaneous decision to commit vast state resources to land redemption while feeding 
Napoleon’s armies put too much strain on the Bavarian state. The Bavarian state was strong and 
well-supported so long as Napoleon’s armies were victorious. Trade embargoes and the steep 
demands of Napoleon for men, draught animals, and food brought Montgelas’ regime to a 
breaking point in 1813. 
Montgelas’ efforts did modernize the state bureaucracy and introduced a systemic, 
coherent, and uniform legal system to Bavaria. Critics viewed Montgelas’ tenure as First 
Minister as “an interruption” in the stable, if perhaps unremarkable, management of Bavaria’s 
finance and justice ministries.424 In reality, it was the unstable nature of the Napoleonic Wars, 
and Bonaparte himself, that destroyed the first coherent expression of unitary Bavarian rule and 
effort to efficiently manage state finances. When Bavaria found itself on the losing side in 1813, 
critics blamed Montgela for the disastrous alliance. The Kingdom of Bavaria was stripped of 
territories in the Innviertel, Trentino, and the South Tyrol. State debt soared. Powerful restoration 
powers led by Prince Klemens von Metternich also viewed Max Joseph with suspicion. Bavaria 
was reduced in size at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Famine and civil unrest also followed. 
The Crown Prince Ludwig, Marshal Karl Wrede, and the jurist Graf Georg Friedrich von Zentner 
removed Montgelas from power in 1817 ending Bavaria’s first complicated experience with land 
allodification. 
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The 1808 Constitution: Legal Context 
The reformers who drafted Bavaria’s constitution in 1808 eliminated the jurisdictional 
privileges of the Güter estates and subordinated nobles to the authority of King Max Joseph. The 
conference to draft the constitution was a secretive affair. The Secret Council (Geheimen Rat) 
was dominated by Montgelas whose constitutional committee faced opposition from the twenty-
two-year-old Crown Prince Ludwig. Ludwig, who first appeared at the conference on 11 May 
1808 as his father’s representative, perceived Montgelas as a threat to his father’s rule.425 Ludwig 
opposed the constitution due to its similarities to the Napoleonic model. The Crown Prince also 
served under Napoleon and found the French to be elitist and wasteful of Bavarian resources. 
Ludwig was therefore opposed to anything French-influenced, much to the chagrin of his father, 
Max Joseph.426 Whatever problems Ludwig had with the constitution, the 1808 document, 
became law. Ludwig, however suspicious of Montgelas’ role in the Bavarian state, would benefit 
from the uniquely powerful Bavarian constitution when it came time to solidify his own rule in 
subsequent years. 
The new constitution dramatically transformed the oversight for the ministries of Bavaria 
through the inclusion of a framework for hierarchical allegiance to Max Joseph and his First 
Minister Montgelas. King Max Joseph proclaimed the first constitution on 25 May 1808 making 
the power of the Wittelsbach Dynasty and its civil bureaucracy the supreme authority in the 
Kingdom of Bavaria. The constitution was a fusion of Napoleonic legal influence and the older 
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traditions of Germany’s enlightened despots – the powers of the Austrian and Prussian 
Machtstaaten. The Gemeindeedikt (community edict) established the uniformity of the 
centralized rule of the Wittelsbach Dynasty as ordained by the 1808 constitution. Montgelas’ 
state ministries, however, would have to enforce said constitution. Montgelas, Johann Wilhelm 
von Hompesch zu Bollheim (the son of Montgelas’ mentor Franz Karl von Hompesch), and 
justice minister Heinrich Theodor Topor Graf von Morawitzky drafted the constitution. The 
Bavarian constitution’s preamble established that,  
By appropriate regulations and provisions, it aims at providing the just demands of the 
state (based on its general raison d’état) toward its members, as well as those of the 
individual members toward the state, with the guarantee of their fulfillment, the whole 
with firm structure and cohesion, and each part of the state authority with the efficacy 
commensurate with the requirements of the common good.427 
 
Montgelas, and the constitution’s other authors, established the monarch as the sole ruler of 
Bavaria. All subjects looked to King Max Joseph, and his representatives, as the unitary 
authority of the Bavarian state. The 1808 constitution was a revolutionary compact in the 
Kingdom of Bavaria and provided similar powers and freedoms somewhat comparable to 
contemporary reforms in other German states. Montgelas and Max Joseph swiftly broke the 
power of feudal estates and the interests of the Church. This was a special achievement for 
Montgelas and his fellow reformers. Many other states in German central Europe failed to 
accomplish in such a sweeping capacity. 
A similarly ambitious, yet far less successful program was underway in the Kingdom of 
Prussia under the direction of Baron Karl vom und zum Stein and Karl August von Hardenberg 
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by 1807-1808. Stein and Hardenberg’s “Edict Concerning the Facilitated Possession and Free 
Use of Real Estate as well as the Personal Circumstances of the Rural Population” (Edikt den 
erleichterten Besitz und den freien Gebrauch des Grund-Eigenthums, sowie die persönlichen 
Verhältnisse der Landbewohner betreffend) of 1807-1808 (the October Edict) presented similar 
reforms. It would later be enacted for the purposes of eliminating the last vestiges of feudal 
servitude in Prussia. Stein and Hardenberg proposed opening feudal land buying privileges to a 
broader cross section of prospective buyers, and promulgating the enhanced legal notion of 
“Staatsbürger” – citizens of Prussia rather than subject status.428 The Stein-Hardenberg Reforms 
would take nearly a decade to be implement (in a far more conservative form). In part, they led 
to the widening of land buying privileges throughout German central Europe.429 In addition, they 
were indicative of the broad influence of state centralization efforts that swept Germany in the 
first decade of the nineteenth century and were most successful in Bavaria.  
Bavaria was not the only state in the German Confederation to produce a new 
constitution but its provisions for the execution of the King’s will was unique. Other regional 
attempts that mirrored the advent of the 1808 constitution transpired in the French occupied 
Kingdom of Westphalia and the Duchies of Baden and Württemberg. Karl Friedrich of the 
Duchy of Baden instituted a legal code with a streamlined, hierarchical delineation of rights and 
privileges intended to be, “both useful, and for political reasons advisable.”430 Hans Gagern, a 
political theorist, also proposed a legal system based on, “the similarity of political 
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considerations.”431 The main regulations of the 1808 constitution include the relationship 
between the document and the Napoleonic system with the introductory proclamation, “The 
Kingdom of Bavaria forms part of the Confederation of the Rhine.”432 Max Joseph’s power came 
from the introduction of the Konzessionsystem (concession system) – a systematic approach of 
rule and law applied by civil servants and the imposition of uniform laws and community and 
state levels.433 The constitution represented the Oktroi (the implementation of law by will) of the 
King of Bavaria that established him as Bavaria’s sole ruler. The architects of the Bavarian 
system believed, however, that Bureaucratic reform, in the spirit of Enlightenment virtue, set 
their constitution apart from contemporary legal compacts.  
Property, including land, and the authority to determine the rights of its possessors, were 
the sole responsibility of the state. Max Joseph and Montgelas’ reforms made Bavaria a kingdom 
with the most liberal land buying requirements by 1808. A full 70% of the Bauernstände were 
now afforded rights including uniform taxation.434 Land reform, including the wholesale breakup 
of Gutsherrschaft estates, formed a key part of this program. Land as property was protected 
under the 1808 constitution but apparently not so if it was a manorial estate or a former Güter 
Domainen. Montgelas continued to promote the seeming equity of the new property system. The 
seventh article of the main regulations of the 1808 constitution ostensibly built on previous 
efforts to protect property rights. Article seven stated, “The state grants all citizens safety of 
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person and of property...”435 Montgelas, here, remained attached to his allodified system. 
Property would not be interfered with. The noble estates, however, were no longer property and 
were thus not respected. 
1808: Montgelas and the Administrative Reorganization of Bavaria 
 The establishment of the First Bavarian Constitution also led to the restructuring of 
Bavarian administrative divisions with regional capitals. In addition, the Bavarian state created 
new ersatz organizations to replace charities to aid rural and urban poor. Reorganizing the rural 
Güter estates meant that Montgelas and Max Joseph needed to create regional capitals and 
provide new state services. These resources would replace the charity provided by religious 
orders, operating under the concept of Notbedarf – the mutually beneficial, pre-eighteenth 
century “economy of need,” existed before.436 Montgelas, having centralized the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Finance under his authority as First Minister, 
soon divided Bavaria into sixteen Kreise or administrative units (Regierungsbezirk). Regional 
control through cameral institutions preceded this redrawing of the jurisdictional map. These 
cameral institutions, however, were the sinews between ancien regime economic, religious, and 
social controls to provide a functional harmony of estates.  
The 1808 reorganization of the Bavarian Kreise gave Munich a semblance of centralized 
control under the king and his royal ministries that replaced the power sharing arrangement of 
the Electoral state’s varied estates. Bureaucratic centralization also entailed the elimination of 
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estate privileges including special tax rates and personal pensions.437 A general tax rate was 
implemented through the geographic incorporation of new territories and the gradual erosion 
then eradication of Güter estate boundaries.438 The ideal tax system was uniform and systemic. 
Tax rates were presented in the Intelligenzblätter of each of the sixteen Kreise. Land was 
“redeemed” by the state in theory via the consent of estate holders.439 Estate nobles possessed 
land but did not own it. The land was connected to their titles. Titles were removed via the 
process of “mediatization” and therefore estate land was simply property to be bought and sold. 
Many elite landholders were cash poor due to persistent conflict and lagging rent collections. 440  
The Bavarian estate, led by Montgelas, offered to buy land from elites through a process called 
“redemption.” In practice, the new system of hierarchically imposed land redemption met with 
some resistance. Yet some of the former estate nobility were suddenly amenable to cash payment 
in exchange for estate land.441 Montgelas exploited the climate of economic instability. As 
historian Manfred Treml observed, a coercive state of affairs (Sachezwang) governed 
centralization efforts, debt relief, and bankruptcy (Bankrott).442 By 1808 land was requisitioned 
by the Bavarian Finance Ministry and thereafter apportioned into enclosures with increasing 
frequency. Montgelas’ designs went far beyond tax reform. The Bavarian civil bureaucracy 
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played a significant role in land redistribution as Montgelas sought to buy loyalty of common 
Bavarians and fracture the former Güter elites beyond the elimination of privilege and pension 
collection. 
The Finance Ministry under Montgelas grew and became more complex under the 
foundation of the 1808 constitution and the legal supremacy of King Max Joseph. Cameral 
institutions in the electorate served the interests of the Adelige Stände – the landed, titled and 
untitled ranks of Bavarian society. Although the 1808 constitution was by no means republican 
in spirit, the document did include provisions for the elimination of elite privileges. If members 
of Bavarian society were “worlds apart” in social status, economic power, and political power 
under Electoral rule, then certainly the founding years of the Kingdom of Bavaria led to a 
levelling of social and economic status and a vast reduction of elite political standing.443 1808 
was the year of the bureaucrat. The Organizational Edict (Organischen Edikt) of 8 August 1808 
granted authority to regional bureaucrats in the GeneralKreiskommissariate to enforce tax 
revenue collection.444 The Finance Ministry exercised direct authority over the regional 
administrative Kreise and gave them legitimacy to publish the edict and have it respected at a 
local level. 
Montgelas’ guided expansion of the Bavarian state next addressed the complex legacies 
of cameral institutions and privileged estates, a process which focused on stimulating rural 
agricultural production. Results were less than satisfactory. The early implementation of 
unchallenged rule met with conflict and confusion. Historian Eberhard Weis described the 
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friction created by this legal shift as the “abolition of old estate constitutions in Altbayern, 
Neuburg, Tyrol and Voralberg with their dualism between prince and the countryside and their 
cementing of estate privilege being taken…”445 State integration on a village level was slow and 
fraught with challenges from the traditional measure of rural autonomy enjoyed throughout all 
the regions of Bavaria.  
Changing land policies also entailed altering the Bavarian way of life. The Electoral 
Bavarian programs of school reform, compulsory education, and conscription were implemented 
to their most forceful and direct ends by 1808.446 Some things remained static. The basis of the 
Bavarian economy into the middle of the nineteenth century was agriculture.447 Shifting 
Bavarian farming towards a physiocratic inspired notion of production over subsistence would 
require focusing on both the regional customary restrictions on crop development and 
overcoming ignorance of new farming techniques. Problems with increasing Bavarian crop 
yields were a persistent issue throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historian 
Wilhelm Abel commented that Bavarians produced less than comfortable resources both for 
market and personal consumption. Abel found, “Agricultural production was largely increased 
though physiologically it was not significantly changeable by type and the needed quantity. Food 
was not available to people in more than 3,000 calories a day in all types of food.”448 Crop 
 
445 Weis, Montgelas, 1759-1838, Eine Biographie 380. 
446 Lee, “The German Family,” 86-87. 
447 Ibid., 87. 
448 Wilhelm Abel, Agrarpolitik,  42. German: “Die Landwirtschaft ist mit ihrer Erzeugung ganz 
uberwiegend auf physiologische, nach Art und Menge nicht wesentlich veranderungsfahige 
Bedurfnisse angewiesen. “Es ist dem Menschen nicht bekömmlich, mehr als 3000 Kalorien 
alltaglich in der Nahrung zu sich zu nehmen.” 
 
 
137 
 
yields, in and among the most fertile regions of Bavaria, could not be transformed either easily or 
quickly. Market prices, for the average Bavarian, did not fluctuate greatly in 1808. 
The price of food changed little during the first year of the new regime’s constitution 
perhaps owing more to the lack of substantial rural intervention by the government of Max 
Joseph. Policies made beyond Bavaria’s borders were the first to impact the average Bavarian. 
Napoleon’s Continental System barred the trade of grain, among other goods, to Britain. Fifteen 
percent of all British grain imports were from smaller German states including Bavaria.449 The 
price of grain throughout the German states plummeted in part due to a lack of buyers who were 
willing to pay what British merchants previously offered.450 A short term crisis was averted 
through extensive moneylending by Bavarian and other German creditors.451 Bavarian 
production of cereals thus was not dramatically affected by sudden trade restrictions. The price 
of bread in remained consistent throughout the year of 1808.  Montgelas reacted to the demands 
of Napoleon on Bavaria and the intent to increase state wealth by instituting a new progressive 
tax on land (the 1808 Grundsteuern) which increased profits by 9%.452 This was profitable 
because agriculture constituted 65% of Bavaria’s economic product.453 State intervention was 
still needed, however, to stabilize the operation and quality of farming products. 
The temporary stability of grain prices in the German states brought a sense of optimism 
for the new regime and stability to nearby German states in the early-nineteenth century. Just 
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beyond Bavaria’s borders in the key trading city of Regensburg, the price of a loaf of bread 
(Paar Semmel) remained consistently six Kreuzer Landmünze, or .10 Gulden from January to 
December 1808.454 Bavaria also employed other means of state intervention to keep the grain 
market consistent yet profitable. The Department of Spiritual Affairs (Departements des 
geistlichen Angelegenheiten) administered the former church lands and oversaw poor relief for 
Bavarian subjects.455 Other services such as the, Organization of Medicine (Organisations des 
Medizinalwesens) tended to medical relief with regional sanitation guidelines and the promise of 
consistent treatment options including the provisioning of food.456 The reorganization of Bavaria 
at a regional administrative level also brought the creation and maintenance of tax and toll 
collections as well as adequate leadership to oversee such an intricate operation. 
Death and Taxes: Montgelas’ Overhaul of the Civil Service, 1808 
 Tax, toll, and pension collection was the basis of the twin responsibilities of law and 
order as well as revenue generation for the Bavarian state. These funds, and fund collection, were 
of paramount importance to Montgelas who increased the rate and number of taxes and tolls on a 
regular basis. Montgelas, who effectively ran the various ministries of the state (even beyond his 
own purview of the Finance Ministry), commanded an enlightened bureaucracy with the legal 
mandate of a sovereign, Max Joseph. The First Minister behaved as an agent of not only French 
inspired reform but of direct service to Paris. Montgelas’ extractive policies included an increase 
in special taxes, the erosion of guild privileges and imposition of fees, and the dramatic reduction 
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of Güter pensions. All this to pay for Napoleonic backing.457 In 1808, Montgelas introduced 
various revenue collection schemes. The Mautordnung of 1807-1808 established a 15-30-florin 
tax on the various craft industries in Bavaria as well as foreign trade.458 This protectionist 
measure produced increased income for the Bavarian state while simultaneously alienating 
bordering countries.  
The implementation of the new toll and tariff system was, however, not implemented in a 
straightforward fashion. A report featured in the 17 March 1808 issue of the Bavarian National 
Newspaper (Baierisches National Zeitung) demonstrates the confusion surrounding the creation 
and enforcement of new tariffs. The newspaper commented;  
“…Since this change made the control stipulated in the new customs and toll regulations 
insufficient, and other measures had to be met in order to ascertain the security which the 
royal toll levies previously found in these cash payments of the main customs rate at the 
borders; however, since these measures intervene so deeply in the formal constitution of 
the new customs and toll regulations that, due to the clarity and certainty required by law, 
a complete revision of the new customs and toll regulations became necessary, so that the 
Royal General Customs and Toll Direction received them in their modified form in order 
to move them anew into print and to instruct all customs and toll agencies from April 1 
on in the full and exact compliance with their contents.”459 
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New tolls and tariffs came at a critical time for the Bavarian Kingdom. State debt surged to 86 
million gulden and Montgelas increased taxes on internal and foreign trade while promising to 
alleviate the burden of existing taxes on the most marginalized portions of Bavarian society.460 
Elements of the Bavarian Finance Ministry were also committed, ostensibly, to the amelioration 
of the quality of life despite tax increases. The Ministry of Trade and Public Works (Ministerium 
des Handels und der öffentlichen Arbeiten) was founded in the early years of the Kingdom’s 
existence to monitor and manage Bavaria’s trade balance and the profitability of merchant 
activity for the state.461 Bavarian bureaucratic expansion and restructuring, however, were 
desperately needed to support revenue collection and the imposition of local law and order. The 
continued activities of the Bavarian state could not be carried out by Montgelas’ fiat. The 1808 
constitution, however, laid the groundwork for the larger role played by Bavarian civil servants, 
in accordance with the wishes of Montgelas and the assent of King Max Joseph. 
  
 Montgelas’ role as the First Minister allowed him to create a hierarchical structure for 
tax and toll collections. The state reforms of 1808 established a Central Authority 
(Zentralbehörden) to administer the new Bavarian government. The Secret State and Conference 
Ministry (Geheimes Staats und Konferenzministeriums) was chaired by Montgelas.462 The 
subordinate foreign, finance, interior, and justice ministries were consolidated under the 
authority of Montgelas himself.463 Individual leaders included Graf Morawitzky (from the 
Finance Ministry) and Graf Reigersberg (from the Justice Ministry).464 The Ministry of War was 
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commanded by Graf Johann Nepomuk von Triva, a logistical officer who served under Bavaria’s 
preeminent general Karl von Wrede. Yet these individuals possessed little ability to operate 
independently of Montgelas. The Central Authority (Mittelbehörden) was under the direction of 
each of the four ministries (Generalkommandos) and included the vital departments of tax and 
toll inspection (Zoll und Mautinspection) under the Finance Ministry’s authority.465 Military 
garrisons assisted with tax and toll collection as well as regional control.466 This constituted a 
major shift in revenue collection for the Bavarian state. Güter lords collected taxes and rents 
from their estates and were permitted to protect the mechanism for how they were taxed – a 
principle known as the Bauernschutze.467 These responsibilities were now subordinated to the 
Landgerichte – courts overseen by the Kreise administrative governments that answered to 
Munich. The very structure of Montgelas’ new state ministries demonstrated the dramatic scale 
of government expansion and stratification that began in 1808. Extensive, highly specific taxes 
were also introduced. Tolls and tariffs required enforcement and collection. Bavarian civil 
servants, as products of transformed cameral academies, became more powerful and 
authoritative, as well as becoming careerist elites within the state administration.  
 Friction between civil servants and the former elite estate increased in the years 
following 1808. Seething notables became envious of Bavarian civil servants and coveted the 
unparalleled, privileged authority they exercised.468 The transformation of the Bavarian civil 
service, however, constituted a new version of German bureaucratic status. Bavaria employed 
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cameral officials in the electoral era who were servants of the Hofkammer – the court chamber. 
The expansion of the Bavarian civil service brought talented civil servants to every corner of the 
Bavarian kingdom including the minutiae of rural life. The General Commissariat of the Toll and 
Tax Directories, for example, were instructed, “primarily to report on the local peculiarities of 
their districts, to forward the ministerial instructions and to monitor the implementation.”469  
Guild restrictions were also lifted, in much the same way that the elite estate was stripped of all 
privileges. Montgelas’ bureaucratic foot soldiers oversaw the gradual erosion of the higher status 
middling handicraft industry professionals including rule by patricians in cities like Augsburg.470 
Civil servants, for example, collected the rents from subjects in place of the manorial rents that 
existed under the Gutsherrschaft system.471 Yet Bavaria was not alone in professionalizing the 
civil bureaucracy and the more involved role in the everyday lives of all subjects. 
 The enforcement of Bavarian law thus fell to a new generation of bureaucrat, or 
Schreiber, that found himself more the arbiter of regional law than the loyal servant of the state. 
Civil servants throughout the German states were not well-respected. Historian Ian McNeely’s 
2003 study The Emancipation of Writing introduced the cameral official at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century as a venal, untrustworthy pariah. Elisabetha Jäger, one subject of cameral rule 
in southwest Germany decried the local magistrate and his subordinate officials as Spitzbuben 
(rogues).472 The reputation of civil servants changed little, but their power and breadth of 
responsibilities increased dramatically. Interactions between subjects and civil servants increased 
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in frequency. The development of the Innenressorts (interior department) and the 
Medizinalwesen (the medical service of the doctor’s department) by 1808 subjected Bavarians to 
state scrutiny but also permitted ordinary Bavarians to voice grievances.473 Some complaints 
highlighted the impact of land quality and the availability of food. The establishment of, “local 
medical districts and the appointment of local doctors (Gerichtsärzte) was designed on the one 
hand to strengthen State control over medical practices.”474 Civil servants in other Napoleonic 
inspired German states followed suit. In the Duchy of Baden, the Vogt or Oberamtmann, an 
advocate on behalf of the state, visited rural farmers every three years to evaluate conditions and 
record any outstanding hardships.475 Records became public record and highlighted the purported 
omnipresent nature of governments throughout the Confederation of the Rhine. 
 Bavarian civil servants became a ubiquitous sight in the sixteen Kreise of the kingdom 
through tax and toll collection, medical inspection, and the much-dreaded visitation for the 
purposes of conscription. By 1809 taxes and tariffs were imposed to protect Bavarian agriculture 
and handcrafts.476 The common Bavarian civil servant collected proceeds for the state but also 
oversaw the development of profitable agriculture and trades. This was an effort from above, 
under the guise of guided state reform, to increase export profits. Several individuals contributed 
to this effort. Joseph Ritter von Hazzi was one of the leading civil servants to take part in the 
transformation of the Interior Ministry into a professional bureaucracy. Hazzi was born in 1768 
into a family of peasant and middling origins.477 Like Montgelas, Hazzi’s education included the 
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traditional notion of specialized, decentralized cameral training in Ingolstadt with key influences 
for land management provided by the Catholic Church.478 Hazzi passed his civil service 
examination in 1789 and became a specialist in land development.479 This specialty would make 
Hazzi, among other favorable candidates, useful to Max Joseph when he acceded to the throne. 
Hazzi left Bavaria in the 1805 for service with the French military but his experience and 
usefulness reveals much about the priorities of the Bavarian state. The increasing intervention in 
rural life destroyed local traditions in place of a homogenized view of productive and efficient 
use of resources for the Kingdom of Bavaria.480 Officials in Munich adopted an extractive, 
exploitative model that was shared with its patron state, Napoleonic France. The successors of 
men like Hazzi were now seen as ever-present, educated agents of Munich. To others they were 
occupiers in much of Bavaria, searching for every product or person of economic utility. 
The amtliche Statistik: Montgelas’ Census and the Sale of Land 
The desire to categorize and exploit Bavarian resources led to the creation of an improved 
census in 1809.  The legal foundation of Bavarian state centralization was coupled with the 
creation of a large, professional, career civil bureaucracy subordinated to a favored servant of 
king Max Joseph. Montgelas instructed his bureaucrats to document rural and urban life through 
a quantitative lens. The result of this effort was the amtliche Statistik (Ministerial Statistic), also 
known as the Montgelas Statistik. Montgelas employed every level of the civil service to gather 
information pertaining to three key data points; Einwohner (subjects), Güter (estate land), 
Landesbeschreibungen (territory). Bavaria even became the first German state to measure 
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mortality rates. Montgelas also classified the optimum wealth generated by craft industries. The 
number and wealth of each Handwerker (craftsman), Fabriken (factory), Manufakturen (trading 
entrepots), Kaufleute (merchants) and Kraemer (shopkeepers). The Montgelas Statistik was 
important for structuring the Bavarian economy but not planning growth. 
The amtliche Statistik did have omissions that reflected the limitations of state civil 
servants. Certain categories proved elusive, perhaps due to the inability to properly quantify their 
goods on a new market. Concern over how best to value the worth of land and mines, despite the 
physiocratic inspired nature of land reform, persisted.481 Getreide (corn) and Viehmärkt (the 
market value of cattle) were considered because they were goods that could be traded.482 
Montgelas, having separated titled privilege from the possession of land had yet to establish the 
monetary worth for land. As First Minister, Montgelas, like the physiocrats of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, viewed the king as the co-proprietor of land as property.483 The next great 
question would be what value land as property would hold when sold at market. 
Montgelas struggled to establish the value of land as an immovable good due to 
disagreements concerning land valuation metrics. The conflicting notion of land worth was a 
combative, and confusing, multi-decade debate to shift the value of land from that based in 
pensions and rents collected under the Gutsherrschaft system to that of a cash-based market. 
Difficulties also arose when Montgelas attempted to reconcile the region-specific taxes and tolls 
of Swabia, Franconia, and Greater Bavaria with his plans for a uniform set of economic 
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guidelines.484 The sale of Güter estate land from each area of the Kingdom of Bavaria would 
have to be done with both the consent of the estate holders. As in 1808, many of the elites faced 
cash shortages stemming from a lack of rent collection and the loss of special privileges 
(including special tax rates), in 1809.485 The task of redeeming land and compensating the 
mediatized, or nobles who now had no privileges or jurisdictional power, rested not with 
Montgelas himself but with the Kreise Finanz Direktion – the financial administration of the 
least seniority in the Bavarian Finance Ministry.486 In practical terms the system relied on 
negotiation with individual complainants. 
 One instructive example is an internal Finanz Direktion discussion of credit granted to a 
former lord Michael Vegbauer.487 The discussion pertains to the cash value granted to Vegbauer 
for land on and near the former Vegbauer Güter estate near Kelheim in the administrative 
division of Regen-Kreis, stating, “The Royal Finance direction of Regen-Kreis received files 
about a bundled fief loan for Michael Vegbauer to be taxed by the Margrave of Kellheim. This is 
for its appropriate use with the note that the pro preceterito has no relevant series of issues.”488 
Vegbauer’s case had no definite conclusion by Finance Ministry officials. The central question 
surrounding this case, however, revolves around the fair pension compensation for former Güter 
land. Estate lords collected pensions for their service as the jurisdictional leader under the 
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Gutsherrschaft system. If special privileges, like regional authority, and thus, pensions, were 
terminated as a part of the new constitution, then how would estate holders be compensated for 
their land? The answer to this question, despite the sophisticated, analytical pretense of the 
Montgelas Statistik, was more grounded in negotiation and compromise depending on region and 
state interest. 
 Cash payments for Güter lands were thus a common fixture for the regime that sought to 
transform the agricultural landscape while pacifying rural resistance to Munich. The process of 
land redemption by the Bavarian state was fraught with complexities. Theoretically, cash poor 
nobles would duly accept payments from the state for a modest reduction in status. In practice, 
however, this transaction revealed the limitations of Bavarian bureaucracy and the obstinacy of 
former Güter estate lords unwilling to accept the loss of privilege and legal authority. The 
Bavarian state mediatized the estate holders, imperial knights within the kingdom, and 
individuals with titles. Bavarian nobles could express themselves publicly through an airing of 
grievances through hardship reports, or Beschwerde, but were no longer represented as a Stände 
or an estate of the kingdom’s social and political standing. Pensions tied to jurisdictional 
privileges were also threatened by state land redemption. Land sales from the titled nobility of 
Prussia to poorer farmers was illegal.489 In Bavaria, however, the transfer of land with the state 
as a broker was not only legal but encouraged.490 Officials from the Finance Ministry extended 
loans to nobles to facilitate this process.491 Still, this process, as German historian Friedrich 
Lenger, concluded, was difficult to execute.492 The Finance Ministry was nevertheless intimately 
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involved in monitoring the exchange of goods such as lands or their products and the 
profitability of compensating landholders for them. 
A 14 February 1809 extraction report from the finance direction of Vilsbiburg in the 
Regen-Kreis reveals that inheritance laws were changed, and the value of land was not consistent 
during this era. The initial extratus (extraction) report stated, “The government's financial 
direction of the Regen-Kreis also received the files on a collection of land loans for the Michael 
Vegbauer case. He testified to the Kelheim court [on the subject] of the appropriate use with the 
noted pro-preceterito relevance. Finance Ministry, Su fidem extratus (extracted in good faith and 
credit).”493 Vegbauer’s Güter estate case is demonstrative of a typical complaint. Vegbauer’s 
“stolen” property was land extracted by the Bavarian state as private property not connected to 
the now mediatised fiefs. The regional Bavarian court at Kelheim heard Vegbauer’s complaint, 
recorded it, but did not address his predicament.494 The Bavarian state, as historian Dietmar 
Stutzer advanced, demonstrated little flexibility in the realm of debt assistance or personal 
suffering.495 The Catholic Church, long a bastion of welfare support in Bavaria did not have the 
authority or resources to assist rural poor due to the secularization of Church assets. Land plots, 
beginning in the eighteenth century, could not be bequeathed to specific individuals through a 
concept known as erbliche Lassiten.496 The more subordinate institution of the financial direction 
could offer little to help Vegbauer or others in similar circumstances. 
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Further reports highlight the diligence of Bavarian civil servants to process, record, and 
address grievances regarding property value while offering little action on relief or redemption of 
land. 1809 proved to be a pivotal year in Bavaria’s agricultural history. Depressed markets from 
the imposition of the Napoleonic Continental System and large-scale state intervention in land 
exchanges did not lend an air of stability. Protectionary tariffs imposed by the Bavarian state 
were also cancelled in compliance with Napoleonic policies towards the continental trading 
bloc.497 A new agreement imposed by Montgelas’ Finance Ministry subordinate Morawitzky 
called the Bestimmung (settlement) eased taxation rates within Bavaria to spur growth.498 
Montgelas imposed new measures to protect Bavarian trade and remain within the guidelines 
imposed by Paris. A two-year halt on internal tariffs was implemented while taxes on imports 
increased. Bavaria, though a non-military contributor to the Spanish Peninsular War beginning in 
1808, furnished essential goods such as foodstuffs and draft animals for French use. State debt 
surged and direct control over Munich’s purse strings was desperately needed. 
Mounting issues of debt and the inconsistent application restrictive land laws produced 
confusion in Bavaria in 1809. Land values plummeted and complaints regarding enclosed lands 
became more numerous while Montgelas attempted to stimulate the domestic cereal market. 
Mounting state debt forced Montgelas to replace Morawitzky in 1809.499 Cash and interest debts, 
as well as land overuse, combined to produce new problems for Bavarians. A complaint lodged 
by Benedikt Trosst on 17 November 1809 in the town of Straubing, in the Regen Kreise reflects 
the desperation of the times.500 Trosst possessed 1/16 of the jurisdictional land in Kelheim before 
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the process of allodification.501 Trosst had hoped to purchase ¾ of an old, disused area of the 
Weltenburg Monastery near Kelheim. The price of 150 florin was offered, rejected, and Trosst 
then insisted on being loaned an additional 50 florin a year to purchase and improve the 
connected land. The taxes and price of land Trosst asked, or was required to pay for land, was 
also subject to the state discretion for revenue collection. Tax authority (Steuerverwaltung) made 
any such transaction, like Trosst’s, subject to the scrutiny more senior bureaucrats within the 
Finance Ministry.502 The Rentamt (Department of Pensions) and Kreiskasse (administrative 
regional cash point) also investigated similar cases.503 Therefore, ordinary Bavarians like Trosst 
were required to navigate a dense web of bureaucracy imposed by a Bavarian state that had 
replaced the indirect system of cameralism with the more specific, all-encompassing world of 
Staatswissenschaft (state economy).504 The dense network of Bavarian bureaucracy made land a 
vital and valuable commodity to possess as property. New laws and tariffs, however, confused 
and bewildered Bavarians. Buying land, paying off loans, or negotiating the sale of part of a fief 
were far from concrete, institutional practices. 
Opposition: Land and the Napoleonic Wars in Tyrol and Austria (1809) 
Bavarian state centralization brought a more systematic use of bureaucratic control to 
rural areas that produced friction, and at times, conflict. The centrality of Bavarian rule remained 
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that of controlling and developing agricultural land. Bavaria acquired new land in the Inn Kreise 
in the vicinity of Salzburg and Alpine land in Tyrol as a reward for its close alliance with 
Napoleon. The expansion of Bavarian bureaucracy brought an extension of Bavarian authority 
over foreign land in the form of an occupying force. Bavarian rule met with disdain and then 
opposition in the Tyrol in 1809. Andreas Hofer, a Tyrolean innkeeper, organized an armed 
insurgency against Bavarian rule due to the, “destruction of provincial privilege and [because 
Bavaria was] strongly anti-clerical…”505 Tyroleans were also protective of their property rights 
and inheritance traditions. Tyrol’s culture featured partible inheritance, where land was 
bequeathed to children, with usually the largest quantity going to the oldest male heir.506 
Tyroleans divided land between the Muttergut (mother’s property) and the Vatergut (father’s 
property).507 The former provided sustenance for the mother in the event of the death of her 
husband while the latter provided the bulk cash value property for valuable division of labor, 
wealth generation, and inheritances after the passing of the Tyrolean pater familias.508 This 
system represented a regional status quo and made the competition for dowries important a 
central aspect of Tyrolean family life.  
Dowries and property inheritance were a central figure in social standing in Tyrolean 
society and made marriage, as Bavarian’s commented, full of “cash talks” rather than that of an 
amorous union.509 Land property holdings were thus marked by massive disparities, as had the 
Bavarian Hoffuss system of private land ownership in the eighteenth century. Bavarian 
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allodification and enclosure of land produced a glut of small scale privately held plots. Marriage, 
in the eyes of many of Bavaria’s poorest landholders, was not as dominated by financial 
ramifications as was the case with Tyrolean traditions. It stands to reason that a serious 
disruption in martial traditions and social status could produce resistance to the power imposing 
such sweeping changes to rural life. 
 Bavarian reforms in Tyrol brought the secularizing impulse of the Enlightenment, the 
domineering nature of bureaucracy, and the destruction of land inheritance rites of local culture. 
Bavaria occupied Tyrol with a token force of 3,000 militia.510 Montgelas’ legal reforms, ported 
to the pro-Habsburg Tyrol, rankled much of the populations. Churches were closed, land was 
seized and sold off, and many men were conscripted into Bavarian military service.511 Tyrloeans 
rankled at the presence of Bavarians despite the establishment of Christian religious toleration in 
the Religionsedikt of 24 March 1809.512 The Religious Edict provided tax privileges and 
increased autonomy for priests but did not relinquish state control over Church lands.513 While 
no sizeable armed protest broke out within Bavaria, Tyroleans responded with furor to the 
secularization of Church lands and village life while competing with an extractive and invasive 
bureaucracy of an occupying power. The nexus of Bavarian control in Tyrol was Innsbruck 
where regional announcements were made. Bavarian civil servants set prices for comestibles in 
Tyrol, announcing their authority as Polizei Direktion.514 The Innsbrucker Zeitung, a publication 
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which posted the set prices of crops available on the market, produced limited information on 
cereal and meat costs in April 1809.515 Bavarian land control and agricultural productivity, 
subject to the Continental System, were more restrictive than Habsburg policies. The recorded 
price of rye bread, per loaf, in Innsbruck, ranged from 26-30 kreutzer in April of 1809 and the 
price fluctuated wildly thereafter.516 Set prices for food formed yet another layer of unwanted 
Bavarian domination of local customs including land management and market practices. 
 Prices are significant metrics to measure the mood of Innsbruck in the key month of 
April 1809. Tyrol was subjected to a common practice of cameral transformation of land when 
Bavarian bureaucrats “invaded” the countryside and foisted new cultivation and farm 
management techniques on the local populace.517 The farming techniques of the small Tyrolean 
farm favored the development of cultivation typical of labor intensive, wage earning 
sharecroppers.518 This transformation upset Tyrolean practices and the Tyroleans who followed 
them. According to historian Eric Wolf, the new cash-based, labor intensive farming of small 
plots was unfavorable to the land and dowry market so crucial to the Tyrolean way of life.519 If 
land was not worth a multi-generational investment for sustenance, then it was worthless. 
Bavarian practices, done as haphazardly and in such an improvised way (as they were also done 
in Bavaria proper) did not bode well with Tyroleans. Tensions rose between Bavarians and 
Tyroleans during a subsequent period of depressed local economic activity and a stagnant land 
market. 
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In May of 1809 a significant insurrection began in Innsbruck and spread throughout 
Tyrol due to economic pressures and anti-clerical attitudes expressed against Bavarian occupiers. 
Aggrieved Tyroleans armed themselves and assembled local militias to harass and ambush 
Bavarian soldiers. Hofer’s irregulars were also an indirect product of the expanding, data driven 
Bavarian bureaucracy. Economic management of Polizei Direktion kept Tyroleans well-
informed of the actions of Bavaria’s key ally France as Napoleon committed to a destructive war 
in Spain against Spanish regulars and a new irregular scourge, the guerrilla. Hofer and his 
associates, deeply pious and anti-French (and thus anti-Bavarian), were spurred to rebellion. 
 Bavarian forces struggled to contain the Tyrolean insurrection. Insurgents defeated 
Bavarian forces in multiple areas and seized control of Innsbruck itself. The revolt spread 
throughout Tyrol and emboldened Napoleon’s various adversaries. Ironically, the anti-clerical, 
anti-nationalist Tyroleans, of whom there were French, German, and Italian speakers in their 
ranks, would inspire their own firmly partisan nationalist movements decades after, drawing 
inspiration from the 1809 revolt.520 French forces were required to assist Bavarian forces in 
containing Hofer and his fighters. Napoleon’s troops subjected Tyroleans to the same ruthless, 
indiscriminate violence that they had unleashed on resisting Spaniards and ultimately executed 
Hofer. The revolt grounded as much in the clash of anti-clericalism and forced conscription was 
also a struggle of two land ownership systems. The war in Tyrol, and the Bavarian failure to 
manage or contain the transfer of land to state control and an imposed system of land enclosure. 
Tyrolean resistance, and Bavarian weakness, prompted enemies of Napoleonic France to again 
declare war. 
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 The Habsburg Empire declared war on Napoleonic France and the Kingdom of Bavaria 
in April of 1809, sparking the War of the Fifth Coalition and the reduction of Munich to one of 
Napoleon’s vassal states. Austrian forces defeated an outmatched, smaller French contingent at 
the Battle of Aspern-Essling on 21-22 May 1809. Bavarian forces, commanded by Marshal 
Wrede, joined their French allies to repel an Austrian incursion into the newly restored Innkreis 
at the Battle of Wörgl. The battle restored Bavarian authority in Tyrol and confidence in the 
stability of Montgelas’ various ministries slowly returned. French support for the Bavarian effort 
in Tyrol and the Innkreis, however, cemented the central role of Napoleon as not only the 
benefactor of the Bavarian state but its ultimate protector. Napoleon sent a 40,000-man army 
through Tyrol, requisitioned Bavarian resources at will through foraging, and only sent a brief 
letter to King Max Joseph after the campaign was underway.521 Bavarian forces also shelled the 
rebellious Tyrolean town of Brixen as the revolt faded leading to criticism of Bavaria’s First 
Minister, Montgelas.522 Though French forces, joined by Bavarians, defeated the Austrian army 
at the Battle of Wagram in October of 1809, the conclusion of hostilities was destructive for all 
parties involved and crippled local trade, food supplies, and represented a serious crisis for 
Munich’s leadership. Support for Montgelas within the Bavarian kingdom, even amongst 
members of the Wittelsbach Dynasty itself (such as crown prince Ludwig), waned and the First 
Minister met with the first serious challenge to his unchecked authority. 
Serving France: Montgelas and the Disastrous Alliance with Napoleon, 1810-1813 
 Montgelas’ alliance with Napoleon Bonaparte became increasingly one-sided by 1810 
as the Tyrolean uprising and the War of the Fifth Coalition revealed the indispensable necessity 
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of French backing to support Max Joseph’s regime. The entire land reform effort and demands of 
state centralization hinged on Napoleonic support. Eventually the mutually beneficial alliance led 
to the Kingdom of Bavaria being used by the French Emperor as a buffer state against his 
enemies. The uneven alliance caused growing discontent first within the Bavarian royal family 
itself and thereafter spread to the professional civil service. Montgelas, who used French support 
to elevate the Bavarian state, found himself increasingly dependent on Napoleon for the security 
of Bavaria and to fulfill his bureaucratic vision of the future. Montgelas maintained Bavaria’s 
alliance with Napoleon after the Treaty of Schonbrunn on 14 October 1809. Napoleon gave areas 
near Salzburg and the entirety of the Tyrol to Bavaria.523 In 1810, Ludwig, the Crown Prince of 
Bavaria and the son of King Max Joseph, voiced his concerns about the close alliance his father 
and his First Minister had made with Napoleonic France.524 Ludwig, though a loyal son and the 
heir apparent to the Bavarian throne, had served in the Bavarian Army and had seen its glaring 
limitations. Ludwig had commanded a division of the Bavarian Army that was subordinated to 
French overall command at the Battle of Abensberg in 1809. Ludwig’s impression of the 
Napoleonic alliance was that it handicapped the autonomy of Bavaria and was a disastrous 
disruption to the established powers of Europe.  
 Ludwig was certainly justified in believing that the relationship between Napoleonic 
France and Bavaria was costly. The Kingdom of Bavaria contribute 60.5 million gulden fighting 
wars as part of the Napoleonic coalition.525 Montgelas and Max Joseph remained within 
Napoleon’s orbit if the war favored France. Graf Montgelas, ennobled in 1809 by Max Joseph, 
traveled to Paris in December of 1810 to negotiate for the further territorial expansion and 
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protection of Bavaria. The visit was valuable for the objective of expanding Munich’s rule into 
new lands. Bayreuth and the adjacent, long coveted city of Regensburg became Bavarian.526 
While the territorial acquisitions were profitable in theory, broader events outside of Montgelas’ 
control threatened to sabotage the integrity of the Bavarian state, the stability of agricultural 
productivity, and the legitimacy of Wittelsbach rule. 
 The redistricting and development of Bavarian agricultural economy was complicated 
by Napoleonic demands for goods to fight costly wars from 1810-1813. Montgelas and his 
subordinate ministers had many reasons to be optimistic about the alliance with Napoleon 
Bonaparte by 1810-1811. Bavaria’s ministers convinced king Max Joseph to reorganize the 
administrative units under the expanded legal oversight of regional governments. The result was 
the reduction of the sixteen Kreise to ten in 1810.527 The new Kreise were organized around river 
access, aiding trade, taxation, and communication within the Kingdom of Bavaria. The 
respective administrative units were; Rezatkreis, Mainkreis, Regenkreis, Unterdonaukreis, 
Salzachkreis, Isarkreis, Innkreis, Illerkreis, Oberdonaukreis.528 Bavarian citizens were also 
subject to more uniform legal practices and a court system called the Appellationsgericht by 
1810.529  The redistricting of Bavarian territories was a necessary step in collecting resources for 
Napoleon’s wars but brought new legal challenges. 
 Bavarian control of resources was used to direct trade towards assisting Napoleonic 
campaigns. Feuerbach’s Handelsgeseztzbuch auf der Grundlage des Code de Commerce (Trade 
Law Book for the Foundation of the Commercial Code) was used to standardize mercantile law 
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in Bavaria in theory but was never implemented on a consistent and permanent basis.530 
Bavarians, however, likely understood that the invidious growth of Napoleonic support for 
Bavarian rule more than merely influenced the economic policies of the Kingdom. Tens of 
thousands of French soldiers were stationed in Bavaria where they were fed, quartered, and 
requisitioned, if not stole, resources from locals. Weather conditions in Bavaria, and throughout 
Germany, worsened in 1811. International volcanic activity spread dust and the dark clouds of 
ash restricted sunlight.531 Dreams of eventual land enclosure and abundant agricultural surpluses 
were now in serious jeopardy. Nevertheless, Bavaria’s Finance Ministry officials remained 
committed to the exploitation of farmland. French officials, for their own part, also had a vested 
interest in German agricultural land, including Bavarian farms, and backed measures supporting 
state centralization and the abolition of subsistence farming.  
 French reports on German lands reveal much about the Napoleonic regime’s desire to 
encourage if not demand the project of mediatization and the enclosure of estate land via 
allodification. The French representative, Claude Ambroise Regnier, ennobled as the Duke of 
Massa in 1809, was a lawyer and a trusted associate of Napoleon Bonaparte.532 Regnier, reported 
on French efforts to accelerate the abolition of feudal type agricultural systems and recorded his 
findings in, “Reports and Project for the Decree on the Abolition of Feudalism in the Department 
of the Ems-Superior, the Banks of the Weser [River] and the Banks of the Elbe.”533 Regnier’s 
report also testifies to the Napoleonic French interest in developing and expropriating German 
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resources for the empire’s benefit. The French report from 1810 featured the explanation that, 
“The Grand Duchy of Berg has ceased, for two years, being submitted to a feudal regime.”534 
The report, a concluding commentary on a study begun two years prior, concludes that feudal 
privileges, rents, and pensions on each estate were also terminated.535 French efforts to destroy 
regional authority in German states was backed in large part by Bavarian acquiescence and 
participation in the process. 
 Invasive land seizure policies, emulated in Bavaria, and reflected in the 1808 
constitution, were now enforced as a concerted project by the French state. Napoleon occupied 
territory in northern Germany and exerted increased pressures on the Continental System, 
influencing the development of economic and associated legal reforms. French reforms were 
frequently copied throughout the German states and the presence of Napoleonic armies and 
many advisers and administrators contributed to the transformation of the agricultural economy 
and ownership deeds. French influence spurred the creation of enclosure and the implementation 
of a stronger bill of exchange for land.536 Thus, the Duke of Massa’s report concerning 
allodification in the merged northwestern states of Hanover and the free city of Bremen is 
consistent with these developments. The duke of Massa reported that urban patricians rejected 
the abolition of the patronizingly defined “feudal law of Lombards.”537 Much to the Duke of 
Massa’s consternation, Bremen was, “just at the moment of abolishing [the feudal system] the 
regime had pronounced by the Westphalian law which the country submitted at the time of this 
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reunion.”538 The French project of allodification, the removal of the designation of power as 
property, was foisted upon northern German states as much as it was encouraged of client states 
like Bavaria. Commitment to this project for unwilling German states, or willing parties like 
Bavaria, however, exacerbated shortages of food and draft animals as French demands for 
resources increased by the end of 1811 due to events in Russia. 
 Tsar Nicholas I withdrew from the Continental System’s embargo of trade with Britain 
in 1810, in part motivating Napoleon’s desire to invade the Russia Empire, with Bavaria as a 
loyal ally and logistical assistant in tow, in the summer of 1812. The invasion of Russia was as 
much a disaster for the Kingdom of Bavaria as it was for Napoleon. Bavarian portrait artist 
Albrecht Adam, who was also present for the carnage of the Battle of Wagram, reflected years 
after that, “the campaign of 1809 was like a stroll in comparison to this [the Russian 
campaign].”539 Napoleon’s Grande Armée was augmented by vast levies of German troops and 
supplies. Foodstuffs, horses and other draught animals, and wagons and carts of all types were 
requisitioned for the campaign. Bavarian debt, in large part due to the Russian campaign, 
ballooned to the tremendous sum of 118.1 million gulden.540 State debt in Bavaria in 1810 alone 
was 800,000 gulden lost from restrictions imposed by Napoleon’s Continental System.541 In 
addition, 30,000 Bavarian troops, led by marshal Wrede, would perish in Russia or during the 
disastrous retreat across the Berezina River that winter.542 Montgelas and Max Joseph were 
forced to reassess the Bavarian alliance with France as the defeat turned into a rout. Conditions 
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in Bavaria worsened as state debt incurred from land redemption and furnishing the Grande 
Armée soared and food shortages abounded. 
Assessing the Damage: Famine and Debt after the Treaty of Ried (1812-1815) 
Max Joseph and Montgelas made the difficult yet necessary decision to terminate 
Bavaria’s alliance with France in 1812 before attempting to keep the agricultural market afloat 
and rural farmers solvent. The project of allodification and land redemption stalled in the face of 
Bavaria’s battlefield reverses, Napoleonic economic controls, and the prices incurred during the 
process of land redemption. Bavarian notables, despite their lack of cash, retained much of their 
original land. The process of allodification was successfully implemented to strip notables of 
their titles, special privileges such as variable, personalized tax rates. Montgelas, however, failed 
to redeem land for the transformation of land into suitable, productive farms.543 Bavarians were 
still largely dependent on subsistence agriculture. The burden of poor relief had previously rested 
with the Catholic Church but with the process of secularization complete, the Bavarian state was 
responsible for addressing the ensuing crisis.544 Something had to be done to salvage struggling 
farmers from notables to the much-idealized small-scale Bavarian peasant plot. 
In 1812, the Tilgung’s Commission (Redemption Commission), organized by Montgelas 
at the behest of Max Joseph, met to address the debt crisis. Montgelas’ basis for the commission 
was laid out in the Ansbach Declaration of 1796.545 A commission report from 11 October 1812 
to Graf von Montgelas described secret meetings of the Tilgung’s specialists with Max Joseph at 
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Munich’s Nymphenburg palace on 10 September. Max Joseph responded, “Our government debt 
repayment commission has to begin the yield of the loan and report back to us as soon as 
possible,”  signaling the beginning of debt and land relief efforts.546 Montgelas’ solicited as 
many assessments and regional reports to categorize the material worth of the Kingdom before a 
new project of financial recovery could begin.  These communications laid the groundwork for 
financing what remained of Bavarian resources by 1812. So great was the depletion of Bavarian 
resources that hunger gripped most of the regions of the kingdom by early 1813.  Drastic 
reevaluation of the needs and ability to assist the development of each Landkreise into stable, 
profitable, and loyal regions of the state began.  
The state debt commission of October 1812 could only make broad assumptions about 
each region from Munich leading to a call for local reports on resources and collection of taxes. 
The involvement of local administration played a crucial role in reassessment and reorganization 
of Bavarian lands as regional authorities and interests gradually entered the circle of policy 
formation and reporting.  Montgelas’ Redemption Commission, required detailed reports of 
privation and disrepair to aid land assistance and development. Act number 100, an example of a 
land designation report commissioned by the Bavarian Finance Ministry, included a 
correspondence record from 25 November 1812 establishing that:  
Which of the most humble shows his royal majesty because of the beautiful building of 
the royal ministry the rest of us grew to the Royal State Debt Redemption Commission - 
Nymphenburg the 10th l.m (last months) surrounded, excellency of the K. Secret State 
and Conference Ministry Mr. Graf von Montgelas and the above vidimirten copy to the 
under Secret Commission this year after the highest S. Königl. Your Majesty soon 
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possible, and first you must raise yourself up by chance and try to get someone to 
negotiate.547 
 
The report is a typical entry as it records the ubiquitous practice of debt assessment and 
considerations for buttressing flagging agricultural efforts. Finance Ministry administrators also 
set out to restructure Munich’s program of regulating trade networks to extract further profits to 
pay off debt. A report on royal financial direction from Regensburg in the Hainsbach 
Sallachkreise on 4 July 1813 demonstrates the Finance Ministry’s commitment to supporting and 
taxing trades.  Hainsbach-Sallach’s millers, for example, fell under Montgelas’ plan to commit 
resources to supervising the taxation and certification of the trade between the 21st to the 26th of 
the month.548  The supervision and taxation of trades by the Bavarian state provided the 
government with a source of revenue and the ability to sponsor development of local industries. 
Debt reports were integral to compiling data about the conditions on the ground during the end of 
1812, but little action could be taken to fully support, defend, or improve land conditions or trade 
networks. Defending Bavarian security also required leaving its now one-sided, deleterious 
alliance with France. 
Max Joseph decided to end Bavaria’s alliance with France and join the side of the allied 
coalition in the War of the Sixth Coalition (1812-1813) to save Bavarian sovereignty and chart a 
new course of economic renewal. Historian Thomas Schuler presented king Max Joseph’s 
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options in 1813 in stark terms: a change of alliance to the allied side, a choice that would put 
Bavaria at great risk if Napoleon was victorious, remaining allied with the French, or becoming a 
neutral state.549 The Kingdom of Bavaria expanded as a result of its close partnership with 
Napoleonic France and Max Joseph was not eager to terminate the alliance. Max Joseph owed 
his rule to Napoleon and was the father-in-law of Bonaparte’s favored stepson Eugéne 
Beauharnais. Bavarian troops had fought under French command and had won the Kingdom its 
territorial legitimacy as well as additional spoils of war ranging from Regensburg and Bayreuth 
to Tyrol and Salzburg. Max Joseph understood defection would still be viewed with some level 
of suspicion by the allies and, given an allied victory over Napoleon, would reduce the status, if 
not the territorial boundaries, of Bavaria. Bavarian field marshal Karl von Wrede and crown 
prince Ludwig convinced king Max Joseph to terminate the alliance with Napoleon and to join 
the sixth coalition against France.550 The result was the 8 October 1813 Treaty of Ried between 
Bavaria and Austria. Bavaria found itself on the winning side when Napoleon was defeated at the 
costly Battle of Leipzig from 16 to 19 October 1813. The allied victory sent Napoleon into 
retreat and became a significant moment for German nationalist propagandists in the Kingdom of 
Prussia who stoked anti-French sentiment and dubbed the event “the battle of nations.”551 
Bavaria, though wisely situated on the victorious side, did not consistently echo the anti-French 
rhetoric of other occupied German states such as Austria and Prussia. The Kingdom of Bavaria 
was subject to scrutiny, punishment, and reduction in power status after the Allied victory. 
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Years of Crisis: Famine and Territorial Reduction (1814-1817) 
 The years of 1813-1817 brought several crises to Bavaria including debt, famine, and 
territorial loss. Bavarian debt from 1813-1815 stood at a vast 300 million gulden.552 Montgelas’ 
proposed partnership with France had brought great victories, territorial aggrandizement, and the 
defeat of Bavaria’s two greatest threats, Austria and Prussia. Bavaria, having defected to the 
allied side in 1813 was viewed with suspicion as a collaborator puppet state of Imperial France. 
Bavaria was thus relegated to a lesser status among European powers by the Congress of Vienna 
system and forced to pay a 30 million-franc (23 million gulden) indemnity by the victorious 
allies.553 Shortages of cereals and meats increased within each area or Kreise of Bavaria. A 
notice posted by Justice Minister Rödelmayer and his subordinate Bollmuth from 13 December 
1813 highlights a shift in the management of Bavarian markets.554 Rödelmayer’s report came 
from Würzburg and was accordingly reprinted in the Würzburger Intelligenzblatt. The advisory 
stated that an auction of 478 portions of veal would be made from the stores of Melchior Schüler 
zu Neustadt at 10 AM on 5 January.555 The auction is atypical of responsibilities that could be 
carried out by the regional government at the general commissariat level. Meat was generally 
sold at the market level and its price was regulated, at least in theory, by the responsibility of the 
finance direction at the Gemeinde, or community level.556 Greater action for food auctions and 
management would be needed as shortages and climatic conditions worsened. 
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 A series of poor harvests from depleted farmland and the surrender of territory won 
from Austria years prior crippled the Bavarian state. The winter of 1813-1814 was also 
unexpectedly harsh. Montgelas, faced with furnishing a continuing military effort against 
Napoleon, levied a new land tax that raised 23 million gulden from Bavaria’s approximately 
three million subjects.557 By 1814-1815, events like the auctions of meat stores and crops by 
local authorities increased. Famine conditions abounded as the agriculture failed. In April of 
1815 ash from the eruption of Mount Tambora in the Dutch East Indies blocked between 18-20% 
of sunlight.558 Land owned by small scale farmers was affected as were the land estates of the 
mediatized elites. Elites, 9-10,000 of all Bavarians (.3 percent of the population), now possessed 
half of the land they had prior to the dual processes of allodification and land redemption.559 
Even the former elites of Bavarian society were affected by the sudden destruction of food 
supplies. The worst conditions came in 1816. Summer temperatures were between 2.3-4.6 
degrees colder than expected and a complete harvest failure ravaged southern Germany.560 Even 
the productive enclosure-based agriculture of Great Britain, now an active trade partner with 
Bavaria and other German states, was affected. British wheat yields were the lowest in 1816 out 
of the time frame of 1815-1857.561 Bavaria, struck by famine, was also deprived of vital 
agricultural land as a condition of the post-Napoleonic settlement. Bavaria surrendered Salzburg 
and land in the Palatinate to Austria in the Treaty of Munich in 1816.562 Thereafter, Bavaria’s 
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debt crisis worsened, food scarcity, and growing number of beggars provoked concerns that the 
current state was unequal to the task of government. 
 Bavaria’s debt crisis, famine conditions, and territorial losses became so severe in 1817 
that senior Bavarian officials, including the crown prince Ludwig and Field Marshal Karl von 
Wrede blamed Montgelas for the catastrophe and removed him from his post as First Minister. 
Maximilian von Garnerin, the Graf Montgelas, had possessed a nearly unchallenged dominance 
over Bavarian state bureaucracy from 1799-1817. Montgelas allodified Bavarian land and 
redeemed half of all estate territory by 1815. His program of state centralization was also highly 
successful and used the rising tide of Napoleonic influence to win Bavaria unquestioned 
sovereignty and European standing. But Bavaria’s commitment to the Napoleonic alliance was 
costly and Montgelas’ authority, however, consistently drew criticism from within the highest 
reaches of the Bavarian state and royalty.563 However successful Montgelas’ reforms had been 
they depended on the fortunes of the Napoleonic system. Montgelas’ career thus ended with 
Napoleon’s defeat and the collapse of the Bavarian military. Ludwig and Wrede believed the 
Kingdom of Bavaria needed a new civil service and political establishment to salvage what 
remained of Montgelas’ reforms. 
Conclusion 
 The success and failure of the Montgelas era reforms in the Kingdom of Bavaria hinged 
upon Napoleon Bonaparte’s demands, victories, and ultimately defeat. Montgelas used an 
uneven and exploitative alliance with Napoleonic France as the impetus to drive the 
allodification and redemption of land through 1817.  The First Minister was also partly 
responsible for the drafting of a constitution in 1808 that provided unitary rule under the aegis of 
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King Max Joseph. Montgelas used this new legal compact to categorize and steer Bavarian 
commerce, implement uniform tax, tariff, and toll rates, and to spur agricultural growth through 
encouraging enclosure of plots. In addition, he presided over a Finance Ministry that attempted 
to establish new values for land independent of previous pension payouts. This was partly done 
to help feed the Bavarian machinery of state and to supply Napoleonic armies. Montgelas’ 
efforts were very rational in theory. In practice, the demands of Napoleon Bonaparte, created 
massive state debt and aggravated rural poverty and famine conditions. The hierarchical system 
of regional governments Montgelas designed was efficient at extracting resources but failed to 
adequately support debt and famine relief. It is dubious, however, to say if any civil bureaucracy 
of this era could. Montgelas’ policies also sparked protest in Tyrol and the Innkreis in the 
vicinity of Salzburg. The system itself left Bavarian subjects with no support network in case of 
debt, famine, and rising taxes. Bavaria became a vassal state of Imperial France when 
Montgelas’ government committed to Napoleon Bonaparte’s wars from 1809-1812. The result 
was the destruction of Bavaria’s economy, the sharp rise in sovereign debt, and the exacerbation 
of poor farming conditions to the horrors of a vicious famine from 1814-1816. By 1817, the 
failure of Montgelas’ system, in large part due to the alliance with France, convinced the First 
Minister’s peers within the Bavarian state that it was Montgelas himself who was responsible for 
the collapse of the allodification program and not the indirect fault of the extractive Napoleonic 
system. Montgelas’ critics, in their rush to blame him for the near collapse of the Kingdom of 
Bavaria, ironically blamed the First Minister for signing the same destructive alliance with 
France that also elevated the German state to any degree of prominence. 
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Chapter 4: Land and Power: the Landtag and Land Redemption (1818-1825) 
The Period 1818-1825 saw major adjustments in the Bavarian state, with added greater 
accountability, representation, and codified land law to the foundational basis of enlightened 
absolutist and cameral rule of Montgelas’ Finanzpolitik (financial politics). At the war’s end, the 
Bavarian state was heavily indebted, and its bureaucracy was unequal to the task of confronting 
the depressed markets, soaring state debt, and the spread of famine and disease. It was for these 
reasons that Graf Montgelas was scapegoated for the failure of his own system and removed 
from his position as First Minister in 1817. Yet, Montgelas was responsible for the centralization 
of power of the Bavarian state under the King and unitary legal code. He was also the creator of 
an improved organization of Bavaria’s agricultural land. The agricultural economy was still 
crucial to the vitality of Bavarian power and the well-being of the Kingdom’s subjects, and land 
redemption from the mediatized notables (those now subordinated to the state through the 
removal of titles and privileges) was still a project very much of interest to Bavarian civil 
servants and Max Joseph.564 Not that this was uncontested: the process of land redemption itself 
was met with the intransigence of Gutsherrschaft lords who refused to accept state payment for 
land and a general confusion regarding land value and the development of what exactly was 
productive agriculture.565 Max Joseph, Graf Georg Friedrich von Zentner, Marshal Karl Philipp 
von Wrede, and Crown Prince Ludwig all looked to notables in 1817 to salvage the very system 
that removed so many titles from landed estates. Saving Montgelas’ system, one so heavily 
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contingent on compromise, required the great compromise of including notables in the very land 
negotiation process itself. 
This chapter examines the complex steps taken by a new generation of Bavarian 
reformers to complete the Kingdom’s legally supported transition from Montgelas and Max 
Joseph’s foundational program of land allodification, a unitary legal system subordinate to King 
Max Joseph, and state centralization to that of a constitutional monarchy supported by a 
parliament (Landtag). In many regards these reformers, led by the legal theorist Georg Friedrich 
von Zentner, were successful. First, the monarch retained power and gained a more authoritative 
role to advance legislative ideas. Second, the Bavarian constitution was respected by more 
reactionary peers abroad. Third, the Bavarian state’s civil bureaucracy was further 
professionalized and educated members of Bavarian society, including many landholders, earned 
entrance into the Landtag where they debated legislation advanced by the King. Bavaria was not 
a republic and was therefore far from democratic. These achievements, given the pressures of the 
era are noteworthy. 
The foundation for a broader representation of Bavarian society in political participation 
was very narrow but found its first expression in 1818. Ordinary Bavarians, the landed elites and 
small-scale landholders alike, faced consistent issues of debt, crop failures, and land erosion. The 
agricultural economy was still crucial to the vitality of Bavarian power and the well-being of the 
Kingdom’s subjects. Land redemption from the mediatized notables was still a project very much 
of interest to Bavarian civil servants and Max Joseph but faced the same hurdles of grievances 
regarding pensions from the same elites.566 The process of land redemption itself, however, was 
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met with the intransigence of Gutsherrschaft lords who refused to accept state payment for land 
and a general confusion regarding land value and the development of what exactly defined 
productive agriculture.567 Bavaria’s land management and enclosure movement would need an 
added level of state oversight and scrutiny from the subjects, notable and prominent middling 
members, to bring a rational order to this system.  
Landtag legislators, civil servants, and the King himself produced the reforms so critical 
to assisting the practical, everyday elements of agricultural production through financial support 
and maintenance of land. This demonstrated that an expanded civil bureaucracy and more 
representative, transparent legislative process did much to affect the lives of common Bavarians 
in the promised meaningful, visible terms. The slow reforms of the Bavarian state, from the 
perspective of vital high politics were successful and used Montgelas’ system as a vital basis for 
the enhancement and systemic overhaul of land-related economic projects and networks of 
agricultural, notable assistance. 
Background of the Second Bavarian Constitution 
 Bavaria was beset by many crises in 1818. The Napoleonic Wars left millions of dead 
throughout Europe. Agricultural land was also depleted from extractive Napoleonic demands and 
France’s continual troop levies from the Confederation of the Rhine states. This meant fewer 
farmers to till the land. In Bavaria, arable farmland was overused, and draft animals requisitioned 
for French use. Bavaria’s economy was, in large part, based on agriculture and agricultural 
products. This had significant repercussion because some 55% percent of the Bavarian was based 
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on agriculture.568 The implementation of the Second Bavarian Constitution in 1818 transformed 
the relationship between the Kingdom of Bavaria’s official land policies and landholders by 
making the machinery of the state, and thus its impact on land sale and development, the partial 
responsibility of both Bavarian subjects and a dedicated, professional civil service that answered 
to the King and a legislative body, the Landtag. 
After 1817, Montgelas was replaced by a secretive council placed at the highest reaches 
of the Kingdom’s Bavaria legal and court circles.569 These were chiefly civil servants who were 
kept on by the King and Crown Prince due to their critical role in forming and interpreting 
constitutional law. Foremost among these personalities was Georg Friedrich von Zentner, a legal 
theorist and civil servant, was the most prominent of these personalities to challenge Montgelas’ 
nearly unobstructed personal rule. Zentner was instrumental in the creation of the modern 
Bavarian state and worked closely with Montgelas. Zentner’s career was also an ideal expression 
of the nearly meritocratic ideal of Montgelas’ plan for civil service training. Zentner was born in 
1752 in Mannheim and was the son of an innkeeper.570 Jesuit education in Heidelberg played a 
formative role in Zentner’s training before his specialized cameral and legal education in Metz 
and Göttingen, respectively. Zentner’s education and subsequent rejection of Jesuit political and 
social influence mirrored the career trajectory of Montgelas. At Göttingen, Zentner studied under 
the cameral theorist Johann Stephen Pütter, the same thinker who had made such a great 
impression on Montgelas as well. Pütter broadened the narrow focus of the cameral faculties by 
combining notions of Politik (newly defined political science) with a general education in 
 
568 Hermann Kellenbenz. Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte Band I Von Anfängen bis zum Ende 
des 18. Jahrhunderts, 67. 
569 Heinz Gollwitzer, Ludwig I von Bayern. Konigtum im Vormärz. eine Politische Biographie, 
71. 
570 Ibid., 72. 
 
 
173 
 
mathematics, history, and specialized law among many other subjects.571 Zentner’s education 
and political role within the Bavarian state made him an ideal candidate for reforming 
Montgelas’ system. 
Zentner delivered lectures on history of the Holy Roman Empire and German law in 
1779. Zentner’s educational pedigree helped secure both employment and notoriety. The future 
Bavarian field marshal Karl Philipp Furst von Wrede attended a lecture in 1779 as was the Duke 
of Württemberg, Charles II. Charles invited Zentner to advise his court in 1780 on legal 
matters.572 Montgelas recruited Zentner in 1799 and the legal scholar thus entered the Bavarian 
civil service. and along with Montgelas, worked to form a universal property law beyond 
privilege and social status. Zentner’s input was critical during the drafting of the first Bavarian 
constitution especially in the realm of extending Napoleonic property laws, among other legal 
traditions, into the Kingdom of Bavaria.573 Zentner was also Bavaria’s leading legal theorist who 
defended the Kingdom’s constitution, and sovereignty in the Congress of Vienna system. 
Zentner’s loyal service aided his advancement within Montgelas’ regime into the post-
Napoleonic era. 
The energetic role of Crown Prince Ludwig as a state council advisor brought new 
urgency to efforts to restructure the Bavarian state. Ludwig served as his ailing father’s (Max 
Joseph) representative in the Bavarian court and to government ministries. The Crown Prince, 
having served in the Bavarian Army during the Napoleonic Wars, was skeptical of French ideas, 
including the land and administrative reforms of Montgelas. The Bavarian state was foundering 
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in debt and the worsening of famine conditions loomed on the horizon when Mongtelas was 
removed from power by what the First Minister almost surely believed was a camarilla of 
reactionary interests. Ludwig was eager to scrutinize the purported weaknesses and mistakes of 
Montgelas’ ideas and his personal rule that was shrouded in secrecy.574 The Crown Prince was 
interested in pragmatic solutions to Bavaria’s myriad woes, not philosophical views of scientific 
and economic theory. Zentner, also a member of the 1817 group that ousted Montgelas, seemed 
an ideal choice to represent Bavarian interests abroad with a new, seemingly anti-French face, 
while drafting a revised constitution for the state. While Ludwig assessed the inadequacies of the 
Bavarian constitution, Zentner added his doubts that the existing compact could protect the now 
vulnerable authority of the state.575 Bavaria’s reduced status in the Congress System, and its 
alliance with Napoleonic France against Austria, made Ludwig, Zentner, and Munich’s 
governing elite wary of threats to state sovereignty. Work within the new German Federal 
system was now necessary to protect the integrity of Bavaria. 
 The political maneuvering of Bavarian statesmen in the system of German Federalism 
was characterized by the protection of Wittelsbach rule, the retention of the Kingdom’s borders, 
and a commitment to repairing and augmenting the economic value of agricultural land. Bavaria, 
as a power in the new German Confederation, was subject to several challenges from abroad. 
The German Confederation, and the Congress of Vienna System, were the key networks within 
which Bavarian sovereignty was threatened most. Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, the chief 
Austrian architect of the postwar conservative rebuke to the Napoleonic order, presided over the 
Congress of Vienna System following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Metternich’s 
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rejection of French, republican inspired state reforms was tempered by his tolerance for 
constitutions drafted by German states. Article thirteen of the German Federal Act (Bundesakte 
XIII) afforded states within the German Confederation the ability to draft and implement 
constitutions.576 Metternich, though he represented as an arch conservative of the post-
Napoleonic era, ostensibly favored the protection of a altständische Verfassung – a constitution 
that preserved the privileges and landed titles of the elite estate of the German states.577 The 
Bavaria state dispensed with titles and privileges but its enlightened absolutist monarchy was 
hardly radical in design. 
Within Bavaria, however, key members of the Bavarian government and monarchy, 
Zentner and Ludwig counted among them, demonstrated a clear bias for a reformed constitution 
to protect the supreme authority of the Wittelsbach dynasty. Metternich’s article XIII could, at 
least in theory, give support to the mediatized nobility in Bavaria, and in other German states. 
Though reduced in status by the reforms of Montgelas, these 9-10,000 individuals (some .3 
percent of the Bavarian population) possessed half of the land and material holdings they had 
prior to the establishment of the Bavarian constitution of 1808.578 The resurgence of the 
Ständische Herrschaft system, a trapping of seigneurial, Electoral Bavarian land law, stood to 
benefit from a favorable constitution approved by Metternich and more conservative 
personalities in the German Confederation.579 Metternich’s Article XIII articulated the 
conservative order’s outsized influence on the development of state constitution’s, eliding 
recognition of existing, Napoleonic era compacts. 
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 The German states that did possess constitutions and greatly restructured state 
bureaucracies balked equally at Metternich’s declaration. Wurttemberg’s kings, Frederick I and 
the subsequent William I, honored the declaration of Article XIII with a resounding celebration 
of the existing constitution but urgently reformed the legal code to protect against foreign 
meddling.580 Württemberg’s rulers were not alone in their scramble to secure pre-Congress 
constitutions and legal traditions. In the Kingdom of Prussia, the Stein-Hardenberg reforms were 
vigorously protected by the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the theologian and 
historian Joseph Görres.581 The former Hanseatic Free City of Hamburg, now a member of the 
German Confederation, was keenly defended by its patrician leaders who exalted the virtues of 
unrestricted free trade and the demolition of city walls.582 Perhaps the most provocative reactions 
came from the Kingdom of Prussia in 1818 where a proposed leadership of a German Federal 
Army (under the direction of Berlin) met with hostility throughout the German states.583 The 
sudden absence of the strong leadership of Montgelas in Bavaria, however maligned he now was, 
threatened to weaken the position of the Kingdom during this period of uncertainty and 
deliberation. 
The Constitutional Process and the Uncertain State of Allodification in 1818 
Montgelas’ system of allodification of estates posed its own series of distinct problems 
for the Bavarian state as it revealed a deep dysfunction within the overstretched civil 
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bureaucracy. Bavaria’s early attempts at redemption of land for allodification were unevenly 
applied by Montgelas’ Finance Ministry. The process of allodification was interpreted by 
Finance Ministry officials on an individual, negotiated basis. Land became an immovable 
property. Immovable properties and real ownership of immovable goods had an assigned price at 
market.  Land law by 1818 also included more traditional division of Realität (real property 
owned as land) through inheritance portions.584 Land was divided into smaller parcels of land 
through enclosure The value of land was based on the supposed value of agricultural goods it 
could produce.585 A muddled process of privatization of land from estates caused great 
confusion. Movable property was bought and sold on the same markets as immovable products. 
Therefore, the movable and immovable goods were both traded for cash value.586 Redemption 
claims, and state assistance for notable losses through compensation related complaints played 
more of a role of assigning value for all goods lost during the Napoleonic Wars and subsequent 
years of hardship. The movable goods like crops were weighed against the value of immovable 
goods like land.587 Markets for goods with cash value meant the velocity of transactions 
increased. Compensation claims, therefore, measured the loss of productivity as a metric of 
disused land.  
Confusion about the value of specific goods thus abounded and Bavarian Finance 
Ministry officials struggled to make consistent decisions. Land compensation claims in the 
Untermain-Kreis, for example, reflect this conflation of immovable and movable goods during 
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the state decision to establish cash values for land compensation claims. A report from 1817-
1818 records compensation for Franz Nickels’ crops and land as 20 florins.588 Other goods 
commanded a 40 florin, 47 kreutzer price.589 The goods exchanged are placed in a general 
category and the type or numbers of goods are not specified. Set prices for movable goods are 
possible to explore as a type but more classification is unfortunately missing. The incomplete 
picture of exchanges and pricing of goods also underscore the reality of a limited state presence 
in managing land development beyond its purchase for enclosure. Untermain Kreis’ records give 
a notion of a market that had structure but also include statements that demonstrate negotiation 
was commonplace. The collection description begins with the order that labor and agricultural 
products, as approved (and stamped) by regional authorities, were to be awarded the suggested 
total of 57 florin, 27 kreutzer. Buying, selling, and compensating destroyed land, was a far more 
complex and improvised process than extensive Finance Ministry records suggest. 
Land assessed by the Bavarian state was, however, never subject to a coherent system of 
assessment and compensation. Buying and selling land was presented as a straightforward 
transaction by Montgelas. Fair transactions at market value was another question. In theory, the 
assessment of the price of land was an action overseen by the expanded bureaucracy of the 
Bavarian Finance Ministry. The reality was far different. The ubiquity of Finance Ministry cases 
eventually brought before the Landtag attest to the lack of a systemic means of judicating land 
transfer or sale. One critical point to explore is who was buying land. Few Bavarians had the 
ability to purchase large quantities of land. The enclosure movement in Bavaria helped the state 
generate revenue from previous seigneurial dues first, dividing and exploiting the former lands of 
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mediatized nobility. Bavaria was mostly a land of small agricultural holdings that stayed within 
families through the practice of partible inheritance – a process that divided land between family 
members based on equal division of property. The open field system, as Theodore Hamerow 
described it, disappeared and was replaced, at first, by early partition and sale among small 
landholders.590 Seigneurial dues were replaced by exchanges of cash for rental after the passage 
of the first Bavarian constitution (1808) and continued through the passage of the second in 
1818.591 The existence of this rudimentary exchange of wages and rents for land as well as cash 
for small plots persisted as the modus operandi for most Bavarians through the Napoleonic Wars 
and beyond. The Bavarian state was more concerned with setting the value of larger former 
estates and the sale of more substantial fields. Land quality and market value were chief concerns 
of Bavaria’s reformers in 1818. 
Drafting the Second Bavarian Constitution: Debate and Compromise 
 The careers and opinions of Bavaria’s most prominent civil servants were themselves 
reflections of the complex loyalties of a state in transition from an Enlightened absolutist model 
to that of a constitutional monarchy. The dismissal of Bavarian First Minister Graf Montgelas, 
though seen as necessary by Ludwig, Wrede, and Zentner, weakened Munich’s central authority 
during the interim period before the drafting of the second Bavarian constitution. Max Joseph, 
however, acted quickly and appointed a new regime of Graf Alois von Rechberg as Foreign 
Minister, Graf Friedrich Karl von Thürheim as Minister of the Interior, and Freiherr Maximilian 
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von Lerchenfeld (a close associate of Montgelas) as Finance Minister.592 These candidates knew 
Montgelas’ system well and were dedicated to the service of Max Joseph. 
Therefore, the new regime, at least in 1818, reflected an initial desire on the part of Max 
Joseph for state stability rather than a dramatic overhaul of the most senior leadership positions 
in the Kingdom’s civil service. Rechberg, Zentner, and Lerchenfeld seemed an ideal trio to 
govern Bavaria due to their earlier collaboration on the 1810 Bavarian Civil Code.593 Graf Alois 
von Rechberg was a career civil servant who hailed from Max Joseph’s native Zweibrücken and 
served as Bavaria’s leading plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna.594 Rechberg advanced a 
Bavarian position that emphasized a conciliatory attitude to the new German Confederation.595 
The new finance minister, Freiherrn Lerchenfeld, however, typified the divided loyalties still 
present over fifteen years since the beginning of Montgelas’ efforts to redeem and transform 
Bavarian estate agriculture into productive, enclosed plots. Lerchenfeld’s family line belonged to 
the rarefied elite stratum of the Bavaria Ständeschaft. Egglkofen, in Landkreis Mühldorf, 
Oberbayern, was an estate tied to the jurisdictional privileges of the Lerchenfeld family.596 
Lerchenfeld served as a loyal subordinate to Montgelas and the latter possessed a castle on the 
former Egglkofen manorial grounds as late as 1833.597 Rechberg and Lerchenfeld, elites in their 
own right, were a critical connective tissue between the estate Ständeschaft and the statist regime 
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of the Wittelsbach dynasty. Their bureaucratic experience, and elite ties, would prove crucial 
during the process of forming the second Bavarian constitution. 
 Zentner, Rechberg, and Lerchenfeld, central, trusted figures of the Bavarian state were 
thus entrusted with defending Bavarian interests against reactionary intervention from beyond 
Bavaria’s borders. When Ludwig dismissed Montgelas in 1817 he did so at a critical point of 
Bavarian negotiations within the Congress of Vienna system. Two years prior, Rechberg, then 
serving as the Bavarian representative to the Congress of Vienna, was forced to manage 
Bavarian loss rather than serve as the envoy of a major power. Metternich, the dominant 
personality of the Congress of Vienna, presided over the Vienna Final Act following the 
conclusion of the Congress sessions, therefore overseeing the return of Austrian territory to the 
Habsburg throne. The Bavarian territories of Brixen in the Trentino and Tyrol were among the 
Napoleonic spoils of war returned to Austrian possession per article 93 of the Vienna Final 
Act.598 Salzburg, a Bavarian possession, was ceded to the victorious Habsburg Empire.599 The 
price for this territorial loss seemed fair. The resumption of open access to Rhine and Danube 
mercantile traffic, however, meant the end of the restrictive, protectionist Napoleonic 
Continental System and new opportunities for Bavarian commerce.600 Montgelas’ dismissal may 
have taken place at a critical point for Bavaria, but the Kingdom’s territorial sovereignty 
remained intact. Serious reform of the existing system, was, however needed. 
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Land and Political Representation: The Second Bavarian Constitution 1818 
The writers of the 1818 constitution would have to address the failures of the 1808 
constitution to protect subjects, including notables, from the unchallenged and inefficient 
Bavarian state as the Kingdom was reduced in size and stature in the Congress system. The 
enclosures of land not tied to privilege and title left many Bavarian notables cash poor. Although 
done on a voluntary basis, the lack of liquid assets held by Bavarian notables, incentivized their 
decision to relinquish land (the process of redemption) to Munich. Bavarian notables were faced 
with the loss of power and influence as their legal and taxation privileges were destroyed without 
recourse. This mediatization of Bavarian notables occurred during a climate of war and 
economic privation. The ultimate authority of the Bavarian state made protest a futile effort. 
Bavaria’s 1808 constitution made the King the “sole organ of the state”.601 The 1818 constitution 
was a document written in response to the purported failure of the Montgelas era state ministries 
to protect and improve upon Bavarian agriculture and trade. Zenter, Lerchenfeld, and Rechberg 
(among other officials) needed to address perceived shortcomings of the last legal compact of the 
Montgelas years. 
The special committee addressed the key points of taxation and land privileges by 
eliminating many of the tax burdens of the Montgelas era despite their success in cementing state 
authority. These topics produced friction between the supreme authority of the state under 
Montgelas and the Bavarian notables who had been stripped of privileges and special taxation 
and pension rights.602 The elimination of special taxation rates was part of Montgelas’ plan to 
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create a streamlined, extractive, and uniform system of taxation.603 Historian Jörg Rode observed 
that the long term consequences of this project were significant. Rode wrote, “In addition, the 
reform of the unmanageable system of direct taxes was particularly significant.”604 While this tax 
reform was a significant step in the centralization of the Bavarian state and its accumulation of 
revenue, the immediate products were less promising. The new tax system created a deeply 
indebted state opposed by a cash poor notable population. These cash poor nobles were unable to 
assist, even if willing, in the transformation of Gutsherrschaft land into a productive and 
profitable agricultural enterprise. Zentner and the constitutional committee addressed the 
taxation and hunger crises faced by Bavarians in the preamble to the second constitution. 
Metternich’s influence on state constitutions is also present throughout the text of the second 
Bavarian constitution. Zentner wrote; 
The monumental and unprecedented world events that did not leave a single German 
State untouched, and during which the people of Bavaria immediately demonstrated 
themselves to be great both while suffering under the pressure and while surviving in 
battle had hardly reached their goal in the Act of the Wiener Congress when We began to 
seek to fulfill the requirements of Our State.605 
 
The constitutional committee was beset by the imposing interest groups of Bavarian notables, the 
reactionary order of a German Confederation led by Metternich, and critics of state ministries. 
Zentner and the constitutional committee thus sought compromise, not confrontation, with the 
notable interests in Bavaria implemented on 26 May 1818 by a special committee led by Ludwig 
I with the legal oversight of Graf Zentner. 
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The constitutional committee, an informal circle including Ludwig I, Marshal Wrede, 
Zentner, Rechberg, and Lerchenfeld, convened in early 1818 as the Staatsratkomission (State 
Council Commission).606 The implementation of the second Bavarian constitution in 1818 
brought the promise of increased representation for landowners, notable and Mittelstände (non-
noble middling Bavarians who could buy property) alike. The Mittelstände property buying class 
was small in 1818 but grew steadily during the next two decades. Merchants, lawyers and 
professors, and enterprising farmers rose in monetary status and desired greater access to land. In 
time these individuals, following a highly specific property-based pursuit of liberal politics, 
demanded inclusion in the Landtag. Zentner, more than any other Bavarian statesman, was 
responsible for the writing of the second constitution.607 The legal theorist and general director of 
the Ministry of the Interior was ideally situated to gauge both the unrest in the Kingdom of 
Bavaria and the conflicting interests of each estate. Zentner was politically adept for someone 
considered to be a loyal, apolitical civil servant, and he was given free rein to draft much of the 
text of the constitution.608 Staatsratkomission members took the important step of drafting a 
constitution amenable to notable and, to a lesser degree, wealthy Mittelstände interests. 
 The state, represented chiefly by Ludwig and Zentner, was still the supreme Bavarian 
authority under the King. Bavarian representation came, legally speaking, from a two-chamber 
parliament (Landtag) comprised of notables in the Reichsräthe (Chamber of Imperial 
Counsellors) and the Kammer der Abgeordneten (the Chamber of Deputies).609 Together, the 
sessions of the Landtag contained favored nobility connected to the Bavarian state, untitled 
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nobles, members of the manufactory (Fabrikante), a small contingent of prominent lawyers, 
professors, and merchants (Kaufleute), and those private citizens who owned sufficient quantities 
of land. Land qualifications for voting were common in Federal German constitutions and the 
traditions of Rhenish law.610 Crown Prince Ludwig I lent his support to both the establishment of 
a two-chamber parliamentary assembly as well as the implementation of a uniform tax system.611 
All parties, however, were not equal. Membership in the Landtag emphasized social standing 
and gross land ownership. The bicameral Landtag exposed the more conservative tacking of the 
1818 constitutional reforms and the fundamental differences between the Bavarian Stände 
(estates).  
The two chambers of the Landtag contained an elite, propertied representation of 
Bavarian men. A small proportion of the Bavarian populace possessed the ability to vote. 
Reichsräthe members were from the most rarefied ranks of Bavarian society. Members came 
from the top two voting classes of the five-class system.612 Classes I and II had 475 and 86 
members respectively.613 Of these members 440 and 79 possessed the ability to vote in the lower 
chamber. Class I members were noble landholders who collected rents as landlords. Such 
esteemed members frequently held higher offices such as being a regional judge as well as 
having membership and voting rights in both houses of the Bavarian Landtag. Sebastian Wenzel 
Baron von Schrenck-Notzing, the first president of the upper and lower chambers of the Landtag 
from 1819-1837, also held the office of minister of justice among other offices. Class III, with 
3,416 members, was completely represented in the lower chamber as a voting bloc with 100% of 
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its members being represented and present as Wahlmänner (electors).614 Classes IVa, IVb, and V 
especially, comprised the vast majority of Bavaria’s 3 million plus subjects. Voting rights in the 
chambers of the Landtag, and participation as Wahlmänner, were extremely limited. Class V for 
example constituted 6,689 Wahlmänner drawn from some 673,164 families and a total of 
3,030,000 Bavarians. Membership requirements constrained the political voice of Bavaria’s 
poorer landholders and non-noble Mittelstaende members. The responsibilities of both chambers 
thus contrasted and presented potential points of friction for prospective deputies. 
Members of both chambers of the Landtag were consumed with questions concerning 
land politics with a specific focus on pensions and taxation rates. One of the most important 
responsibilities of the Landtag was the control of granting and assessing landed property and 
their connected tax and pensions rates. Article five of part 11 of the 1818 constitution stated, “In 
order to compensate for great and determined services to the State, other State domains or 
pensions may be awarded, but only with the approval of the Estates. They shall adopt the 
property of being a fiefdom of the crown only inheritable in the male line.”615 The arbitration of 
property rights and pensions thus became a central responsibility of Landtag members. While 
historian Andreas Kraus observes that the membership qualifications of each chamber did not 
necessarily entail tensions in the Landtag over issues such as property rights and pensions, the 
interests and social standing of deputies represented opposite sides of Bavarian estates.616 
Notables and the more middling members of the Landtag thus shared certain responsibilities. 
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Social standing provided potential areas of disagreement for Landtag members. The 
notable, first class Schrenck dominated the Stände Versammlung as its president. His deputy, the 
second president Johann Michael von Seuffert, a lawyer by trade, belonged to Class IV of the 
voting bloc. Schrenck and Seuffert were both dedicated civil servants rewarded for their loyal 
service to King Max Joseph. No conflict between Schrenck or Seuffert can be found in archival 
material. Their positions in the Landtag and voting class membership, however, reveal a 
fundamental inequality of suffrage criteria between Bavarian legislators. This gulf between 
social rank and voting qualifications, would, in time, become a more visible point of conflict 
between Landtag members. In 1818, however, land, and the social standing, pension, salary, and 
participation in the Landtag, slowly became sources of consternation and friction among 
deputies. 
While no organized, republican inspired liberal political movement in the Landtag 
membership existed in 1818, the very foundation of the assembly spurred lively discourse about 
the scope of responsibilities possessed by the various members and committees of the Chamber 
of Deputies and its educated, professional landholding representatives. Animated debate about 
the broad range of economic and legal ramifications posed by of a two chamber, comparatively 
representative assembly took place in 1818.617 King Max Joseph, Zentner, and the State Council 
Commission sought to create a sense of unity through the establishment of the second 
constitution. This “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) became the basis for the 
citizenship of subjects and the legitimacy of the Wittelsbach Dynasty.618 Constitutional 
patriotism and debate aside, the key focus of discussion gravitated towards land. 
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Gutsherrschaft land was the foundation of the Bavarian economy and was thus a key 
topic of discussion for Landtag members. The Güter land of former Gutsherrschaft estates was 
central to the integration of Bavarian subjects, noble and commoner alike, and subsequent 
subordination to the will of the King and the decisions of the Landtag.619 Landtag members 
deliberated overt who owned Gutsherrschaft land and how it could best be maintained  Landtag 
Actenproducte – the main points of parliamentary procedure – often revolved around land value 
and pensions associated with former estates. A Landtag report for a typical financial report reads, 
“Security for the purchase of the foundation money, security for the future retention.”620 
Members of the Chamber of Imperial Counsellors and the Chamber of Deputies thus possessed a 
vested interest in the formation of property law and its impact on wealth and pension 
accumulation. Individuals in the Reichsräthe were consumed with preserving land and the 
fortunes and privileges they retained. Reichsräthe members frequently criticized the inclusion of 
common landowners in the Landtag, arguing that their presence and voting responsibilities 
meant that “power and courage were lost in a sea of soup.”621 Members of the Chamber of the 
Deputies, who were eligible to stand for membership via election, were thus more motivated to 
gain access to Güter land and the wealth of its potential agricultural products. The 
responsibilities of the Chamber of Deputies would soon include vital discussions about the 
property rights connected to land ownership, creating a potential conflict of interest between the 
former Güter elites and commoners wishing to buy land. 
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1819: The First Session of the Landtag and Land and Pension Debate 
The Chamber of Imperial Counsellors, and the lower Chamber of Deputies served as a 
passive audience for interpreting the laws proposed by King Max Joseph during the first 
legislative session of the Bavarian Landtag beginning in February 1819. German historian Dirk 
Götschmann comments in Bayerisches parliamentarismus in Vormärz, 1819-1848 that the 
increased representation brought the promise of state modernization with it.622 Members of the 
Chamber of Deputies supported King Max Joseph’s legitimacy as the sole ruler of Bavaria. This 
process, however, was defined by the contrast of the Chamber of Deputies’ legislative 
responsibilities in theory and those it possessed. Deputies from both chambers played a more 
reactive than proactive role in the legislative process.  
The King of Bavaria, per the second constitution of 1818, presented legislature to the 
Landtag. This idea was known as the monarchical principle in Bavarian Verfassungstheorie 
(constitutional theory).623 This concept, familiar to the Francophile King Max Joseph, was 
borrowed from the French Charter of 1814 that proposed the same “so-called monarchical 
principle.”624 The constitution itself also implied that the “we” of the Bavarian state was that of 
the State Council Commission and Max Joseph, not the legislators of the Landtag. “The current 
file…” the preamble of the 1818 constitution begins, “is the work of our free and firm will.”625 
King Max Joseph, by Zentner’s design, was the driving force of the legislative process while the 
bicameral legislature served as an advisory panel. Paragraph one of the second constitutional 
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article also established, “The King is the head of the state.” The King had to convene a 
legislative session every three years for the duration of no longer than two months and also had 
the discretion to dissolve the entire assembly at will. Both chambers could also be dissolved at 
the King’s discretion. Therefore, this process of supposed state modernization began with the 
meeting of a largely undemocratic assembly of advisors who could be dismissed at the whim of 
the sovereign. The putative legislators would have to find certain responsibilities from which to 
carve out a more active role in the legislative process. 
 Questions regarding law enforcement and trade were important in 1819 due to increasing 
hardships for ordinary Bavarians and a climate of reactionary policing and social surveillance in 
central Europe. Members of the two chambers of the Landtag deliberated over taxes, hardship 
reports from landowners, and various petitions brought before them. The legal initiative 
(Gesetzes Initiative) of the monarchical principle meant that King Max Joseph was responsible 
for presenting reforms before the Landtag. The two chambers of the Landtag approved new 
taxes (Steuerbewilligung), cooperation over legal interpretation (Mitwirkung), lawmaking 
(Gesetzesgebung), and petitions and hardship law (Petitions und Beschwerderecht).626 Ongoing 
disorder and damage to Bavarian property were chief among the concerns of the Landtag. The 
task of the Bavarian Landtag, in part during 1819, was to support commercial activity in the 
Kingdom by authorizing the enforcement of private property law. Property related concerns 
filled the 1819 agenda of the Landtag. Many of these cases were part of a persistent decline in 
commerce and the need for local authorities to have the support of Munich to enforce laws. One 
of the first Landtag sessions, on 25 February 1819, considered the limits of local policing in 
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Straubing.627 Members of Straubing’s local government sought the best means to enforce laws 
without impeding trade. Finance ministry authorities secured foundation funds from trade and 
local dues before reporting on local officials confidence in civil servants. A report reads, “the 
foundation’s let out of a feeling of responsibility among the general population someone who is 
responsible for grain, and to subjects among the division of landed property can be stored in the 
community house of in a church.”628 The limits of centralized authority, as this case from 
Straubing illustrates, had yet to be appropriately addressed by the Bavarian state. Landtag 
members were more adept, though, at extracting wealth from landholders than administering 
land. 
The Landtag was tasked with ensuring agricultural commerce while securing the 
unabated flow of tax revenues into state coffers. A severe price shock hit Bavarian agriculture in 
1819 and concomitant debt concerns spread throughout the Kingdom’s land estates.629 Bavaria’s 
taxation system did not help matters. The regimen was also far from a unique problem faced by 
German states in the post-Napoleonic era. Bavaria, along with the Kingdom of Baden, 
implemented massive taxation, allodification, and compensation efforts to transform the land of 
elites in a continued effort to stimulate agricultural production.630 The governments of Bavaria 
and Baden attempted to extract as much cash from landholders as well to pay off state debts.631 
Bavarian income from dues charged to former estate holders constituted a full 15-22% of all 
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state revenue.632 Income from land dues was of paramount importance. Landholders were the 
largest group represented in the Landtag. One eighth of the Chamber of Deputies’ members were 
Landeigentümer – those who owned land as property. The membership of the Chamber of 
Imperial Counsellors was drawn from the elite estate of Bavarian society (Adeligestände) who 
possessed Güter land as property and largely resisted the Kingdom’s land redemption efforts.  
Ongoing hardships for Bavarian landowners (and non-landowners as well), were brought 
before the first session of the Landtag. The Actenproducte of the Landtag included a discussion 
of protecting private property and commercial interests in Passau dated to 29 April 1819.633 
Ensuring the protection of free commerce and private property was a priority throughout 1819. 
The Landtag also paid close attention to protecting property in Straubing, Augsburg, and 
Nuremburg due to reports of hardship submitted by regional governments from February to April 
1819.634 Private property in 1819 was also under assault due to a spontaneous, violent series of 
riots known as the Hep-Hep Riots by August of that year. These anti-Semitic riots added to the 
deleterious conditions of debt and famine that challenged the King and Landtag to find ways to 
preserve private property rights and law and order in the Kingdom of Bavaria. Hardship reports 
pertaining to agricultural estates increased during this year of instability and the treatment of 
Güter estates as private property was again debated. 
 The process of Bavaria’s economic modernization hinged upon the division of land as 
private property – a task which the Landtag played a crucial role. Authority in Bavaria still 
rested in the leadership and title of the King. Max I Joseph presided over the Landtag and its 
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overall juridical and economic committees. Hardship reports and other petitions were heard by 
the Chamber of Deputies, but the final negotiations were debated in the Chamber of Imperial 
Counsellors. Finally, such cases were brought before the King. The specific work of 
transforming land from estate to private property status meant establishing the land’s cash value. 
This process was done by the “Rule of the Bicameral System” – a system of taxation, 
cooperation between the two chambers of the Landtag, and a general legal commission. Land 
concerns, in the form of hardships and petitions, also occupied the majority of the “animated 
debate” by 1819.635 The allodification of estates would thus entail the assessment of land by 
examining the hardship reports and petitions filed by landholders. Most of the friction between 
the two chambers focused on the borders of the enclosures and compensation claims including 
the “legal initiative” of 1819. Land negotiations in the Landtag considered the value of estates 
before allodification and enclosure and how pension and taxation would progress in an era of 
private property plots. A reordering of land rents, pensions, and value was thus underway. 
Deliberating Enclosures and Compensation: Drawing Boundaries for Land 
 The cases of aggrieved landholders that the Landtag heard were usually elites looking for 
compensation for their disused land and much-needed pensions. Elite compensation claims were 
part of the allodification process. Compensation was a slow process in part due to the detached, 
dispassionate civil bureaucracy and the seemingly unresponsive nature of Landtag committees. 
Mediatized nobles consistently complained about the new definition of land as legally defined as 
private property. By 1819, many of the mediatized nobles, like those in Oberbayern had ruined 
land, lagging rent collection, and a lack of liquid assets.636 Many nobles reported such hardships 
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to the Landtag. Nobles expressed confusion over the boundaries produced by land enclosure 
while demanding pension payments that matched those tied to the former borders of their 
estates.637 Landtag members responded demonstrating that new system was more responsive. 
The new constitutional laws, the representative power of the Landtag, and the monarchical 
principle, though impressive in theory, however, provided little immediate assistance. 
The struggle of the Beer family estate, contextualized within this turbulent era, further 
elucidates the desperate and frustrated efforts estate holders, and common landowners alike, face 
when confronting the impasse of Landtag sessions and the disengaged nature of the monarch.  
Ludwig von Beer, the son of estate holder Wilhelm von Beer, inquired about his father’s life 
annuity in correspondence to the Landtag.638 Beer’s estate in Alsatian Electoral Bavaria was 
subject to several enclosure attempts under first French then Bavarian states beginning in 
1805.639 The Beer family negotiated pension compensation plans that considered early 
revolutionary policies in property reform in France from 1792 before Napoleonic reassessments 
of property. Beer demanded a monthly pension of 323 Francs from the French state, as promised 
by a 1792 regulation. The turbulent nature of the French political establishment during the years 
of the revolution likely justified Beer’s decision to bring his grievances, next to the attention of 
the Electoral Bavarian government. By 1805, Beer’s rising personal debt spurred him to make a 
desperate plea to Munich for financial assistance. The absence of a functioning private property 
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regimen (not to mention the lack of contemporary understanding of how such a system might 
operate) meant that Beer could not mortgage his estate to alleviate financial burdens. The 
Bavarian Finane Ministry reported to Max Joseph, “In the attached documents that we are 
handing to your royal highness the first decision result in the aforementioned conflict which 
definitely frees the royal perspective from the lawsuit. We present the secularized documents 
very humbly.”640 In addition, Beer, like other Bavarian subjects, did not expect that he could 
name a beneficiary for a pension or to whom his land or liquid assets could be bequeathed.641 
Thus, a French and German language letter sent by Beer to Elector Max Joseph in 1805 
demanded scheduled payments to his life annuity that, in sum, exceeded 2,000 Francs.642 
Therefore, members of the Landtag were negotiating pensions and land value with subjects 
whose long pre-constitutional history with allodification complicated their understanding of land 
as legally private property in a confused state of inconsistent laws. 
 The example of the Beer money woes reflects a broader trend of restoration nobles 
refusing to adapt to the new parameters of Bavarian property law. A gap in archival material 
makes it difficult to assess what exactly became of the Beer family drama from 1805-1818. Their 
estate was likely subject to the ruinous demands of French occupation including the seizure of 
goods and the destructive nature of the Continental System’s “internal blockade” of continental 
Europe. One thing, however, is certain: the Beer family continued its demand for state financial 
assistance despite weathering the storm of successive wars, governments, and dramatic changes 
to both French and Bavarian legal systems. Ludwig von Beer wrote King Max Joseph on the 16 
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December 1819, beseeching him for financial assistance owed to the Beer family in “Gulden und 
Gnaden.”643 The Beer’s fell back upon the old trappings of privilege and jurisdictional authority: 
the touchstones of Old Regime Bavaria and Europe. Though addressed to the appropriate 
Liquidations Commission of the Landtag (of the Petitions and Complaints Commission who 
heard pension related cases) the letter appeals to a more antiquated pre-revolutionary mindset. 
Beer’s letter recounts the shifting borders of the estate, the rise of French influence, Bavarian 
control, and finally addresses loyal service to Max Joseph’s royal lineage of the House of 
Zweibrücken.644 The notion of unchallenged Wittelsbach authority and the legitimacy of the 
1818 constitution had yet to be cemented in the minds of Bavarian notables. 
Petitions and complaints, like those of the Beer family, were the right of all Bavarians as 
written into the Second Constitution yet were also subject to the scrutiny of both chambers of the 
Landtag. In addition, this new system also involved the oversight of the Interior Ministry 
(Ministerium des Innern), Justice Ministry (Ministerium der Justiz), and the newly reorganized 
regional governments of the eight Kreise of the Finance Ministry. The petition system was 
guaranteed by title VII of the 1818 constitution.645 Graf Georg Friedrich von Zentner declared 
that petition law allowed for any of the “subject class” to bring a petition or grievance to the 
attention of the Landtag.646 In theory, such a petition was heard by the joint chamber as part  of 
the petition and hardships process (Petitions und Beschwerde). A petition could also be referred 
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to King Max Joseph. In practice, many petitions, including hardships reports and pension cases, 
were reviewed by the commission, assessed by the ministries of the government, but few were 
resulted in sustained deliberation. Petition law was also subject to the “effective circles” 
(Wirkungskreise) of the parliament.647 Certain personalities frequently dominated the 
proceedings of the Landtag and petitions commission. Count Alois von Rechberg, the more 
autocratic leaning foreign minister and senior member of the Chamber of Imperial Counsellors, 
was, in part responsible for examining such cases. Although a facet of new constitutional law, 
the operation of the petitions commission was inconsistent. Assessment was arbitrary and, in the 
case of the Beer family, compensation, was subject to the decisions of various ministries or the 
personal whims and biases of Landtag members. 
The division of larger landed plots, carved from the former Gutsherrschaft estates, like 
the Beer family’s estate, occupied most of the attention of the Finance Ministry and the 
proceedings of the petition and hardship commissions. Legislation and pension and land 
compensation was often the responsibility of wealthy, career civil servants who had vested 
interests in the process of assessing, selling, and taxing land. Finance Ministry officials, present 
in the eight regional governmental subdivisions of the Bavarian kingdom (Kreise) also 
established specialized offices to assess, enforce, and arbitrate cases regarding pensions, wages, 
and the liquidity of the mediatized nobility’s former assets that were in large part connected to 
land. Such divisions were called Rentamten and the wide availability of sources related to their 
operation implies their frequent assessment of land in each Landkreise and their role in 
arbitrating local land disputes and complaints about the inadequacy of state compensation for 
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former noble estates. Professional civil servants presided over these cases and heard the hardship 
reports. The Finance Ministry grew following the dismissal of First Minister Montgelas.  
Bavaria’s Chamber of Finance (Kammer der Finanzen) was added to the already swelling 
number of bureaucrats assigned to overseeing the complex taxation system necessary for the 
growth of the Bavarian state and the enrichment of the Kingdom. Finance Ministry officials also 
exercised greater control over Bavarians’ everyday lives. The prices of movable goods and 
immovable goods were now taxed and regulated by the Finance Ministry. Finance Ministry 
officials, in the case of land sales, issued land certificates for a price. Such certificates were a 
physical representation of the creation, sale, and purchase of land that the state made legal. These 
certificates created a sense of legitimacy for land sales overseen by the state. Price controls on 
land, seen frequently in town and city weekly broadsheets (Wochenblatt) also gave the 
impression of state authority and a systemic approach to market regulation. The Intelligenzblatt 
for Nördlingen, for example, recorded the gross value of land at 2,500 gulden on 1 January 1819  
in a report that read, “the lovers of the cause have to appear in Kirchheim on the day noted, and 
with proper documentation certify that they have the necessary knowledge for running a business 
and that they are of immaculate reputation and can afford a security deposit of 2,500 florin in 
goods or twice the value for present reasons.”648 The survey, sale, and compensation of land 
 
648 “Intelligenzblatt der Königlich Baierischen Stadt Nördligen Nro. 1.” Digipress Bayerische  
Staatsbibliothek (BSB). https://digipress.digitale-
sammlungen.de/view/bsb10626654_00007_u001/1 [accessed November 1, 2019]. German: “Die 
Sache liebhaber haben am bemerkten Tag in Kirchheim zu erscheinen, und sich durch gerichte 
Zeugnisse anzuweissen dass sie die zu Fuhrung des Gewerbes nöthigen kenntnisse besitzen, von 
untadelhaften Rufe senen, und eine Caution von 2,500 florin Waare oder den Doppeln Werth 
dafür anliegenden Gründen leisten können.” 
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appeared to be a concise and ordered task of the state. State administration of land negotiations 
fell to career civil servants of the Finance Ministry, however, not members of the Landtag. 
 Buying and selling land meant interacting with civil servants, an entirely new experience 
for many Bavarians, who soon learned that the operations of the government on a local level 
were far from consistent or fair. Finance Ministry scribes, and other civil servants, known more 
colloquially as Schreiber, were the product of improved schooling and moral vetting. Many 
German states implemented new selection criteria and training programs to produce efficient, 
loyal, and morally upright bureaucrats.649 Unlike the training of many cameral officials who 
were highly educated in dedicated programs and a dossier was collected on their personal 
background. Ian F. McNeely’s book The Emancipation of Writing clarifies that “a typical dossier 
included the scribe’s age, birthplace, religion, father’s name and occupation, and mother’s name 
with her father’s occupation, children’s names and occupations, university training (if any), 
previous employment (if any), net worth, and the names of relatives of in state service.”650 State 
ministries tried to root out nepotism and cronyism as well. Civil servants, however, commonly 
accepted bribes and could be convinced to look the other way while illicit activities occurred.651 
Land transactions, therefore, were subject to a fallible, inconsistent, and the overstated reach of 
the state during a period of the kingdom’s centralization. 
Compensation: Evaluating and Negotiating the Price of Estate Land 
 Conflict between mediatized nobles and the Bavarian state revolved around land 
evaluation including pensions, land area, soil quality, and capital. These issues remained a focal 
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point through 1825, reflecting a major trend in allodification related compensation cases. The 
concept of allodification remained confusing to former Güter lords who placed claims to larger 
estate boundaries irrespective of Finance Ministry maps of enclosures. Loans and pensions 
related to estates were frequently subject to the review of the Kammer der Finanzen (K.d.F.). 
The K.d.F was approached regarding financial assistance for struggling enclosures, to verify 
enclosure payments at purchase, and to assist cash poor nobles in compensating the value of their 
land. A consistent point of disagreement between the K.d.F and nobles were the rents collected 
and pensions awarded based on the borders of each former Gutsherrschaft estate. One report 
from 17 September 1820 offers a glimpse into the transactional nature of financial support for 
enclosure holders.652 The Rentamten München features numerous cases regarding pensions 
connected to rent profits. Rents collected were part of surveys about estates from the early-
nineteenth century creation of enclosures. Pensions (Renten) were attached to the old obligations 
connected to titles and service to the elector. The Sitzung Protokolle (laws created by the meeting 
of the K.d.F and the Landtag) governed the collection of taxes derived from revenues from land 
including enclosure, soil quality, and capital.653 In the land assessed in case Ad. 16421, the value 
of land, for example, was a hefty 3,720 gulden. Of this, twenty gulden worth was enclosed in the 
case resolution to support the land holder based on a table of land valuation metrics gathered and 
analyzed by the K.d.F. The relative worth, as assessed by the various entities of the Finance 
Ministry, were essential to the growth of state centralization and paying off sovereign debt.  
The early 1820s included a series of new crises for the Bavarian state, exposing the 
bureaucracy’s inability to implement meaningful reforms to ameliorate conditions for struggling 
 
652 Finance Ministry (Rentamt Isarkreis) Discussion of the Feudal Allodification of the Manorial  
Estate of Freiherr Josef von Leyden, October 20, 1813, in BHStA MF 17374. 
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notables or the common weal. Europe’s grain market imploded again in 1820 and 1821.654 
Hardships reports increased in number. Bavarian crop prices dropped significantly, as did the 
cash value of estate land. Most Bavarians lived modestly at best and desperately at worst. 
Although the Bavarian population grew, famine and adverse climate conditions made life 
difficult. Persistent problems included housing, nutrition, income, and infant mortality rates.655 
The average age of Bavarians at marriage was 25, which half of women never reached. 40-45% 
of Bavarian women gave birth to six or more children by the end of the famine years 
demonstrating that nutrition, though largely inadequate, was slowly helping to improve fertility 
rates at the time of marriage. Therefore, most Bavarians were concerned more with survival and 
finding work than buying land on the market. Most Bavarians were also cash poor, a problem 
that both the mediatized nobility and the agrarian peasantry faced. Despite Bavaria’s inclusion in 
the Bauernbefreiung (the emancipation of peasants), ¾ of all Bavarians, like their other German-
speaking counterparts, also still worked the fields for wages or rented segments of larger plots 
for subsistence farming. Bavarian concerns regarding land value and sale, turned to basic 
stability over market prices. 
The metrics for land valuation were restructured in 1821 during the crop price crash and 
informed bureaucrats but did little to affect their practical intervention in handling loans or 
pension support. Munich established that the worth of one court in the former Electoral Bavaria 
(Altbayern), Schwaben (Swabia), or Franken (Franconia) valued at 3,000 gulden were required 
to give up 420 gulden to the state alone independent of any other tax considerations.656 The 
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Jahrhunderts, 70. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Stutzer, Geschichte des Bauernstandes in Bayern, 178. 
 
 
202 
 
K.d.F had to collect data on each estate and weigh what each former court owed. Legislators in 
the Landtag were presented with the crisis in stark economic terms. The alleviation of debt 
burdens for landholders was soon considered. The 30 January 1821 Landtag examination of 
estate loans, chattel, and pensions presents a more organized overlay of how such data were 
reevaluated. Landtag members deliberated over Lehen Umhandlungen (fief negotiations) from 
30 January through 10 February 1821.657 The “Directory of estate ownership” from 1821 in the 
Unter-Donau Kreise was the focus of the Landtag’s attention.658 Reports regarding affected 
estate land flooded the ministry of the interior. This state organ collected and assessed the 
finanzelle Gesichtspunkte – the financial points of view - of various sources of state income via 
rents and loan payments.659 Landtag members, informed by the product of state census collection 
and the tabulation of rents, cereal movable good products, and other data, negotiated support for 
ordinary Bavarians. 
These detailed financial reports were the product of the work of Finance Ministry and 
ministry of the interior bureaucrats. Landtag members viewed the number of individuals who 
possessed portions of estate lands (Lehen-Körper), fiefs/estates (Lehen), salaries and estate worth 
(Gehalt) and those who stood to inherit land, rents, and pensions (Erben) from 1821 onward.660 
The survey also considered the Besitzer (owner) of land.661 This metric allowed the Landtag to 
assess the impact of land values and production on a personal level as well. Market regulations 
 
657 Petition of Ana Meierl to the General Commissariat of the Isar Kreisamt, August 10, 1808, in  
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increased during the early 1820s during a time when the lingering effects of the Continental 
System still wreaked havoc on grain prices and trade.662 By 1820 cereal prices were ¼ of what 
they had been in 1817.663 Aid was thus offered to Philipp Kitziger whose three sons stood to 
inherit a plot that had a crop yield of 240 kreutzer on 2/3 of its cereal producing plots.664 Such a 
case was consistent with the ongoing lag in agricultural products and personal, as well as state 
debts, during the 1820s. The actions of members of both chambers of the Landtag managed to 
alleviate some debt concerns through 26 October 1825 when Max Joseph, King of Bavaria, and 
the dramatic reforms of land allodification, died.665 The Crown Prince Ludwig, known for his 
vocal role in the constitutional process, acceded to the throne during a period of recovery and as 
the last of the Montgelas era reforms diminished in scope and importance. 
Conclusion: Reform and Revision, Protecting and Stabilizing the Bavarian State 
 The drafting of the second constitution of 1818 and the establishment of the bicameral 
legislature brought a semblance of stability and systemic legislative oversight but little practical 
assistance to address land quality, or landholder debt and pension concerns. Graf Zentner’s 
constitution fundamentally altered the legal basis of Bavarian legitimacy at home and abroad. 
The constitution was a product as much of an unstable domestic economy as it was the tense 
atmosphere of civil unrest and the reactionary influence of larger powers bordering the Bavarian 
state. Zentner’s constitution made Max Joseph, and future Bavarian Kings, legitimate rulers by 
restoring the Adeligestände (the Bavarian elites) to a measure of respectability and utility for the 
health of the state. Zentner formed a coalition of necessary personalities and interests in the 
 
662 Stutzer, 170. 
663 Ibid., 169 
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Bavarian state to stabilize debt, tax revenue, and agricultural vitality. The Bavarian state in the 
post-Montgelas era, was more expansive in its scope but more compromising. Critics of the 
Bavarian state, however, perceived the reforms as failures. The Bavarian state was more active in 
forming policy through the actions of the King and the legislative interpretations of the Landtag 
but remained just as ineffectual as its predecessor in realizing coherent, systemic improvement of 
Bavarian land. Zentner honed Montgelas’ reforms, in theory, harnessing the powers of state 
authority for the shared, legally backed nature of a more transparent, republican inspired state. 
Support for notables and landholders, in practice, did not transpire. For landholders, the Bavarian 
state was still far from functional or responsive to everyday demands and hardships.  
The Bavarian state and monarch themselves retained legitimacy, surviving the 
reactionary revulsion to allodification and other land reforms that had marked the years of 
revolution in the early-nineteenth century. Crown Prince Ludwig, who played a key role in the 
dismissal of Montgelas in 1817, setting in motion the process of the reforms of 1818, became 
King in 1825 at a point of stability and legislative and bureaucratic coherence. His rule, from the 
vantage point of 1825, appeared to offer more of what Zentner provided, stability crop yields and 
fair taxes. Thus, the modernization of Bavarian bureaucracy, twinned with the dual program of 
agricultural development exposed the practical limitations of governmental and physiocratic 
perceptions of modernization. The gradual evolution of the Bavarian state from 1818-1825 
proved that a relatively seamless transition to legitimate professional bureaucratic service to a 
constitutional monarchy was possible. The gulf between functional bureaucracy, economic 
management, and social policing, beyond the theoretical, official capacity of the Bavarian state 
was never truly present in the town or village setting. The litany of hardship reports, data 
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collected, and minutes of Landtag minutes do little to prove that the Bavarian state, on a 
functional, everyday level, did much for ordinary Bavarians through 1825. 
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Epilogue. The Road to Liberal Land Policies (1825-1848) 
King Ludwig’s efforts to stabilize productive agriculture and land value ultimately led to 
his decision to join the Prussian led Zollverein (or customs union), a disastrous arrangement that 
opened Bavarian landholders to new markets that in turn crushed them competitively. Ludwig’s 
entry into the Zollverein constituted a new form of cooperation with the neighboring southern 
German states of Baden and Württemberg in a failed regional South German Customs Union. 
These negotiations revealed Ludwig’s desire to exploit Bavarian economic recovery for a 
commanding role in a regional economic bloc, challenging the meteoric economic prominence of 
Prussia and the looming presence of restoration-era Austria. The failure of the South German 
Customs Union brought Bavaria into Berlin’s orbit and bought Munich access to unprecedent 
European, and ultimately global market share. As had been the case with the Continental System, 
Bavaria was again at the mercy of larger, more powerful political and economic forces beyond 
its control. Grain prices plummeted, land quality diminished, and waning popular support led to 
his abdication in 1848. The entry of the Kingdom of Bavaria into the Zollverein again devolved 
control of the Bavarian economy and agricultural management to a foreign power – the second 
time such an event had transpired in thirty years. New economic and political theories and forces 
by the 1840s heralded the final demise of the Bavarian property regime that sought to transform 
Güter estates into privately held plots. This supplanted a state driven by a strong monarchy and a 
close circle of advisors for bold middle-class notions of power derived from the personal 
accumulation of property. 
This epilogue traces the lingering aftermath of Bavaria’s formative interdependent 
bureaucratic and land allodification schemes seen in their last iteration as an attempt to preserve 
Bavarian economic and political autonomy in the face of domination by foreign powers and the 
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challenges posed by domestic insecurity. Swirling economic forces beyond Bavaria’s borders 
and new notions of property within the Bavarian state complicated attempts by King Ludwig I to 
increase the Kingdom’s prominence in European political and trade circles. Land as privately 
held property became more common and the agricultural sector, in the coming years, would 
become more competitive. In sum, the Kingdom of Bavaria, like its predecessor the Electorate of 
Bavaria, proved unequal to the task of managing and controlling the agricultural economy, 
placating or taming landed notables, and securing the strong, independent status of the polity 
amidst looming regional threats.666 
Ludwig I and The South German Customs Union: Bavaria and Broader Markets 
The longstanding, multi-decade Bavarian quest for particularism within German-
speaking central Europe came to a critical juncture with Ludwig’s attempt to create a southern 
German customs’ union with Munich as its capital. Bavaria was in a precarious political position 
by 1825. Bavaria’s ministers at the time, including foreign minister Alois von Rechberg, 
operated from a defensive position, advocating for the primacy of the Kingdom’s interests over 
shared German objectives. Rechberg, pressured by Bavarian merchants, staunchly opposed 
joining a customs union if the tariffs and crop prices did not disproportionately favor the 
Kingdom’s private, moneyed interests while Maximilian von Lerchenfeld, acting as finance 
minister, disagreed due to the potential markets Bavarians could reach. 667 By 1825, growing 
trade networks in southern Germany also meant more markets for Bavarian farmers that stood to 
help stabilize the agricultural market. Ludwig pursued a path of unity amongst the smaller 
 
666 This is not to imply that Bavaria would inevitably succumb to Prussian led German 
unification but merely serves to illustrate how much Bavaria’s rulers were incapable of subduing 
consistent challenges from persistent domestic and foreign challenges to state sovereignty.  
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southern German states, rather than Bavarian exceptionalism, appeared as a promising 
alternative. The preliminary agreements for a South German Customs’ Union, the product of 
cooperation between Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden, went into effect in 1825.668 Ludwig was 
skeptical of the plan at first. Bavaria raised tariffs on goods, including agricultural products that 
same year.669 Disagreements between the three independent German states ensued. Any regional 
customs union, however, required compromise, investment in infrastructure, and the active, 
consistent negotiation between each power’s representatives. 
 Ludwig’s defense of Bavarian particularism was challenged by the benefits offered from 
joining a customs union that would help stabilize the Kingdom’s economy and assist struggling 
landholders. Bavaria’s agricultural sector comprised 55% percent of the entire Bavarian 
economy in the first half of the nineteenth century.670 Facilitating the trade of agricultural 
products and reducing tariffs on transportation and importation could, at least in theory, greatly 
assist in stimulating growth in the Bavarian economy. A regional customs union stood to benefit 
landholders as well. Lerchenfeld was wholly opposed to Bavaria’s integration into a system that 
also benefitted agricultural producers in neighboring German states. Although Lerchenfeld’s 
many opponents, such as Josef Ludwig Graf von Armansperg (then foreign minister), criticized 
this position, they agreed that Bavarian products should hold a privileged position in any 
hypothetical customs union.671 Negotiations and parliamentary deliberations regarding the 
customs union ensued in Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg from 1826-1828. Broadsheets of the 
German states followed the discourse closely. The 24 December 1826 issue of the Nuremberg-
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based “Friedens und Kriegs Kurier” reported that in Stuttgart, King Wilhelm I of Württemberg 
had tasked the Landtag, “To inquire with the government to take the appropriate action to bring 
about a trade treaty or customs union with the Bavarian government.”672 Bavaria’s King 
responded similarly in 1825. 
 Ludwig’s position on the prospect of a trade union changed in the ensuing years when he 
made Josef Ludwig Graf von Armansperg, a well-respected civil servant, his finance minister. 
Ludwig made Armansperg finance minister in 1828. Heinz Gollwitzer, Ludwig’s preeminent 
biographer, presents Armansperg as an uncompromising champion of Bavarian particularism and 
the integrity of the Kingdom of Bavaria’s core lands of Altbayern, Schwaben, and Franken: 
“Armansperg undoubtedly envisioned a supremacy in southern Germany that seemed more 
important to him than a solution to the Baden-Palatinate territorial question.”673 Armansperg, 
with Ludwig’s support, however, sought cooperation with bordering states, including a trade pact 
with Baden and Württemberg and mutual respect for each state’s constitutions in the German 
federal system.674 Armansperg’s efforts helped resurrect the stalled discussions about the 
function of the proposed South German Customs Union between Bavaria, Baden, and 
Württemberg. Wilhelm, raised concerns about the disadvantageous position faced by his subject 
 
672 “Frieden und Kriegs Kurier Nro. 31.” Digipress Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB).  
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Württembergers in the proposed system.675 These concerns were addressed and adequately 
settled when the South German Customs Union went into effect on 18 January 1828.676  
Problems in the customs union, however, abounded within the system itself and beyond. 
Infrastructure in Bavaria, for example, was lacking. Road traffic throughout Germany was 
reported as, “expensive, arduous, and slow.”677 Murray’s travel guide described travel in Bavaria 
as “very bad” years after the initial customs union was first attempted.678 Legally, uniform tariff 
revenues on these poorly maintained trade arteries would be shared proportionally based on each 
state’s population.679 In practice, Bavaria collected 72% of all tariff revenues and the trade 
network and customs zone was rated as far inferior in bill of exchange when compared to the 
Prussian Zollverein to the north.680 In short, the tariff collection were meager in comparison. 
Understandably, the uneven tariff revenue collection scheme provoked disagreement. Forty-four 
percent of the tariff revenues went towards administrative costs for the maintenance of the 
customs union.681 The annual tariff negotiations, held in Munich, were less than productive.682 
Looming Prussian trade dominance in the north of Germany began to apply an irresistible 
amount of pressure on this ambitious scheme through Berlin’s stronger trade and diplomatic 
presence, leading to the weakening of the South German Customs Union and the integration of 
smaller German states, including Bavaria, into the Prussian-dominated system. 
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Bavaria in the Zollverein System (1834-1840) 
Ludwig presided over the entry of the Kingdom of Bavaria into the Zollverein in 1834, 
subordinating economic and, in time, political power to a nexus of Prussian dominance. 
Bavaria’s entry into the Zollverein came at a critical moment in the Kingdom’s history. Ludwig 
built confidence in his role by strengthening the Bavarian economy as the state weathered the 
hunger crisis of 1825. Bavaria’s place within the German Confederation, however, had not 
changed. Ludwig operated within an interdependent system that offered little room to 
maneuver.683 Prussia dominated the Zollverein and negotiated trade agreements unfavorable to 
smaller states. Protectionist duties on corn were lifted in 1835 and prices plummeted in 
Germany.684 Prussian trade decisions no longer had merely an indirect impact on Bavaria’s 
economic health. Instead, Bavaria was formally subordinated to a trade pact outside of the state’s 
control. The price of corn in Regen-Kreis, an administrative unit of the Kingdom of Bavaria with 
a capital in Regensburg, sank to a measly three kreutzer per bushel, a drop by 2 kreutzer.685 
Berlin’s control over the Zollverein protectionist measures were also inconsistent and subject to 
exploitation from competing markets. Dutch traders made routine profits, for example, by duping 
inattentive Prussian customs agents in various ways.686 Merchants exploited a loophole in 
customs duties and comparative market prices by dumping partially refined sugar into the 
Zollverein trading zone at a lower price due to their claims that the good was unrefined.687 
Prussian dominance meant that Bavarian goods could be traded on a much wider scale but were 
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also subject to increased foreign competition and greater demands on the agricultural and trade 
sectors to best stronger markets. 
Global market competition constrained Bavarian growth to such an extent that it dwarfed 
that of the regional trade imbalance and the exploitative Napoleonic Continental System of years 
past. Sixty-seven percent of all Bavarian land in the 1830s was agricultural and nearly two-thirds 
of the population was involved in cultivation.688 Ludwig’s support for productive, if not stable 
agriculture, was thus tested like it had never been before. Bavaria’s Finance Ministry officials, at 
the behest of Ludwig, raised an indirect tax of over 11 million gulden as well as a new tax 
revenue of 7 million gulden derived from the products of privileged estates of Bavaria’s elites as 
part of a yearly increase in thirty-five million gulden for the state coffers.689 Bavarian state debt 
in the 1830s, however, soared to an unprecedented 110 million gulden.690 State taxation on 
overburdened farms came during a competitive tariff war as the Zollverein’s representatives 
confronted the powerful merchant economies of Britain, Belgium, and France.691 The Zollverein, 
in theory, was unprecedented in scope and importance for the development of the economies of 
German-speaking central European states, save for the non-participant Habsburg Empire.692 In 
practice, the markets available to smaller states like Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemberg, were 
dominated by stronger international competitors. These smaller southern German states, now 
joined by concerned Silesian and Saxon merchants, as well as farmers, could not compete with 
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more powerful markets.693 Ludwig, like the monarchs of Baden, Württemberg, and other smaller 
German states, was beset by more frequent and dire calls for assistance as the land regimen so 
critical to Bavarian stability buckled by the end of the 1830s. 
The hierarchical Bavarian property system succumbed to the great forces of market 
competition, famine, and an insurgent middle-class liberal movement in the Landtag in the 
1840s. Integration into the Zollverein left the Bavarian state adrift among stronger powers and at 
the mercy of forces beyond the control of even the most able statesmen. Armansperg, and his 
successor, Arnold Friedrich von Mieg, could not harness the powers of the Bavarian state to 
control the explosion of state debt, the degradation of land, and the severe constraints imposed 
by a domineering Prussian guided customs union.694 Ludwig, and the rulers of other south 
German states, believed that the further survival of this system necessitated joining a larger trade 
bloc to protect the vitality, and sanctity, of what Montgelas had so many years before dubbed 
“the sacred right of property.”695 
Conclusion 
 The mass allodification of Bavarian land was a multi-decade process pursued by several 
statesmen for the purposes of boosting agricultural yields. This process was undertaken for the 
purpose of creating a robust economy. It also leant legitimacy to the rule of a sovereign by 
separating notions of elite privilege from its connection to land possession. Allodification was 
 
693 Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, and Reaction, 13. 
694 Henderson, The Zollverein, 42. 
695 Graf Montgelas, Maximilian Joseph von Garnerin, “Ansbach  
Memorandum." Proposal for a Program of State Reforms (September 30, 1796),” German 
History in Documents and Images (GHDI), https://ghdi.ghi-
dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3524. [accessed February 1, 2020]. 
 
 
 
214 
 
known as “redemption” when land itself was purchased as a property. Bavaria’s leader would 
provide unitary law and order above the patchwork of estates including the Catholic Church and 
landed notables who possessed semi-feudal land and elite privileges. New legal definitions for 
property were created in Bavaria’s cameral academies where the influence of physiocracy, an 
Enlightenment school of thought emphasizing productive land use, prompted cameral faculty to 
advocate for a greater role for civil servants within the Electoral state. These bureaucrats would 
play a critical role in enhancing economic growth and the authority of Bavaria as an enlightened 
absolutist state. The elevation of the status of cameral officials to civil servants of the Bavarian 
state was itself a controversial process that provoked the ire of traditional power blocs such as 
the Church and landed elites. Yet Bavaria, as a smaller German state, lacked the resources of a 
much larger polity like the Kingdom of Prussia, the Habsburg Empire, or Revolutionary France. 
Bavaria’s leaders could not employ many civil servants to carry out land reform.  It is for this 
reason, along with the power of regional enemies and influential estates of Bavarian society, that 
Munich’s rulers required foreign assistance to bring this project to fruition. 
 Allodification, as pursued by Montgelas, though doomed to an imperfect implementation 
fraught with compromises with foreign powers and nobles so critical to agricultural production, 
was an unqualified success that survived an era of war, famine, debt, and social upheaval. 
Montgelas diminished the power of landed elites and the Catholic Church from Bavarian politics, 
funded the creation of a unified civil service for Bavaria’s Elector, and leveraged the tumultuous 
era of the Napoleonic Wars to grant King Max Joseph unmitigated power over a unitary state 
with a uniform legal compact. The system was tested by the personal failings of Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s wars and consistent imposition on the Bavarian state for supplies for his wars. 
Bavaria, perpetually trapped between the clout of much greater powers, was successfully led by 
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Montgelas through destructive conflicts, famine, debt, and military defeat. Montgelas’ land 
system itself survived and “redeemed” (or claimed) much of the land. The political system, 
though altered by his successors, was but a modification to his monocratic rule from 1799-1817. 
Bavaria possessed a strong bill of exchange for land even in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. 
 Montgelas’ system survived the Napoleonic Wars and was in time altered to include a 
broader cross section of the Bavarian populace in a property buying class. In 1818, a second 
constitution was drafted that gave some non-noble Bavarians the opportunity to participate in the 
legislative proceedings of the Landtag parliament. By the 1840s the budding Mittelstände¸ from 
which manufacturers, merchants, craftsmen, professors, and lawyers came, were a powerful 
liberal voice in the Landtag and in the Bavarian push towards industrialization. 
 In sum the process of mass allodification in Bavaria was one more defined by 
compromise than consistent conflict. The power of the notables, was in time, lessened by 
demands for cash, pensions, and the negotiated “redemption,” or sale of their land based on 
allodified terms. Montgelas and his successor built and retained this system through persistent 
challenges to its operation and in a much more generous and broad application than much larger 
states such as Prussia or Austria. The problems faced by such a system are more representative 
of the limitations of state power, the reach of institutional civil bureaucracy, and the 
misapplication of present-day connotations of governmental authority to the early-nineteenth 
century. For these reasons, Bavaria, both as a state in the “third Germany,” and as a European 
power, was responsible for one of the most successful, rapid, and sustained consolidation of 
centralized power and transitions from a semi-feudal economy to one of agricultural land 
designated as private property. 
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